IN THIS ISSUE:
- Reports from Afghanistan indicate growing distress and vulnerability as a consequence of the drought and of the displacement brought on by the conflict.
- The destruction of the Bamyan Buddhas and of many other historical artefacts is confirmed.
- The UN Secretary-General concludes, controversially, that the recent UN sanctions have had only a minimal humanitarian impact.
- Pakistan takes a tougher position on Afghan refugees.
The Humanitarian Situation
Reports from across the country indicate very high levels of distress as people are increasingly forced to focus exclusively on their need to stay alive. Although there remain variations from one area to another, the situation is clearly deteriorating in spite of the efforts of humanitarian agencies and in spite of the fact that there has been some rain and snowfall this winter. Reports continue to come in of people endeavouring to survive on wild plants. Stunting amongst children is said to be widespread and TB is on the increase. Survival in parts of Badghis, Badakshan and Ghor is said to be particularly precarious. Indebtedness is a serious problem so that, when food aid is provided, some of it may have to be used to repay debts.
Impact of UN Sanctions
The UN Secretary-General produced a report on 20th March on the humanitarian implications of the UN sanctions imposed in December 2000. This report, which relies heavily on the regular monitoring of prices in particular locations in Afghanistan, concludes that "the humanitarian situation has not been noticeably and additionally affected by the imposition of the new sanctions."
This and other conclusions are potentially of concern in that there is a divergence of view within the aid community as to whether the sanctions have had a significant impact. In part, this divergence of view can be attributed to the fact that, with so many factors influencing outcomes in Afghanistan, it is difficult to establish any precise causality relating to the sanctions. However, the UN report can perhaps be criticised for drawing conclusions too soon and on the basis of relatively few indicators and for appearing to regard as relatively unimportant consequences which others might regard as significant..
The report thus notes that prices have not increased in spite of the fact that the "imposition of additional sanctions on the Taliban movement through resolution 1333 (2000) has been accompanied by instability and the rapid depreciation of the Afghan currency" and that the "depreciation was double the underlying trend". However, it does not consider other factors which may have led prices to remain apparently stable. The potential impact of food aid is, therefore, not noted. It also does not take account of the fact that, with much of the population in a state of destitution, people may have responded to the price rises that were evident in the immediate aftermath of sanctions by reducing their consumption. Decreasing consumption may also be manifest as a result of growing constraints on the ability of people to secure an income because of falling daily labouring rates. An additional factor in reducing demand is the departure of a proportion of the population, notably young men and those fleeing from conflict, to Pakistan and Iran. The report also does not mention an inquiry instituted recently by Pakistan's Central Bank into the increasing use of the Pakistani rupee as the means of exchange in Afghanistan, which is thought to have been an important contributory factor to a 13.3% rise in the rupees in circulation over the past eight months. This would tend to reinforce information from other sources which suggest that there is a pronounced loss of confidence in the Afghani. Although, as the UN report notes, other factors may have led to this loss of confidence, the relationship between the depreciation in the Afghani and the recent sanctions is apparently strong. This near collapse of the national currency will have an inevitable impact on a population that is already living at the margins. The value of what few savings remain at the household level will be seriously eroded and we can expect that it will prove much more difficult to borrow as those in a position to lend money may be increasingly reluctant to do so.
The report, in addition, does not make a connection between the "unusual" level of fighting in central Afghanistan this winter and the one-sided arms ban imposed by the sanctions. In fact, there are strong indications that the opposition have felt encouraged by the one-sided arms ban and that they have been increasing their military capacity. There have been simultaneous indications that the Taliban have been conscripting to a greater degree than before from amongst ethnic minorities which could suggest a wish to further enhance their own military capacity. This may be a factor in of the departure of so many young men, a proportion of whom are said to be leaving in order to avoid conscription. With many people talking of a major summer offensive by both parties to the conflict, we may expect growing displacement, increased constraints on agricultural production and a greater vulnerability of the young men who remain to offers of remuneration or, at least food, in return for active participation in the conflict. A significant increase in the scale of the conflict, with so much of the population living at the very margins of survival, could have devastating consequences. The aid community, which is already over-stretched, may find itself witnessing a major humanitarian crisis yet be seriously under-resourced to respond to the level of need. Although such a scenario relates to the future rather than the humanitarian impact of the sanctions to date, which is the subject of the UN report, it is one that needs to be seriously taken on board in the context of considering the humanitarian impact of the sanctions.
It is also important to take on board an apparent strengthening in the position of hard-liners within the Taliban as a consequence of the sanctions. The UN report very much plays down the actual and potential impact of this radicalisation process on the operating conditions of humanitarian agencies. In fact, there are indications from many parts of the country of increasing suspicion towards UN agencies and NGOs, manifested in a greater level of questioning, scrutiny and interference in relation to day to day operations. In such an operating climate, there is a risk that it will become increasingly difficult to run programmes. However, the report is helpful in noting that the Taliban did play a constructive role in the immediate aftermath of the sanctions in ensuring that international staff were protected. The UN also, as noted, took pre-emptive action by withdrawing its staff on a temporary basis and the UN has continued to maintain a tight ceiling on the number of international UN staff permitted in Afghanistan at any one time because of the increased security risks arising out the post-sanctions climate. This may reasonably be expected to affect humanitarian aid programming.
