IN THIS ISSUE:
- Final results of the parliamentary and provincial council elections issued
- Suicide bomb attacks amongst continuing pattern of terrorist activity aimed at key target groups
- NATO reflects on plans for ISAF expansion to the southern provinces
- UNODC publishes its 2005 Opium Survey
Elections
The final results of the parliamentary and provincial council elections held on 18th September were announced on 12th November after a delay arising from the need to investigate fraud allegations. From an analysis of the election results, it would appear that the candidates for the provincial councils received a higher level of endorsement than did the parliamentary candidates. Thus, for example, the successful provincial council candidates, between them, received more than 40% of the vote in eleven of the 34 provinces whereas the successful parliamentary candidates benefited from this level of support in only seven of the provinces. In six provinces, the successful candidates for the provincial council elections received more than 50% of the vote. In only two provinces was this the case for the parliamentary elections. The reverse pattern is evident for those receiving less than 30% of the vote.
It is clear from the parliamentary election results that there were some candidates who received a significant level of support. Thus, the leading candidates received more than 10% of the vote in 20 of the provinces and more than 15% of the vote in 9 of the provinces. In only three provinces did they receive more than 20% of the vote, in Uruzgan (where the leading candidate received 35.27% of the vote, albeit out of a voting population of only 35,363), Samangan and Bamyan. Of interest is the fact that Muhammed Muhaqeq would appear to have won solid support from the Hazara population of Kabul in receiving 13.84% of the vote in the capital. In fact, he received the highest number of votes of any candidate in the country, with 52,686 votes. The former President, Burhannudin Rabbani, also did reasonably well in Badakshan with 11.38% of the vote. It is not clear whether the former Interior and Education Minister (and presidential candidate),Yunus Qanouni, would have hoped to receive more than the 8.20% of the vote that he secured in Kabul after a much publicised campaign. It is also unclear whether two other high profile figures, Abdur-Rasoul Sayyaf in Kabul and Hazrat Ali in Nangarhar, would have expected to receive more than the 2.58% and 3.44% of the vote that they received respectively.
It is noteworthy that, in the provincial council elections, Abdul Qadir Dostam, the brother of Abdul Rashid Dostam, received 25.08% of the vote in Jowzjan Province and that President Karzai's brother received 10.56% of the votes in Kandahar. Another brother of the President received 8.25% of the votes in the parliamentary elections in Kandahar.
The contrast between the parliamentary elections and those for the provincial councils is even greater in relation to the successful female candidates. In the parliamentary elections, these received less than 5% of the vote in 21 of the provinces. In 9 of the provinces, the vote was less than 3%. In two, Paktika and Kunar, it was less than 2%. While these two particular provinces have a history of extreme conservatism or Islamic radicalism, it is not possible to determine an obvious geographical pattern for the percentage of votes allocated to the successful female parliamentary candidates across the country. Rather, a pattern seems to emerge of particular female candidates benefiting from a significant level of personal endorsement. Individual candidates did well, for example, in the more conservative provinces such as Nangarhar, Badghis, Daikundi, Farah, Logar, Nimroz, Nuristan, Paktia, Panjshir (with 9.17% of the vote), Parwan, Samangan, Uruzgan, Wardak and Zabul It may, therefore, be a question of personal qualities rather than a geographical or ethnic divide.
In the 13 provinces where the successful female candidates, between them, had more than 5% of the vote, it thus appeared to be the case that there were one or two particularly strong female candidates (Kabul was the exception where each female candidate received about the same percentage as the others). In the seven provinces where the successful female candidates received more than 6% of the vote, the percentages for each individual ranged from 6.45% to 9.17%. In Herat Province, a female candidate received the largest number of votes. It is important to note that 19 female candidates across the country were successful in securing sufficient votes to win seats in parliament without the benefit of the affirmative action provision in the constitution. The remaining 49 successful female candidates depended on the requirement in the constitution that a certain number of seats are specifically earmarked for women. It is also noteworthy that , in 22 provinces, no women would be entering parliament if it were not for this requirement.
