Nigel Nicholson
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Kenya Post Election Violence (PEV) Early Recovery Programme was an ECHO supported response by six international NGOs to the ethnic and political violence which severely affected livelihoods in the Rift Valley, Nyanza and Central Provinces after the disputed national elections in late December 2007. Over 1,200 people died and as many as 500,000 were displaced at the peak of the crisis. These areas are structurally food secure under normal conditions and constitute the 'grain basket' of Kenya. The rationale of the programme was to support the recovery of both rural and urban livelihoods of the worst affected households and host populations through cash transfer projects which would also revitalise local markets and the local economy.
The programme included: three interventions by World Vision (WV), Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and Save the Children UK (SC UK) in Rift Valley Province directly supporting a total of 13,180 households of small-scale farmers most of whom had been displaced and returned; two interventions undertaken in Nyanza Province by CARE and German Agro Action (GAA) directly supporting 7,592 households of predominantly small-scale farmers, but also small business enterprises as well, most of these households had relocated from other areas; and one intervention undertaken by Action Contre le Faim (ACF) that was entirely urban-based providing cash grants to 1,000 households in Nakuru.
Vouchers with either a cash value, or for a predetermined commodity or service, were predominantly used to transfer assets to small-scale farmers and small enterprises (except by ACF in Nakuru). Only SC UK supplemented this with cash for work (CFW) and direct grants to a small number of beneficiaries. Vouchers were either redeemed through agricultural fairs or directly through suppliers registered with the project.
The key findings of the lessons learned study were: (i) not all projects undertook sufficient livelihoods, market and risk analysis through preliminary assessments to adequately inform the interventions; (ii) community-based targeting in collaboration with local authorities was well applied, it took particular account of women-headed households and included host populations; (iii) each organization adopted different amounts and methods for cash transfer and controls demonstrating inconsistency and a lack of inter-institutional learning; (iv) innovative practices using local banking facilities were applied in two cases of urban and rural contexts to very good effect; (v) cost-efficiencies varied considerably between different methods and applications; (vi) less than half the projects were able to effectively respond to the short rains (September/October 2008) and a significant proportion of the cash transfer was deferred until the start of 2009; (vii) beneficiaries appreciated opportunities of choice provided through cash transfer and were very positive about the quality of the commodities; (viii) early indications are that cash transfer has revitalised the livelihoods of the target households, it has not inflated local market prices and it has stimulated local businesses (most of whom were also directly affected by the violence); (ix) project monitoring of inputs has been much stronger than monitoring of results or outcomes (for which baselines were of variable quality) and there is virtually no evidence of corruption or misuse of cash or vouchers; and (x) coordination generally worked well within operational areas, but there was inadequate dialogue and information sharing between project partners for much of the programme cycle.
Overall, the cash transfer delivered to 21,772 households in the two provinces has been a positive experience and critical in supporting the more vulnerable livelihoods of those affected by the post election violence. Cash transfer has empowered beneficiaries (especially women and the less able), communities and local businesses alike. The primary lessons learned are that: (i) assessments (prior to project design and interventions) with sufficient livelihood, market and risk analysis are critical in informing project design and implementation; (ii) the timing of cash transfer interventions in an agricultural economy is in many cases more important than the value of the transfer; (iii) community sensitization and community-based targeting is critical to ensure local ownership; (iv) voucher redemption through retail outlets (such as agro-vets) is probably the most cost-efficient to administer, but (v) agricultural fairs generate more open competition, are easier to monitor and support with technical advice, are the preferred means for voucher redemption by rural beneficiaries and suppliers alike, and would be a better model to scale up; (vi) cash transfer through appropriate local banking systems work very effectively in the urban context and similarly could be scaled up in urban environments; (vii) cash transfer projects can only be effective with decision-making authority devolved to the level of field operations; (viii) the capacity of operational partners in planning, designing and implementing cash transfer projects has to be built conforming to common principles and practice which should be articulated in joint guidelines; and (ix) coordination mechanisms must be established to facilitate cross-institutional learning within and between partners to ensure a more informed and consistent approach.
