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Congo-Kinshasa: FDLR threat continues in Kivus

SUBJECT: Continued insecurity in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

SIGNIFICANCE: In the four months since the conclusion of the joint Congolese-Rwandan operation against the eastern DRC's largest remaining rebel group, the security situation has once again deteriorated throughout the provinces of North and South Kivu.

ANALYSIS: Following months of set-backs at the hands of dissident General Laurent Nkunda's National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), President Joseph Kabila in mid-December 2008 reached an agreement with Kigali: in return for Nkunda's arrest, the Rwandan Army (RDF) was allowed into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to pursue the Hutu extremist Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR). This led -- following Nkunda's arrest in Rwanda in mid-January (see DRC/RWANDA: Nkunda arrest reshapes regional security - January 26, 2009) -- to a joint military operation between the Congolese Army (FARDC) and the RDF against the FDLR, called Umoja Wetu ('Our Unity'). At its outset, the operation was widely perceived to be a particularly high risk strategy both for Kabila himself, and for the UN's Mission to the Congo (MONUC), which first sanctioned the operation, and later provided logistical support for it (see CONGO-KINSHASA: Kabila pins hopes on security boost - February 25, 2009).

Symbolic successes. However, within a few weeks of its beginning, Umoja Wetu appeared to have registered a number of important successes:

By mid-February, the operation had forced out the FDLR from several of its key positions, especially around the town of Masisi, and the strategically important gold mines of Lubero (both in North Kivu).

In addition, it had resulted in the deaths of at least 100 FDLR fighters, and the surrender -- and repatriation to Rwanda -- of 390 more (out of a total FDLR force of about 4,500). It also led to the recovery of significant stocks of FDLR weaponry.

By late-February, both the FARDC and RDF, and MONUC sources were claiming that the operation had resulted in a significant disruption of the FDLR's command and control structures, and had paved the way for a final defeat of the group.

Moreover, by the time of its official conclusion (on March 3), Umoja Wetu had achieved much away from the battlefield. In particular -- and not least because the operation did end on time, with a complete withdrawal of RDF troops from Congolese territory -- the operation also resulted in a general thawing of relations between Kinshasa and Kigali, to such a degree that the two countries have subsequently agreed to restore full diplomatic ties. In addition, the operation did much to restore the credibility of MONUC -- the reputation of which had been badly damaged by the CNDP's advance across North Kivu in late 2008.

Continued FDLR threat. However, subsequent developments have undermined the apparent success of Umoja Wetu:

Later intelligence assessments revealed that far from breaking down during the fighting, the FDLR's command and control structure in fact functioned perfectly adequately throughout the fighting, with battlefield movements being directly controlled by the organisation's president, Ignace Murwanashyaka, from his base in Germany (via satellite phone).

More significantly, these same assessments further revealed that the FDLR's withdrawal from Masisi and Lubero during the operation had been far from disorganised, and thus probably represented a 'tactical withdrawal'.

As a result, it soon became clear that far from being close to final defeat, the FDLR remained a significant military threat.

This impression was confirmed by a number of additional events:

- Counter-attack. Almost immediately the RDF left Congolese territory, the FDLR began counter-attacking, to regain the territory lost (or given up) in the earlier fighting. By early April, FDLR fighters had launched at least five major assaults, retaking several key positions around Masisi, and reoccupying the Lubero mines. In several instances, these offensives were accompanied by reprisals against civilian populations the FDLR accused of having been 'disloyal' during Umoja Wetu.

- Recruitment. Since early March, the FDLR has also been actively recruiting, in particular through the forced abduction of child soldiers. For example, in late May the group attacked a school in Mera village -- near Kibua, where MONUC has an outpost -- and kidnapped several dozen of its students.

- Local taxation. In addition, it is also now clear that since late February, the FDLR has consolidated its system of local taxation, not least through the expansion of road taxes, and a charcoal tax it levies on villagers living around Virunga National Park.

In response, since early March, the FARDC and MONUC have conducted additional strikes against FDLR positions. In late June, these actions were incorporated into an official operation, called Kimia II.

FARDC integrity challenge. However, the operations since March have been beset by problems, and thus nowhere near as effective as Umoja Wetu. Many of the FARDC units carrying out the operations are constituted of former CNDP cadres who were only integrated into the national army -- through the formal Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process -- following Nkunda's arrest in January. (The DDR process was accelerated following the signing of a peace agreement between the Congolese government and the remaining CNDP hierarchy in late March.)

It is now clear that the integration process ran far from smoothly, and has resulted in a number of problems:

- Parallel command. Although a majority of CNDP fighters have now been integrated into the FARDC -- or else repatriated to Rwanda by MONUC -- the group's old command structure has not been dismantled. As a result, most cadres continue to take orders directly from their former commanders, who thus constitute a de facto parallel command structure within the national army (some reports have even suggested that the CNDP's military chief, General Bosco Ntaganda, is now acting as the de facto deputy commander of the regional FARDC). This has made coordination of FARDC operations against the FDLR particularly difficult.

- Unpaid soldiers. It has further transpired that at the time of their entry into the FARDC, the names of many CNDP cadres were not added to the army's rolls. As a result, as many as half remained unpaid for several months. This has resulted in a wave of mutinies and strikes, and to a number of units refusing their deployments for Kimia II. It has resulted in some desertions, which have included at least some cases of former CNDP fighters defecting to the FDLR.

- CNDP weapons. In addition, it is now clear that that only part of the CNDP's huge weapons stockpile was handed over at the time of the March agreement. As a result, many former CNDP units have been significantly ill-equipped following their entry into the FARDC.

Outlook. When in March, MONUC began receiving the first of the additional 3,085 peacekeepers -- as had been assigned to the force by the UN Security Council in November -- there was a degree of optimism, both within the organisation and among the Congolese, that the FDLR threat might be finally neutralised by the year's end. However, subsequent events have tempered this view, and the current rounds of fighting have displaced at least 35,000 more people (in addition to the 1.4 million already displaced by December 2008).

CONCLUSION: The FARDC's capacity continues to be hampered by insufficient resources and poor integration of former CNDP fighters. The joint operations with MONUC against the FDLR will not significantly improve security without significant security sector reform.

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