Sudan: JEM assult highlights peace strategy risks - 12 May 2008

EVENT: Rebels of the Justice and Equality Movement on May 10 launched an assault on Omdurman, a western suburb of Khartoum.

SIGNIFICANCE: Omdurman, situated across the Nile from Khartoum proper, is part of the capital's greater metropolitan area. This is the first time a Darfur rebel group has staged an attack on the capital. Government forces defeated the rebels, but their attack highlights a number of concerns for the government and the wider political situation in Sudan.

ANALYSIS: The full details and repercussions of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) attack on Omdurman on Saturday are still emerging. However, the key details and implications are already apparent:

1. Attack. The attack on Omdurman was never going to succeed in toppling the government by force. However, it succeeded to the extent that it presented an audacious and symbolic challenge to the government's control of the capital:

- Objectives. JEM did not expect to capture the capital, but aimed to send a warning to the government and a wider audience, and to test the strength and loyalty of the army and security forces in the capital. JEM has previously staged small attacks outside Darfur, on targets in Western and Northern Kordofan, and it has always held a stronger interest in political change in Khartoum than has the mainstream Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A).

- Methods. The attackers used small groups of vehicles which had crossed from Northern Darfur through Northern Kordofan -- a sparsely inhabited semi-desert region -- during May 8-9. It is likely that these were assisted and perhaps joined by a small number of supporters in Omdurman. The total number of fighters appears to have been in the low hundreds at most.

- Fighting. A small JEM group first tried to attack the Wadi Saidnaya air-force base, about 21 kilometres north of Omdurman (on the west bank of the Nile). After the attack was repelled the rebels drove into Omdurman, where they were eventually stopped by government forces backed up by helicopters.

2. Aftermath. In the aftermath of the attack, each side has made a number of claims and counterclaims, and Khartoum has taken a series of practical measures in an attempt to reassert its control of the situation. However, none of the measures taken so far will have a lasting impact, as they are all tactics that the government has previously used to limited effect:

- Arrests. During and after the attack, the government made a slew of arrests, including it seems of some army officers and Darfurians suspected of having facilitated the rebel attack. It announced a reward of 250,000 Sudanese pounds (125,000 dollars) for information leading to the capture of Khalil Ibrahim the leader of JEM. Notably, on May 12 it arrested Hassan al-Turabi, the influential leader of the opposition Popular National Congress (PNC), and four senior PNC officials. Since Turabi was expelled from the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in 2000, the government has repeatedly arrested and detained him, accusing him of involvement in coup plots and active connections with JEM. Meanwhile state-controlled television showed pictures of purported members of JEM captured in the assault, ostensibly confessing that they had been trained in Chad, and pictures of the corpse of Jamali Hassan Jelaladin, a senior figure in JEM killed in the attack close to Khalil Ibrahim.

- JEM defiance. Since the attack, JEM officials have denied the extent of the casualties Khartoum claims to have inflicted on them. They have already said that said that they are ready to attack again.

- Chad. Immediately after the attack, President Omar Hassan al-Bashir announced that Sudan was once more breaking off diplomatic relations with Chad, accusing it of having aided JEM's attack. Jem denies this, too. Meanwhile, the Chadian ambassador in Washington claimed that Sudanese soldiers had attacked the Chadian Embassy in Khartoum and had taken away documents and computers.

3. Next steps. What the government and the JEM do in the coming weeks and months is likely to determine whether such attacks become more or less likely in the near future:

- Khartoum. Bashir and his government cannot afford to look weak on their own doorstep, especially seeing that they face hostility from many groups. In the near term, Khartoum is therefore likely to step up its military attacks on JEM targets in Darfur, perhaps backing this up by cross-border actions in Chad. At the same time, it is likely to tighten its monitoring of the army and security in and around the capital.

- JEM. The attack on Omdurman was a considerable risk for JEM. Therefore, it may bide its time before attempting further such attacks. However, its ability and interest to carry out attacks outside Darfur is not in doubt.

Implications for Darfur. Beyond its immediate consequences, the attack on Omdurman has a number of implications for Darfur and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA):

- Peace-making. Peace-making efforts for Darfur have been adrift for more than a year and have played into the interests of hardliners in Khartoum. However, the attack illustrates the danger of waiting for an effective peace agreement between Chad and Sudan before seeking an effective peace agreement for Darfur. The attack also illustrates the problem of underestimating the JEM and treating it as merely one of a number of rebel factions in Darfur. As a consequence of the current approach, it is now more difficult to resolve the conflict peacefully than it was before.

- Implications for CPA. The attack illustrates how much is still at stake in domestic politics, despite formal dominance of the NCP and its junior partner in the Government of National Unity, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). With elections due some time in 2009, a wide range of options are on the table for the parties. The SPLM is wary of the possibility of the NCP making an alliance to its disadvantage, before the elections. The Umma Party, the Democratic Unionist Party and the PNC also have yet to decide how to approach the planned elections and are watching each other's behaviour.

Outlook. The attack illustrates that JEM -- in common with the mainstream SLM/A -- will need to be part of any eventual effective settlement of the Darfur conflict, whether that is through a peace agreement, a new political alliance, or another arrangement. The failure to include JEM in the peace process has left the movement free to pursue its agenda unilaterally, thereby adding to the threats facing the CPA. The key benefits that a peaceful settlement would bring would be to improve the situation of displaced Darfurians and reduce the probability of an outcome to the conflict which jeopardised the CPA.

CONCLUSION: JEM's assault on Khartoum did not threaten the government's control militarily. Nevertheless, it illustrates the danger that until JEM -- and the mainstream SLM/A -- have reached a peaceful settlement, the threat remains both to security and to the CPA.