The UN report also appears to attach insufficient importance to the exclusion, by the UN Sanctions Committee, of the vast majority of Afghan non-governmental organisations from the list of recognized humanitarian agencies exempted from the restrictions on those travelling into and out of Afghanistan by air. This exclusion, which is noted but not commented upon, has been used by the Pakistan government to also restrict land travel for these NGOs to and from Afghanistan. Until, as stated, the UN Sanctions Committee has established a new procedure for updating the list of exempted humanitarian agencies and until the Pakistan Government has lifted its restrictions on land travel, it seems premature to conclude that "humanitarian assistance operations have been able to continue largely unhindered by sanctions".
Destruction of Afghanistan's Heritage
Film footage and an arranged visit to the site by journalists have now established beyond doubt that the giant Buddhas at Bamyan have been destroyed. The Taliban have remained unapologetic over the destruction even though they received representations from a major delegation from the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, which included the Grand Mufti of Egypt, Shaikh Nasr Farid Wassel, and many other senior figures in the Islamic world. Shaikh Wassel, speaking at Cairo airport on his way to Afghanistan, said that "from a religious viewpoint it is clear - these statues are part of humanity's heritage and do not affect Islam at all. The proof that these statues have no negative impact on Islam is that throughout Islam's history in Afghanistan they were preserved and no Moslem doctrine has suggested their destruction" The Iranian Parliament expressed its concern that "such anti-Islamic and countercultural acts" would portray "a wrong image of Islam". 'Representations were also made by the Dalai Lama and by important Buddhist states such as Japan, Sri Lanka and Thailand and it is interesting to note that, in spite of its concerns, Japan has announced $6.9m worth of humanitarian aid, stating that it draws a clear distinction between the needs of the population and the actions of the Taliban. Pakistan's Interior Minister, Moinuddin Haider, responded to international pressure by flying to Kandahar on 10th March to urge restraint and the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, used the opportunity of a planned visit to the region to hold talks with the Taliban Foreign Minister, Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil. Appeals to preserve the artefacts were also issued by many Western Governments and by the European Union.
The former King Zaher Shah, also issued a statement, on 5th March, in response to reports that the destruction had already started in which he accused the Taliban of engaging in "anti-national and anti-Islamic activities", adding that the deed was "committed by a regime that is supported by Pakistan's government and imposed on the Afghan nation". This statement represents a departure from his previous neutral stance in relation to the parties to the conflict and may undermine support for the Taliban in those Pushtun areas where Zahir Shah has a traditional following.
UNESCO sent its own envoy, Pierre Lafrance, to hold talks with the Taliban representative in Pakistan, Abdul Salam Zaeef, at the very beginning of March and to visit Kandahar for meetings with the Taliban Foreign Minister. He also visited Jeddah for discussions with Abdelouahed Belkeziz, the Secretary-General of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.
The Metropolitan Museum in New York offered to bring those portable artefacts that the Taliban found unacceptable to the USA, at its own expense, in order to preserve them in the museum. This offer was passed on to the Taliban by Kofi Annan.
There has been much speculation as to the possible factors that led to the decision to destroy all statues in Afghanistan, including pre-Islamic monuments and artefacts in Bamyan, Kabul, Kandahar, Ghazni, Herat and Nangarhar. The Taliban have stated that the decision was taken by a meeting of Ulema and that it was ratified by Mullah Omar. They insist that it was, in no way, a response to external events. This position is consistent with a view held by many commentators that the hard-liners within the movement, including radicals from other parts of the Islamic world, have been able to strengthen their position of late and that they have now been able to achieve an outcome for which they have been pressing for some time.
It can, of course, be reasonably argued that this recent strengthening of the position of hard-liners is a consequence of international hostility manifested in the US air strikes of August 1998 and the two sets of UN sanctions in November 1999 and December 2000. The Taliban leadership is also stated to be concerned that the international community did not respond positively to the ban on opium production imposed by Mullah Omar in July 2000 and that there has not been a greater response to the serious drought in Afghanistan. Taliban representatives making statements to the press have tended to link the destruction of the Buddhas to the willingness of the international community to put resources into the preservation of historical artefacts when, in their view, insufficient resources are being allocated to the drought. It is regrettable that the response to the UN appeal, which is always slow, has been interpreted by the Taliban as a lack of international concern.
International Community's Engagement with Afghan Parties
In spite of the outrage expressed over the destruction of the Buddhas, there remains a broad consensus amongst many governments and amongst humanitarian agencies that a policy of constructive engagement with the Taliban should be maintained. Such a policy fits within the framework established by the UN Security Council that discussions should be held with all parties to the conflict, with a view to achieving a peaceful outcome to the conflict. It is felt that policies which lead to a further isolation of the Taliban will prove to be counter-productive to the efforts of the international community to tackle the major humanitarian needs as well as to address issues such as drugs and terrorism.
