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The Lord's Resistance Army in Sudan: A history and overview

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Abstract

The ongoing peace talks between the Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M) in Juba, the capital of South Sudan, have created renewed international interest in the conflict in northern Uganda. While the negotiations have proved extremely difficult, they have opened up new channels of communication with the LRA. The talks have also allowed the affected population of Eastern and Western Equatoria, South Sudan, to voice their grievances against the LRA and raise questions about the conduct of the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) in Sudan. This study examines the military history of the LRA in Sudan, the current prospects for ending the conflict, and the main challenges facing the peace talks.

I. Introduction

The arrival of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Sudan in 1993-94 marked the beginning of more than a decade of fighting involving Ugandans on Sudanese soil. This development had an impact on both the Sudanese civil war and the war in Uganda, isolating large parts of Sudan's Eastern Equatoria state from outside help and causing thousands to flee. The LRA had ventured into Sudan in the early 1990s to seek refuge from the fighting in Uganda. By 1993, the Sudanese government of Omar al-Bashir had turned the LRA into a signi- ficant actor in Khartoum's efforts to crush the southern rebellion. Moving into the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2005, the LRA became a genuine threat to regional security.

The LRA is one of the most notorious rebel armies in the world. Under the command of Joseph Kony and his second-in-command Vincent Otti, the group has been an armed opponent of the Government of Uganda and President Yoweri Museveni since 1987. Breathtaking brutality, political manoeuvring, and propaganda have marked the conflict on all sides. The LRA has fought this war with ruthless attacks and abductions, and the Government of Uganda has responded with structural violence on a grand scale against the people of northern Uganda.1 Northern and parts of eastern Uganda have been systematically marginalized. Warfare tactics on the government side consisted of forcing the entire population in these areas into so-called protected villages, which are in reality displacement camps with inhumane conditions. This move has destroyed traditional structures and interrupted development (Finnstrom, 2003). Furthermore, there are numerous reports of violence by the Ugandan army against civilians in the region (Otunnu, 2006).

The conflict is also setting precedents in the international justice system. In 2005 the newly established International Criminal Court (ICC) issued its first warrants, selecting Kony, Otti, and three other LRA commanders.2 This heightened international debate about the role of international criminal justice in peace building efforts. Opponents of the ICC see its intervention as the major obstacle to a peace process in Uganda. This is certainly the view taken by the LRA, which argues that the ICC is biased and politically motivated in its pursuit just of the LRA and not of both parties, when many, in fact, see the war as a planned intervention by the Museveni government (Otunnu, 2006). Currently, the question is whether the affected community's quest for accountability is served better through local justice procedures-both traditional and formal-or through an international justice system (Afako, 2006). Both options come with significant challenges. Local traditional justice procedures have not traditionally provided accountability for large-scale atrocities and their suitability for this purpose remains contested (Allen, 2006). At the same time, negotiating a peace deal under the threat of international arrest has proved problematic for the LRA leadership and has divided the international community in its support for a peaceful solution.

It is extremely difficult to obtain factual information about the LRA. Much of the existing voluminous research from northern Uganda is agenda-driven or fails to account for the overlap between LRA and civilian grievances and perspectives. Because research in northern Uganda and, to some extent, southern Sudan requires the cooperation of the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF), information is often coloured by the UPDF's own perspective.

This report is based on focused fieldwork in northern Uganda and southern Sudan in 2005-07. The author conducted face-to-face interviews with a range of Ugandan and Sudanese civilians and community leaders. The military was not present on these occasions and the interviewees were assured of anonymity. Members of the military from both countries, Sudanese politicians, and LRA representatives, including the LRA high command-specifically Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti-were also interviewed.

In describing the history of the LRA/M-UPDF conflict in Sudan and Uganda, this report seeks a balance that has been sorely absent in previous media and academic accounts. That the LRA/M can be seen as having arisen in pursuit of legitimate grievances-which at times have been shared by many communities in northern and eastern Uganda-should in no way be interpreted as a defence of the group's methods and tactics. Part of the story of the conflict, however, hinges on the use of propaganda and access to information; accordingly, this report attempts to separate fact from fiction.