EVENT: On June 6, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement reiterated its rejection of the 2008 census results.
SIGNIFICANCE: The census results are an important basis for electoral preparations and future calculations about wealth and development-sharing. With elections looming and the referendum on Southern Sudanese independence due in 2011, pressures on the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement are growing.
ANALYSIS: Elections are required under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and have been scheduled for February 2010. In principle, the elections have the potential to change the shares of power between Sudan's ruling parties and opposition. President Omar Hassan al-Bashir may also be elected for another term as president, despite the arrest warrant for him issued by the International Criminal Court (see SUDAN: Khartoum looks beyond ICC arrest warrant - February 19, 2009). The six-year interim period provided for by the CPA is due to end in July 2011.
Census controversy. In May, the presidency approved the results of the 2008 census, opening the way for the National Elections Commission (NEC) to start demarcating constituencies in preparation for general elections. The census results were endorsed by international monitors of the census. However, officials from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) -- including leader Salva Kiir, the national vice-president -- have repeatedly disputed the results. The dispute is not of immediate consequence now, but may be raised again before or after the elections:
The census found Sudan's total population to be 39 million, of which Khartoum accounts for 5 million, Darfur 7.5 million and Southern Sudan 8.2 million -- equivalent to 21% of the total population, well below the roughly 33% that the SPLM has claimed the south represents.
The former director of the census commission, Awad Haj Ali, said that he believed the census had undercounted Southern Sudanese living in the north, and that their number might be nearer 1.5 million, rather than just 500,000, as found by the census.
Population numbers and distribution are significant as they influence the distribution of electoral constituencies across Sudan and may eventually influence wealth-sharing formulas and the distribution of central government revenues across the country and within the south.
Elections. The elections stand to be the first full general elections since 1986. The NEC has begun preparations and a number of UN and international organisations aim to assist the exercise. However, the challenges of conducting satisfactory elections are formidable, and the implications of the election outcome are hard to predict:
- Challenges. The history of elections in Sudan provides many reasons for concern about how the elections will be conducted. As was highlighted in a recent report by the Rift Valley Institute (a Nairobi-based research organisation), past elections in Sudan have suffered from widespread malpractice, such as ballot-stuffing, intimidation, unequal conditions for campaigning, and blocking of candidates. Logistical challenges are great. There is also a risk of an electoral boycott or a disputed outcome.
- Implications. In principle, the elections could change the balance of power, leading to a new government. At present, the CPA entitles the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) to 52% of executive positions in the "government of national unity", the SPLM 28%, northern parties 16%, and other southern parties 6%, and the same shares apply in parliament. The NCP and the SPLM have not definitively confirmed their plans for contesting the presidency, but Bashir is likely to be assured victory if he runs.
Legal framework. The elections law was passed in July 2008. However, the SPLM and the major northern-based opposition parties have long been seeking revisions to the laws on security and the media. Censorship of newspapers and interference by the state security organisation have become more frequent and are not prohibited by a new press law passed on June 8. The SPLM and opposition parties argue that laws need to be revised to comply with the CPA and to provide for free and fair elections.
The NCP and the SPLM have begun discussions about a referendum law, to govern the referendum on self-determination for Southern Sudan, which under the CPA is due to be held by July 2011. In early June, SPLM Secretary-General Pagan Amum accused the NCP of slowing down preparation of the referendum law and said that parliament should not adjourn until it is complete. However, even if a referendum bill is finalised soon, until elections have been held it is too early to presume much about the referendum.
Tactics. The major political parties are watching each other closely to minimise the risk of losing out to an alliance between rivals. The NCP is in a position of strength, but nonetheless fears the SPLM tactically allying with one or more of the northern-based opposition parties and making it difficult to manage the outcome of elections:
- NCP. The NCP is looking to maintain its hold on government, which it has controlled since 1989. It has grown more confident about handling the threat posed by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the arrest warrant for Bashir. The key figures around Bashir are still presidential assistant Nafi Ali Nafi, Second Vice-President Ali Osman Mohammed Taha, NCP deputy leader Ghazi Salah al-Din Atabani, presidential adviser Mustafa Othman Ismail, and the head of security, Salah Abdallah Gosh (see SUDAN: Ruling party will keep security apparatus close - July 24, 2006; and see SUDAN: Taha faces domestic rivals, despite position - June 7, 2006).
- SPLM. The SPLM has still not fully resolved the tensions between competing as a national party and competing as a party for Southern Sudan. It is preparing to contest elections by itself, but is monitoring the northern opposition parties, because of the risk that they might form a rival alliance with the NCP. It also faces competition from rival parties in the south and the risk of factionalism. On June 6, Lam Akol (a prominent dissident SPLM figure and former foreign minister) announced that he was founding a new political party, the SPLM-Democratic Change (SPLM-DC). Akol is sympathetic to the NCP and has previously defected from the SPLM to the ruling party, before returning to the SPLM.
- Opposition. In late May, 17 opposition parties announced they had formed a 'National Alliance' in anticipation of the elections in 2010. Ostensibly the alliance includes most of the main parties and factions, such as the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Umma Party factions, and the Popular Congress Party (PCP). However, unless a unified political platform or agenda is agreed, the alliance is likely to prove as weak as previous alliances, such as the National Democratic Alliance in the 1990s. The Darfur rebel movements are unlikely to contest the elections unless a political settlement for Darfur is reached.
Outlook. The NCP and the SPLM have a mutual interest in elections, provided that they lead to the continuation of more or less the present power-sharing arrangement (see SUDAN: Interests favour avoiding war, despite new arms - October 21, 2008). However, there is a growing risk of a major crisis, leading to CPA suspension, revision or collapse. A collapse could lead to wider conflict across Sudan, worse than the situation in Darfur and undoing much of the progress in stability and development since 2005:
There are many potential flashpoints, such as arguments about wealth-sharing (nationally or within the south), inter-tribal fighting (seen recently in Jonglei, Lakes and South Kordofan), or a major election boycott.
Europe, the United States, China, the African Union and UN want the CPA to survive and hope that Darfur can be resolved within the framework of continued CPA implementation.
CONCLUSION: Elections in February 2010 are a major challenge for the CPA and stability in Sudan. Political pressures during the rest of 2009 will mount, potentially leading to a new crisis.
Republished on ReliefWeb with the permission of research and consulting firm Oxford Analytica Ltd. Copyright 2007 Oxford Analytica Ltd. All rights reserved. For additional information, please visit Oxford Analytica or write to enoel@oxford-analytica.com