With regard to the provincial council elections, only 14 provinces had successful female candidates with a combined total of less than 5% of the vote as compared with 21 in relation to the parliamentary elections. Of these, the vote was less than 3% in 6 of the provinces as compared with 3% in 9 of the provinces for the parliamentary elections. Of the 20 provinces in which the successful female candidates, between them, had more than 5% of the vote, 13 had vote allocations above 6%. These percentages ranged from 6.08% to 14.48%. It is therefore clear that female candidates received a higher percentage of the vote in the provincial council elections. Female candidates won 29 of the 124 seats reserved for them without benefiting from the affirmative-action requirement of the constitution.
In Kunduz and Balkh, individual female candidates for the provincial councils received the highest number of votes among all successful candidates, albeit with only 4.91% and 2.56% respectively. In Ghazni, one female candidate received 4.48% of the votes. However, the prevailing pattern is of the female candidates in each province receiving roughly equal shares of the vote. It is particularly significant that, in Kabul, the female candidates received, between them, 14.48% of the votes without any candidate being obviously dominant.
The relatively even allocation of votes for female candidates in the provincial council elections makes it easier to look for geographical patterns. Certainly, the 8 provinces in which the female candidates, between them, received less than 4% of the vote were all in the south of the country. In all of these provinces, there is a history of Islamic radicalism or extreme conservatism. These include the provinces where the US-led coalition forces are engaged in counter-insurgency operations. In Uruzgan, there was no female candidate for the provincial council election while a single female candidate for the parliamentary election received 6.80% of the vote. In contrast, among the 13 provinces where female candidates received more than 6% of the vote, only three were from the southern provinces.
In looking at the actual number of votes cast in each province, Herat is clearly in the lead, with 517,926 voters out of a population of 822,104 who registered to vote. Kabul came second, with 399,810, followed closely by Nangarhar, with 383,170, and Ghazni, with 378,577. This low result for Kabul was a consequence of low voter turnout in the capital, at 34%, while the turnout in Nangarhar and Ghazni was 48% and 52% respectively. Kandahar, with 188,627 actual voters, also suffered from low voter turnout, at only 25%.
In fact, voter turnout was particularly low in Kabul and the nearby provinces of Parwan, Logar, Kapisa, Panjshir, Laghman and Wardak. This could possibly be attributed to voter apathy, cynicism or disillusionment, along with fears that polling stations could be the targets of terrorist attacks, especially in the capital. A similar pattern of low turnout in the southern provinces of Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul and Helmand is even more likely to be attributable to fears of terrorist activity. In these provinces, the insurgency has been particularly intense.
A poor understanding of the functions of both the parliament and the provincial councils may have combined with security fears to inhibit voter turnout. There are indications, on the other hand, of a determined effort in some provinces to maximize the political weight of their representatives. Turnout was especially high in the provinces of Bamyan and Paktika (at 72%) and above 60% in the provinces of Samangan, Ghor, Takhar, Jowzjan, Paktia, Nuristan, Sar-i-Pul, Faryab, Herat, Daikundi, Badakshan and Kunduz. A possible pattern is of the Uzbek and Hazara populations seeking to remedy what they see as their marginal political and economic status within the country. Within the Pushtun south, the high turnout in the south-eastern provinces of Paktia and Paktika stands in strong contrast to the low to medium turnout elsewhere in the south.
With so many candidates receiving a small proportion of the total votes cast in each province, it is difficult to determine whether this is the outcome of a multiplicity of interests each putting forward their own candidates or whether there has been a degree of orchestration by the dominant power holders in each province to ensure that they have a number of candidates who can be relied upon to protect or further their interests. The emergence of a number of strong female candidates would suggest, however, that individual voters are, to a degree, exercising a free choice in spite of any pressures that they may be under.
The indications are that the conservative voice will be predominant within both the parliament and the provincial councils. Two former Taliban ministers failed to secure enough votes to get elected. However, a few candidates with previous socialist links were successful. A small proportion of the successful candidates could be described as technocrats. The Wolesi Jirga is scheduled to convene on 18th December.
