1. The current situation
Overview
After Mugabe's victory in the flawed 2008 presidential election and over a year of power-sharing talks between ZANU-PF and MDC, the formation of a coalition government in February this year gave rise to cautious optimism. Several months later, Mugabe's commitment to the unity government remains in question. Despite small signs of recovery with prices stabilising, schools re-opening and basic stocks returning to shops, the meagre implementation of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and the deteriorating security situation give cause for worry. The international community should get actively involved in Zimbabwe and support the government because failure to do so would only ensure that it collapses and that the military establishment entrenches itself again.
On the political front, tension is rising within the coalition government as the MDC becomes increasingly frustrated by ZANU-PF's refusal to fulfil the terms of the GPA (signed in September last year) and the consequent lack of political progress. This dissatisfaction was strongly expressed on 29 June when MDC ministers boycotted a cabinet meeting that had been unilaterally rescheduled by President Mugabe, taking the opportunity to announce a list of grievances related to ZANU-PF's "unwillingness" to resolve outstanding issues. These grievances concerned ZANU-PF political and economic appointments, Mugabe's failure to convene the National Security Council, and continued harassment and arrests of MDC supporters. Indeed, five members of parliament have been given jail sentences of more than six months, which constitutionally forces them to vacate their seats. Several more MPs also face charges and await trial. This has led the MDC to strongly accuse ZANU-PF of trying to erode the party's narrow majority in parliament.
Some old regime elements seek to cause the new government to fail, out of fear of prosecution, loss of power and its financial sinecures, hatred for Tsvangirai and the MDC or a genuine belief that they are the guardians of the country's liberation. They are thus continuing to provoke and frustrate the MDC, as shown by such actions as continuing arrests and detention of MDC activists, refusal of police to carry out some government orders and efforts to drive out the last few hundred white farmers by continued farm invasions. South Africa, in collaboration with SADC, should negotiate retirement of these hard-line senior security leaders in the lifespan of the inclusive government to counter the greatest stability risk – an attack against Prime Minister Tsvangirai or a military coup.
Under the GPA, the three main political parties (ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M) agreed on a constitutional reform process that should be concluded within eighteen months. To this end a tri-partisan parliamentary commission was formed to prepare a draft, and on 13 July an all-stakeholders convention was held aimed at preparing the grounds for country-wide consultations. Mugabe's ZANU-PF has been pushing for the adoption of a constitution draft known as the Kariba draft which it negotiated with both MDC formations in 2007. The MDC however now state they want to start fresh and consult the population on what it wants. On 29 June the parliamentary select committee for spearheading drafting of the new constitution rejected Kariba as the basis for the new constitution, with co-chair Munyaradzi Paul Mangwana (ZANU-PF) stating that the process needs to be driven by people, not by fixed positions. ZANU-PF responded by threatening to block the process. Most civil society and human rights groups also reject the Kariba draft on the basis that it would leave President Mugabe's powers untouched and would allow him to stay in office for two more terms, and they campaign for a "people-driven process" that would really be all-encompassing.
Amid unrelenting political haggling over the constitution and political appointments, tension and unrest is spreading outside the highest political echelons. While the government announced that 24-26 July would be dedicated to "national healing, reconciliation and integration" - in the first official recognition that there has been violence in the country - this was overshadowed by reports of increasing violence in the countryside. The security environment is reportedly worsening with reports of militias connected to ZANU-PF establishing bases in schools, as they did in the run-up to the second round of elections last year, and violence and intimidation against perceived MDC supporters increasing in villages.
While the humanitarian situation shows signs of improvement, there is still a profound economic crisis that requires urgent measures. For several years, Zimbabwe had the highest annual inflation rate in the world, one that in 2008 had officially reached an inconceivable 231 million per cent. Hyperinflation wiped out savings, while falling production and inability to pay for imports have caused serious shortages of electricity, water, fuel and basic commodities. The Zimbabwean dollar became virtually worthless, and on 12 April 2009, the government announced that it had replaced its use for at least a year, until the economy picks up, with the U.S. dollar and the South African rand. That and other measures have succeeded in halting inflation. The food situation remains dire, however, with some seven million people reportedly having required aid to survive in recent months and humanitarian agencies forced to halve cereal rations to extend stocks due to donor shortfalls. While formerly empty shelves have started to fill again since the currency reform, the number of shoppers with access to foreign currency remains limited, and many basic goods are still out of reach of the poor.
As a result of continued political uncertainty, the international community has been slow to embrace the new government. While there has been some welcome expansion of immediate humanitarian assistance, too many foreign donors — including the United States — are adopting a "wait-and-see" posture towards longer-term financial support for recovery and reconstruction. This approach could doom the new government to failure. In fact, hesitation risks thwarting the very changes the international community is seeking, both by weakening the hand of the MDC and moderates in Mugabe's ZANU-PF party, and by undercutting popular support for the reform process.
It would be premature for foreign governments to remove targeted sanctions — travel bans and asset freezes — against those thwarting the transition, or to adopt a "business-as-usual" posture toward the unity government. But there are actions they can take. Western governments should expand assistance under the "humanitarian plus" strategy that supports revival of the education, agriculture, health and water sanitation sectors. It should go further and also help empower a functioning civil service and legislature, rebuild key infrastructure, and support reform of politicised government institutions, including the judiciary and the police.
Concise monthly summaries of the situation in Zimbabwe are available in Crisis Group's monthly bulletin, CrisisWatch.
