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Somalia + 3 more

Africa: Food crisis worsens Horn of Africa security - 13 Aug 2008

SUBJECT: The effect of a growing food emergency on security in the Horn of Africa.

SIGNIFICANCE: Poverty, drought and food insecurity are well known in the Horn of Africa. This latest emergency occurs at a time of global increases in the price of food and fuel and when regional conflicts threaten to destabilise the region.

ANALYSIS: The sharp increase in food and energy prices globally has hurt the poorest and most food insecure regions of the world particularly hard. According to the US Agency for International Development's latest estimates, as many as 16.3 million people in the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti) are in need of emergency assistance or face food insecurity. Hunger and security. This latest food security crisis arises in a context of increasing tensions within and between the states of the region:

1. Somalia. In Somalia, this is the third year that the rains have failed. The incredible scale of the food security crisis is overshadowed by the humanitarian emergency caused by the brutal insurgency and counter-insurgency which have persisted since early 2007. In June, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the opposition Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) signed a UN-brokered peace agreement in Djibouti. Under the Agreement, the TFG and ARS agreed to end their conflict and called on the UN to deploy an international stabilisation force. However, prospects for such a force are remote, violence continues, and a faction of the ARS based in Asmara has condemned the accord.

An estimated 2.6 million, approaching half of the total population, are at risk. Piracy has limited the shipment of food aid. A series of assassinations of humanitarian workers have further limited the scope of humanitarian assistance. Twenty aid workers have been killed this year and others have been kidnapped. TFG ministers have blamed the attacks on Islamists intent on undermining the Djibouti peace accord. However, the radical al-Shabaab militia has not claimed responsibility, and even the rejectionist ARS faction in Asmara (dominated by Islamists) has pledged to protect aid workers. Somali warlords have found numerous ways to profit from food relief operations and undoubtedly will continue to do so as this emergency escalates. Greater instability supports the agenda of clan-based insurgents and militant Islamist groups seeking to undermine the Ethiopian-supported TFG, which might finally collapse under the additional pressure. In addition, instability might spread from southern Somalia into the relatively stable, semi-autonomous region of Puntland, and into the self-declared republic of Somaliland.

2. Ethiopia. In Ethiopia an estimated 11.8 million people (about 15% of the population) are in need of emergency food assistance. The spring 'belg' rain failed in many parts of the country with drought most severe in the eastern regions. There are pockets of hunger in the southern regions where hail and armyworm infestations have destroyed crops. Annual inflation in Ethiopia rose to over 25% in June, but food prices have risen even higher (78.3% annually). Region 5 in eastern Ethiopia is suffering from a particularly extensive emergency due to fierce conflict between Ethiopian armed forces and the Ogaden National Liberation Front. Human Rights Watch and other monitoring groups report massive human rights violations in the region. The international media cannot gain access to the region and in July, Medicins San Frontieres Switzerland was the latest international non-governmental organisation (NGO) to leave the region.

The ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) party has closed the political opening represented by the competitive national elections in 2005. The boycott of local elections in April and promulgation of a draft proclamation to restrict civil society organisations in July indicate that the regime is intent on deepening its control and denying opposition the ability to mobilise legally. The EPRDF has not faced the kinds of food riots sparked by high prices that have occurred in many countries recently but it will face increased pressures from urban dwellers for relief. Ethiopia is increasingly an urban country and the cities tend to be centres of political opposition, suggesting that the ruling party will face its most significant threats from the urban populations.

3. Eritrea. In Eritrea, a highly militarised state and the continuing conflict with Ethiopia created an economy in shambles. The population now faces drought and rising food prices, driving more and more into extreme poverty and hunger. Little is known about the scale of the emergency in Eritrea, since Asmara has expelled nearly all international NGOs and foreign journalists. However, so long as President Isaias Afewerki can use the threat of an invasion from Ethiopia to justify his harsh military rule, even famine is unlikely to force political change.

4. Ethiopia/Eritrea border. The Algiers peace process that brought the Ethiopia-Eritrea war to an end in 2000 has failed:

- The Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC) dissolved itself in November 2007 without having demarcated the border on the ground, but issuing a 'virtual demarcation'.

- The UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was disbanded when its mandate expired on July 31.

- There is no clear replacement mission or even framework for talks in sight. Neither state was willing to accept even a symbolic UN deployment.

- Eritrean troops have re-occupied the Temporary Security Zone.

- Ethiopia remains in control of areas that the EEBC's demarcation placed on the Eritrean side of the border, including the flashpoint town of Badme.

- In some places, Ethiopian and Eritrean troops are just a few hundred meters apart.

The UN and the rest of the international community have settled into a 'wait-and-see' position as the two parties remain intransigent. Eritrea is steadfast in its commitment to the legitimacy of its position, backed up by international law. Ethiopia clings to the leverage it has by virtue of the de facto situation on the ground and its strong relationship with the United States.

Nevertheless, the underlying stalemate remains stable -- neither Asmara nor Addis Ababa believe they must act immediately. Both regimes perceive that the other is near collapse. Rather than leading to direct confrontation, the border stalemate contributed to clashes in June between Eritrea and Djibouti, which provides Ethiopia's main shipping outlet. Ethiopia and Eritrea will also continue to support opposing sides in Somalia's conflict, as well as to foster insecurity within the other's territory through support of insurgent or opposition groups.

Urban bias. Increasingly, urban areas across the Horn of Africa are affected by hunger as those displaced by rural drought move into the cities and as inflation erodes the urban poor's purchasing power. In Somalia, an estimated 300,000 people have lived for more than a year under plastic tarpaulins in Afgoye, along one of the main roads leading out of Mogadishu, unable to move to a safe refuge. High inflation in Ethiopia has left the very poor unable to turn to the market to meet their basic needs and prevent hunger, and recent attempts to improve the functioning of commodities markets within the country -- such as the commodities exchange launched in April -- are not developed enough to have an impact on the current emergency.

CONCLUSION: The food security outlook in the Horn of Africa has deteriorated severely, with millions at risk. The worst affected areas will be those directly compromised by political instability, in particular the ethnically Somali Region 5 of Ethiopia and the areas of central Somalia -- especially around Mogadishu -- worst affected by the insurgency. However, while the TFG appears even more vulnerable as a result of the food crisis, governments in Ethiopia and Eritrea are likely to weather the emergency.

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