It was interesting, in this context, to note that the US Government permitted a representative of the Taliban to spend a month in the USA shortly after the destruction of the Buddhas to enable him to present Taliban perspectives on the situation to academic and other audiences. Sayed Rahmatullah Hashimi, a key Foreign Ministry Official and adviser to Mullah Omar also held discussions with the US State Department. It is also of interest that the Taliban Health Minister, Mullah Abbas, visited France in February and held talks with the French Government and NGOs. The announcement on 31st March that Ahmed Shah Masoud would address the European Parliament the following week may also be seen within the context of a process of dialogue between the West and the parties to the conflict. However, there are concerns that the tone of the visit might suggest some partiality in relation to the Afghan conflict, a stance which would be inconsistent with the position of the UN Security Council and the EU Common Position.
The policy of constructive engagement will also not be helped by the decision of the Taliban, taken on 14th March, to expel the BBC's Kabul correspondent over the BBC's coverage of the destruction of the Buddhas.
Refugees
The Pakistan Government has demonstrated a pronounced shift in its policy towards Afghan refugees in recent weeks. The refusal of the authorities, on 9th March, to permit UNHCR to continue with the registration of the new arrivals in Jalozai camp has meant that WFP has not been able to distribute food in the camp and the population remains dependent on ad hoc charitable donations. Although conditions in the camp had improved by the end of March, as a consequence of the creation of water distribution points, sanitation tents and health centres, the close proximity of the flimsy plastic makeshift tents to each other and the absence of adequate protection from the intense heat will make people very vulnerable to disease and heat stroke as temperatures rise in the coming weeks. If, as the Pakistan Government is threatening, the refugees from Jalozai are forcibly returned to Afghanistan, they will be, according to UNHCR, potentially at risk under the terms of the 1951 Geneva Convention. Concerns for the protection of this group are linked to other concerns relating to increasing reports that young Afghans are being picked up on the streets of Pakistan and deported to Afghanistan. These reports are particularly worrying in the context of reports which suggest that the Taliban are increasing their conscription amongst ethnic minorities. Of additional concern is the announcement that Nasirbagh camp will close on 31st July because the owner of the land, who bought it some years ago for a housing development, is now demanding his right to use it. There have been conflicting reports as to whether the Pakistan Government will provide alternative accommodation for the current population of Nasirbagh.
It is possible that increasing evidence of drought in Pakistan, combined with a fear that Pakistan might be overwhelmed by the growing number of people in Afghanistan whose situation has become desperate as a result of the drought and the conflict, may have led to this sudden hardening in Pakistan's position. The government may also be concerned that refugees from other camps in Pakistan, for whom day to day survival in the local labour market is becoming increasingly difficult, will also gravitate towards camps where food is being distributed. It is possible that increased donor support for Afghan refugees in Pakistan might result in a more tolerant position but the Governor of NWFP, Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah, is clearly determined to reduce the refugee presence.
Pakistan has continued to demand that provision be made in Afghanistan for those affected by the drought or displaced by the conflict but, although the Taliban authorities were reported by Pakistan's Interior Minister to have agreed to establish camps, UNHCR is not willing to support any move which would result in the return to Afghanistan of those it considers as in need of protection.
Military Situation
There have been reports of increased military activity of late around Bamyan and the conflict in the north-east has continued without any major change in the front lines. However, it is expected that, as stated above, there will be a significant increase in hostilities over the coming months.
Pakistan's Policy
There are indications that, in addition to the heightened international pressure on Pakistan in connection with its alleged support for the Taliban, internal voices are also being raised amid growing fears that the Talibanisation process that is increasingly evident in Pakistan will have serious consequences for the political environment and for the economy.
Speaking at a meeting of the Human Rights Commission on 28th March, the Pakistani journalist, Ahmed Rashid, who has written extensively on Afghanistan, was highly critical of the policy of successive Pakistan governments in relation to Afghanistan. He stated that the various governments had "poured munitions and logistics backing in support of first one and then another Afghan faction" and that "between 50,000 - 60,000" Pakistanis had fought in Afghanistan. He added that "Pakistani munitions have helped destroy Afghan cities and villages and given the justification for other neighbouring countries to do the same." He asked whether Pakistan should "have a policy and a role as a peace maker by treating all Afghan ethnic groups equally, or should we continue to take sides in their war?. I can safely tell you, cut the supplies of military equipment to all sides and the war machines will dry up within months." In concluding, Mr Rashid stated that he would like to "unconditionally apologise" for the "consequences of Pakistan's recent policies in Afghanistan "the deaths of countless Afghans" the destruction of your cities, your culture, your traditions and your freedom to choose your own government."
This report is published by the British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) Project, based at the Refugee Council, London. The Project is funded from a number of sources, including the UK Government's Department for International Development and individual British NGOs operating in Afghanistan. However, the views expressed are those of the BAAG Project and do not represent any official view of its funders.
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