Executive Summary
The NATO armed forces deployed in Afghanistan cannot accomplish their mission without partnering with governmental bodies and nongovernmental agencies. The achievement of a stable, democratic and self-sustaining Afghanistan requires that the actors within the international community take an approach to rebuilding the country that rejects "go-it-alone" initiatives in favour of cooperation and coordination. This "whole of government" approach focuses on achieving the three broad goals of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS): good governance, security and development. This approach to its mission will enable NATO to withdraw its forces from the Afghanistan theatre in the shortest time possible.
The achievement of good governance in Afghanistan has been complicated by nearly three decades of armed conflict and repeated regime change that virtually destroyed the institutions on which democracy and the rule of law are based: the judiciary, the police, the legislature, the executive, local government and the civil service. Afghanistan has had a constitution and elected president only since 2004 and a parliament only since 2005. The donor nations are providing hundreds of millions of dollars to train judges and lawyers, build courthouses, train the Afghan National Police (ANP) and reform the prisons. But the greatest obstacle to building public trust in the judiciary and the police is widespread corruption, fuelled by a large illegal narcotics industry. Good governance is a product of a legitimate, smoothly functioning political process, in which there is widespread participation from across Afghanistan in terms of standing for political office and casting ballots. NATO forces play a critical role in ensuring high voter turnout by engaging in counter-insurgency operations and protecting the population. Nurturing better governance and the rule of law requires close and effective cooperation between the military and civilian actors. NATO is making a concerted effort to facilitate this cooperation in Afghanistan through development of an information and knowledge management portal, known as the Civil-Military Fusion Center/Civil-Military Overview (CFC/CMO). However, a spokesperson for the Afghan government concludes that better coordination between segments of the international community will not build a functioning police force, legal profession, judiciary and correctional facilities without substantially increased investment by the donor countries.
Good governance, the rule of law and respect for human rights depend upon a high sense of personal safety and national security. While civilian actors play the dominant role in enhancing the governance and development sectors, NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) takes the lead in maintaining and raising the level of security. In 2008 the US military shifted the focus of its counterinsurgency effort from Iraq to Afghanistan. As the numbers of US combat troops fall in Iraq, they rise in Afghanistan. The security strategy calls for "Afghanisation," or the gradual handing over by the international community of the combat and law enforcement responsibility to the Afghan security forces, the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the ANP. While ISAF, under the United Nations mandate, has shouldered the burden of training, equipping and mentoring the ANA, originally the UN assigned the task of upgrading the ANP to Germany. A private contractor, DynCorp, with contracts from the US government, was also a major source for the professionalisation of the largely illiterate national police force. While significant progress has been made in the expansion and effectiveness of the Afghan army, raising the quality of the police has lagged far behind. NATO currently is reviewing all of its options, including taking on a direct role in police training.
There is also a need to strengthen the Afghan Border Police and the Afghan National Directorate of Security. The rise of non-insurgent criminal activity, including the kidnapping industry and the narcotics trade, has made many Afghans feel less secure than they felt before and is undermining public confidence in the government and the international community. There is controversy over whether to arm pro-Western militias to guard communities from insurgents and criminals, a policy strongly favoured by Hanif Atmar, the Minister of the Interior. Funding to do so is available from the USAID-supported Afghan Social Outreach Program. One of the most intractable barriers to better security in Afghanistan is the sanctuary that Taliban militants enjoy in Pakistan. The Pakistani armed forces claim that they lack the capacity to seize control of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the border with Afghanistan. Under the whole of government approach, security – no matter how difficult to accomplish – is a means to the end of better governance and increased social and economic development.
Afghanistan is one of the most impoverished countries in the world, saddled with a poorly performing government and beset by a lack of skilled workers and a legal framework to make the country attractive to foreign investors. The perceived lack of security also fuels the insurgency by undermining public trust and confidence in the constitutional regime. The high rate of unemployment, especially among youth, is another major threat to the regime's legitimacy. The 2006 London Conference led to an agreement between donor nations and the Afghan government, known as the Afghanistan Compact, in which Afghanistan committed to building a democracy and free-enterprise market economy. But economic growth depends upon a robust private business sector, a result that is very difficult to achieve given the perceived insecurity and impunity. Progress has been made, however. In 2001 the per capita annual income was US$70; in 2008 the Ministry of Finance reported a per capita income of US$300. In 2001 only 15,000 Afghans had access to telecommunications facilities; in 2008 more than four million had access to a telephone. In 2001 Afghanistan produced 430 megawatts of electricity; in 2008 it produced 754 megawatts. In January 2009, Kabul for the first time began enjoying 24 hours of electrical power each day.1 In 2001 only about one million boys and no girls went to school. In 2008, 6.2 million children attended school, including two million girls.2 More than 80 percent of the Afghan people now have access to basic health services. A high percentage of children have been immunised, and the number of health clinics and hospitals has grown significantly in recent years.
The impressive strides made on key development indicators do not change the fundamental picture that there is no clear path by which NATO forces can leave Afghanistan in the near future. A concerted effort employing the whole of government approach and enhanced levels of funding on the part of the United States, Canada, their NATO allies and non-allied nations such as Japan and South Korea is needed to bring Afghanistan closer to the point where a NATO exit strategy is feasible. In the meantime, Canadian and US soldiers, trained to close with and destroy the enemy, will continue to build schools, bridges, courthouses, health clinics and cold-storage facilities, in an effort coordinated with civilian aid agencies, the Afghan government and their country's foreign services to shore up the authority and legitimacy of the Afghan government.
