Henri Boshoff. Head Peace Missions Programme, ISS, Pretoria
On 2 November the United Nations announced that it is suspending cooperation with units within the Congolese army (FARDC) who are allegedly responsible for the death of over sixty civilians in operations against the Rwandan rebel FDLR.
MONUC has been severely criticised for Operation Kimia 2, the joint operation between MONUC and the FARDC against the FDLR. Since military operations against the FDLR began in January 2009, 800,000 people have fled their homes - the highest number of newly displaced in any African conflict. At least 600 civilians have been killed and thousands of women and girls raped by rebel groups and government forces. The human cost of Operation Kimia clearly outweighs its benefits.
Humanitarian organisations and non governmental organisations earlier suggested that the Congolese government should suspend new offensive operations and focus on consolidating control over those areas that have already been cleared of the FDLR, as well as support from the international community to put in place a more effective counterinsurgency approach that combines military pressure on FDLR leadership with greater incentives for FDLR rank-and-file militia members to lay down their arms and repatriate to Rwanda.
The immediate response from Mr Alan Doss, head of Monuc, at the time, was that the operations was successful and could not be stopped now. During a speech to the Security Council on 16 October he addressed the issue of the FDLR as follows:
- The areas cleared of FDLR presence by the FARDC must be fully secured to ensure continued protection for the population and to allow IDPs to return home.
- Major operations against the remaining FDLR strongholds should be completed as soon as possible with proper regard for the protection of civilians.
- In areas that have been secured the stabilisation effort must be accelerated, giving priority to the control of mining sites to deprive armed elements of revenue backed up by the deployment of armed police and the reconstruction of roads and administrative infrastructure.
- Non-military initiatives designed to encourage defections and surrenders among the remaining FDLR combatants have to be further intensified.
- The discipline of the FARDC and the PNC (the Congolese police), which is itself a vital dimension of protection, requires constant attention to signal that impunity will not be accepted.
In general it sounded good and appears to represent a legitimate effort to address the regional security threat posed by the FDLR as part of a broader diplomatic initiative to mend relations with Rwanda. The biggest threat to Kimia 2 is the 53, 000 soldiers of the FARDC used against the FDLR. The FARDC soldiers used, as part of Kimia 2 had been part of a so-called fast track integration process. In eastern Congo, this “integration” took place with no planning, little outside support, and in the middle of ongoing military operations. Cohesive fighting units could simply not be cobbled together from former adversaries that just weeks earlier been engaged in heavy combat against one another. Integration also occurred without proper monitoring or vetting, allowing known human rights violators to swap one uniform for another. Bosco Ntaganda, a former CNDP commander wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes, is the most notorious example, but not the only one.
The continued impunity throughout the chain of command virtually ensures that the laws of war will not be respected. Furthermore the role of MONUC in this operation in support of the FARDC is questioned. The question often asked is “What will MONUC do in a situation when the Congolese army itself is the most direct threat to the civilian population’? The answer from senior MONUC officials at the time were that they know the FARDC is bad, but the FDLR is even worse, and they should throw their weight behind the lesser evil. That means the international community continues to tacitly accept impunity in Congo and fails to help further establish the rule of law and basic humanitarian norms.
The question could be asked where to now? What is clear is that the current concept of operations to address the FDLR is not working. A possible solution is to change the focus of the operations by identifying priority actions against the FDLR, but not forgetting other issues in the Eastern DRC such as the completion of the DDR process of the Congolese combatants and ensuring governance in the area.
These priority actions against the FDLR need a rethink, focusing on the military capability and the type of operation. One of the options is to establish a task team consisting of a brigade size force from possibly the Southern African Development Community, MONUC and possibly Rwandan advisers. The FARDC at this stage cannot be part of such a force. The military focus must be to identify the leader element within the FDLR and focus on them by using counterinsurgency operation methods. Such a force will need support from the international community to ensure that it is properly resource and funded. It is however important that at the same time other non-military activities against the FDLR continue, such as isolating the FDLR leadership abroad and supporting direct contacts with the FDLR in the DRC. Only such an integrated plan can ensure that the FDLR is dealt with effectively.
