IN THIS ISSUE:
- The Loya Jirga provides an important opportunity for communication across the many divides but delegates leave frustrated that their influence over outcomes has been minimal.
- Hamid Karzai makes a determined effort to ensure that his cabinet and advisors reflect the many interests in Afghanistan, including a strong conservative voice.
- Growing insecurity in the north prompts calls for an extension of the ISAF mandate.
- As donors debate the most appropriate policies to tackle food insecurity in the light of the improved harvest, WFP reports that it faces a continuing shortfall in its requirements.
In assessing the outcome of the Loya Jirga which took place from 11th-19th June, we have good reason to feel positive about its achievements and, at the same time, concerned at the challenges that it has presented. It is thus positive that the event passed off without major incident and that it provided the opportunity for both the power holders and representatives of civil society, including around 200 women, to communicate. It is also positive that the new cabinet includes a number of people who have been active in civil society organisations, including NGOs, and who thus have a long-standing commitment to public welfare. In addition, the new cabinet offers a reasonable degree of continuity, with Hamid Karzai being elected President, thirteen of the thirty one portfolios remaining in the same hands and a further six ministers remaining within the cabinet with new portfolios. Ashraf Ghani, formerly head of the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority, is maintaining the previous momentum to take the development process forward in his new role as Finance Minister. Furthermore, all the major power holders and ethnic groups are represented, both through the ministerial portfolios and through the appointment of five Vice-Presidents. The cabinet contains three women. Hamid Karzai also appointed seventeen advisers in a further effort to ensure that all interests were incorporated.
On the other hand, the Loya Jirga was not given the opportunity to make any decisions beyond the election, by secret ballot, of Hamid Karzai as President. However, this decision was democratic to the extent that two other nominations were put forward, including a female paediatrician responsible for gender issues and health within WFP, by the name of Massouda Jalal, who received 171 votes out of the 1,555 valid votes cast. The Loya Jirga was asked to endorse proposals submitted by Hamid Karzai for senior members of the cabinet but the process did not allow any debate to take place on the names put forward. The names of other members of the cabinet were published subsequent to the Loya Jirga. Efforts to agree on the formation of a legislature failed because of fundamental disagreements as to how the population should be represented. The minorities in the north supported a proposal that each group of ten delegates to the Loya Jirga nominate one member of parliament while the Pushtun element favoured a suggestion that two representatives from each province be chosen. This would have given greater weight to the relatively under-populated rural provinces.
It was also clear that the intimidatory tactics adopted by some power holders during the electoral process were also in evidence at the Loya Jirga. Many of the delegates demonstrated great courage in speaking out on issues they felt strongly about and in verbally challenging those who were felt to have abused their power. There were consequently fears that the delegates who were perceived to have overstepped the mark might be at risk on their return to their home areas.
Members of the Loya Jirga therefore returned home with very mixed emotions. For many, the experience of debating important issues across the many divides engendered feelings of optimism. However, there was much frustration that the Loya Jirga was effectively lending a seal of approval to decisions made elsewhere. Although Hamid Karzai was elected by a large majority, it was clear that there had been much prior manoeuvring behind the scenes, by Zalmay Khalilzad, Special Representative of the US government, and others to ensure that he was selected. Supporters of the former King, Zahir Shah, were clearly unhappy that Mr Khalilzad announced, on the evening before the commencement of the Loya Jirga, that Zahir Shah would not be a candidate for the position of head of state. He thus pre-empted debate on an issue which was already contentious because of calls by Pushtuns and others that the former King should be given real powers. Hamid Karzai's announcement that Zahir Shah would be given the role of Father of the Nation did little to pacify his supporters. The final choice of cabinet members also failed to satisfy those Pushtuns who had been expressing extreme disquiet at the prominent role played by members of the former Northern Alliance in the Afghan Interim Government. The re-appointment of General Fahim in the Defence Ministry, and his designation as Vice-President will not have been well received. Abdullah Abdullah's resumption of the foreign affairs portfolios may also be seen as symbolic, even though he has mixed Pushtun and Tajik parentage, because of his previous long-standing role as spokesman for the Northern Alliance. Younus Qanouni's resignation as Interior Minister in the interests of national unity appears to have turned sour as his successor, Taj Mohammed Wardak, was initially refused entry into the Interior Ministry by its staff. Mr Wardak had recently been appointed Governor of Paktia, having lived in the USA for some time, and was clearly seen as unacceptable by those in the Interior Ministry who had strong links with the former Northern Alliance. It is also interesting that Younus Qanouni felt initially insulted by the offer of the Education Ministry and was only appeased by the additional post of Security Adviser. Dostam has opted not to accept a ministerial post in the new government because, it is reported, he would prefer not to be in Kabul. Ismail Khan is represented through his son, Mir Wais Sadeq, who is the Minister for Air Transport and Tourism.
Aside from the role of Zahir Shah and Pushtun concern over the dominant role of the Northern Alliance, the other contentious issue was the role of Islam in the new state. There was strong pressure from the former President, Burhannudin Rabbani, and others, including his long-standing ally, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf of Ittihad-I-Islami, to adopt Shari'a Law. There was also fierce debate as to whether the title of the Transitional Authority should incorporate the word "Islamic". In the event, this was agreed with the designation of the formal title as The Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan. The re-appointment of Fazul Hadi Shinwari to the post of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who was quoted earlier in the year as favouring the use of the Shari'a punishments, albeit on the basis of stricter safeguards than existed under the Taliban, is indicative of a strong conservative voice. The decision of Hamid Karzai not to re-appoint Sima Samar as Minister for Women's Affairs, who has, instead, been given the leadership of the Human Rights Commission, is said to reflect concerns expressed by conservative elements and the post has been offered to Habiba Sorabi. Such concessions to conservative opinion may be seen as necessary if the new regime is to minimise the risk of a radical backlash. Notwithstanding these concessions, there are fears that radical elements may seek additional outlets for the expression of their views and objectives.
The Loya Jirga may be seen to have thus created an interim government which largely reflects existing power holding arrangements at the local level. It is also a government which is being careful not to disregard Islamic values or conservative opinion. It does, nonetheless, take on board many of the concerns relating to the welfare and rights of the population that have been debated in many circles and the success of the government will very much depend on its ability to achieve a balance between the differing perspectives manifested in the cabinet and the country at large. Its success will also depend on its ability to gradually bring the regional power holders into an acceptance of the value of operating within a national framework and also on its ability to encourage adherence to internationally-accepted standards in relation to human rights.
Economic developments
The carpet industry of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province, which had mushroomed in recent years, has suffered a major downturn as a result of the large-scale return of refugees since March 1st. About half a million Afghan nationals were reported to have been involved in the carpet business. Carpet dealers estimate that 52,000 looms have closed down out of a total of 60,000 and that 75% of the skilled workforce have left. It will, therefore, be interesting to see whether the carpet industry will reach the same scale in Afghanistan.
Among the economic consequences of the return of Afghan refugees has been a halving of rents in the neighbourhoods of NWFP with the highest concentrations of Afghans.
In the context of concerns that the return of around 300,000 Afghan refugees to Kabul will place a heavy strain on the local economy, it is positive to note that the daily wage rate in the capital is now reported as being $4. This compares to a few cents a day a year ago. The growth in the Kabul economy arising from increased trading activity and the presence of the large international contingent has, therefore, been able to more than compensate for the growing demands being made of it.
Security
The deteriorating security situation in the north has prompted calls by the UN and NGOs for an extension of ISAF's mandate to the north of Afghanistan. Particular concerns have arisen following targeted attacks on the personnel, premises and assets of NGOs, including the multiple rape, on June 8th by an armed group, of an expatriate woman employed by an NGO.
The particular incidents documented by Human Rights Watch include:
May 29: armed robbery of international NGO office in Mazar; staff subjected to violence.
June 6: armed robbery of international NGO office in Mazar; staff subjected to violence.
June 8: armed ambush of international NGO vehicle to the west of Khulm, in Balkh Province; expatriate woman gang raped; Afghan staff member subjected to violence; passports and programme money stolen.
June 14: international NGO vehicle fired on at checkpoint in Dehdadi, to the south-west of Mazar, when it failed to stop; one staff member wounded.
June 16: international NGO vehicle fired on, in north-eastern Takhar Province, after refusing request to give a ride to armed personnel; two members of staff wounded.
It remains unclear to what extent these attacks are a result of tensions between the forces of Dostam's Junbesh and Jamiat-i-Islami as opposed to criminal activity.
Human Rights Watch also reported that local commanders from both Junbesh and Jamiat-i-Islami were forcibly recruiting young men into their forces and demanding money from families seeking to avoid such recruitment. It added that both groups were committing abuses in camps for displaced people near Mazar and that Junbesh forces were continuing to engage in targeted violence against ethnic Pushtuns in the north.
UNHCR reports that it "is extremely concerned about escalating violence and deterioration in the human rights situation in some parts of northern and central Afghanistan". It adds: "Scores of attacks against ethnic minorities in Faryab, Balkh and Sar-i-Pul provinces have reportedly resulted in fatalities and destruction of property. There has also been an upsurge in criminal activities - including robberies, rapes and murders. Renewed factional fighting is not only hampering the return of refugees but is also starting to provoke new displacement".
The NGO coordinating body, ACBAR, sent letters to the members of the UN Security Council on 20th June in which it called for their support for the expansion of ISAF forces to Northern Afghanistan. It expressed the view that, until a sufficiently large, equipped and trained national army was in place, an expansion of ISAF offered the only practical hope of a non-partisan security force in such areas. Stating that a limited expansion of ISAF was critical, it noted that the northern areas were in dire need of reconstruction and emergency support. It expressed its fears that, without international intervention, political, factional and ethnic tensions in the North would increase even further.
On 23rd June, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Kieran Prendergast, briefed the UN Security Council on the situation in Afghanistan and asked it "to again consider the possibility of a limited expansion of the International Security Assistance Force to areas outside Kabul."
Britain handed over control of the ISAF forces to Turkey on 21st June. It has withdrawn most of its peace-keeping forces but will retain a limited number of engineers in a support role.
The efforts of Britain, the US, Germany and others to help build a national army and police force have had some success but, in the light of the specific challenges that have been faced, it is felt that it will be many years before fully trained professional forces can provide security across the country. This, of course, assumes that there is a reasonable level of security and of co-operation between the various power holders.
The US envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, admitted, on 14th June, that the USA had enlisted the help of regional warlords in its fight against those thought to be sympathetic to Al-Qaida or the Taliban , thus undermining its efforts to achieve allegiance to a central government. It is also apparent that this resourcing of commanders has created local tensions and led to outbreaks of violence.
The humanitarian situation
One of the dominant issues over the past month has been the stated shortfall in WFP's requirements for the year. In part, this has arisen from the dramatic increase in the number of refugees returning from Pakistan, in particular. However, it is clear that donors have become uneasy about the possible impact of free wheat on the price that farmers can secure for their produce, in the light of declining wheat prices and an improved harvest in many areas. There is also a recognition that traders are now able to reach most districts and are in a position to transport food more cost-effectively than WFP. NGOs are, therefore, being encouraged to use cash for work rather than food for work in their programmes, where they consider this to be appropriate to the local market conditions. It is, nonetheless, acknowledged that, in particularly remote areas, food aid may remain an essential mechanism to ensure survival. The responsibility is left with NGOs to identify such areas, in conjunction with donors and WFP, so that assessments can be made of their relative vulnerability. WFP food stocks are reported to be extremely low in Herat and Quetta, in spite of serious levels of food vulnerability in both catchment areas. WFP has announced a shortfall of 175,000 MT on its planned requirement of 544,000 tonnes for the nine month period from 1st April 2002.
One consequence of the WFP shortfall is that the allocation of wheat within the assistance package given to refugees returning from Pakistan was reduced, in early June, to one-third of its original level, from 150 kg to 50 kg per family.
Refugees
The number of refugees returning from Pakistan under the repatriation programme had reached 1,038,000 by the end of June while the figure for Iran was 88,000.
Since the signing of the repatriation agreement between the governments of Iran and Afghanistan and UNHCR, Afghan refugees in Iran have lost all rights under the 1951 Geneva Convention, rights which those in Pakistan have never enjoyed. Afghans seeking entry to Iran now have to present passports and valid visas. Those entering illegally are dealt with punitively.
The Revolutionary Afghan Women's Association issued a statement on 3rd June in which it expressed its concern over the harassment of Afghan refugees by the Rawalpindi and Islamabad police. It noted that about 2,000 refugees had been arrested, including a large number of children under the age of 15, for not having valid documents and that about 1,200 refugees had been imprisoned. This statement confirms other reports of harassment of Afghan refugees by the Pakistan authorities over the past year or so.
Military developments
US and other coalition forces have continued in their efforts to search out elements thought to be sympathetic to Al-Qaida but the encounters have again been minimal. Britain announced on 18th June that it would withdraw its force of 1,700 Royal Marines from the coalition in July.
This report is published by the British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) Project, based at the Refugee Council, London. The Project is funded from a number of sources, including the UK Government's Department for International Development and individual British NGOs operating in Afghanistan. However, the views expressed are those of the BAAG Project and do not represent any official view of its funders.
For more information, please contact:
The Secretariat, BAAG at Refugee Council,
3 Bondway, London SW8 1SJ
Telephone: 00 44 20 7820 3098/7840 4400
Fax: 00 44 20 7820 3107
Email: baag@refugeecouncil.org.uk