The process of selecting the membership of the Meshrano Jirga, or Upper House of Parliament, has been underway since the results of the Wolesi Jirga and Provincial Council elections were announced. The constitution provides that one third of the seats for the 102-seat Meshrano Jirga are to be filled by candidates selected by the Wolesi Jirga, one third by the District Councils and one third by the President. As the District Council elections have been indefinitely postponed, the Afghan cabinet recently decided to fill the remaining seats by asking the Provincial Councils to select an additional candidate each. Those members of the Provincial Councils who are selected for the Meshrano Jirga are to be temporarily replaced by the candidate of the same gender with the next number of votes. The final list of the members of the upper house selected by the provincial councils was announced on 28th November. These included six women from each of the provinces of Wardak, Sar-i-Pul, Kabul, Badghis, Farah and Nangarhar. There is no obvious geographical pattern in the selection of these candidates. It is therefore likely that the personal qualities of these particular individuals was the determining factor. President Karzai has yet to announce the names of the 34 members that he will appoint.
In response to the election results, separate statements were issued by the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, and the Hisb-e-Islami leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, challenging the legitimacy of the elections and calling for the withdrawal of US-led foreign forces from Afghanistan.
Security
There have been a number of suicide attacks in the past month. These have included the following incidents:
- On 7th November, the governor of Helmand escaped injury when a vehicle packed with explosives was detonated in a suicide attack as he left his vehicle to enter his office in Lashkargah.
- On 14th November, a NATO peacekeeper was killed and two others injured in a suicide attack in Kabul. There are varying reports as to how many civilians were killed in another suicide attack in the capital an hour later. AFP put the death toll for both incidents at nine.
- On 16th November, at least three civilians were killed in Kandahar when a suicide bomber rammed his car into a convoy of US and Afghan forces.
Other nternational peacekeepers have been the victims of terrorist attacks. On 25th November, a Swedish soldier attached to ISAF was killed and three others injured, one of them seriously, in Mazar-i-Sharif when their vehicle was hit by a bomb explosion. Two civilians were also injured.
Civilians perceived as associated with foreign forces have also been vulnerable. On 7th November, two civilians were abducted and later found killed in Uruzgan Province. The Governor of the province advised that they had mistakenly been thought to be interpreters for the US-led coalition forces. Similar incidents in previous months would suggest that such killings are aimed as a warning to the population not to cooperate with international forces.
The pattern already evident of the targeting of construction workers engaged on projects funded by foreign government resulted, on 19th November, in the abduction of an Indian engineer, accompanied by two Afghan bodyguards and an Afghan driver, in the south-eastern province of Nimroz. He was later found dead. The engineer was employed by Border Roads Organisation, an Indian government-owned company, and was working on the construction of the road linking Zaranj to Delaram on the Herat-Kandahar highway. A Taliban spokesmen stated that he had been killed after his company had failed to comply with a 48-hour deadline that it leave Afghanistan.
As in previous months, the police have been a particular target. Among the specific incidents have been the following:
- Five policemen were killed in Deshu District of Helmand Province on 1st November.
- On November 4th, a policeman was killed when a police station was attacked in Abband district of Ghazni Province.
- On 9th November, seven policemen were killed and two abducted, in Kandahar Province.
- On 11th November, two policemen were killed in Helmand and a third in Khost Province.
- Three policemen were killed on 12th November in Helmand when they were ambushed as they were traveling to Lashkargah.
- On 15th November, five policemen were killed in Paktika Province when their vehicle hit a landmine.
- On 23rd November, three policemen were killed in Uruzgan Province.
Others associated with the Afghan government, and even government buildings, have been similarly targeted. Such incidents have included the following:
- On 10th November, the Deputy Governor of the southern province of Nimroz was pulled from his car and shot dead when traveling to a meeting in Kabul aimed to encourage members of the Taliban to cooperate with the government.
- On 11th November, a former district chief was killed as he prayed in a mosque in Helmand.
- On November 26th, 20 rockets hit government buildings in Sharana, the administrative center of Paktika Province. One intelligence official was killed and several buildings were damaged.
ISAF expansion
Discussions are ongoing within NATO as to how to plug the gap left by the planned withdrawal of 4,000 US troops from southern Afghanistan in the spring out of the current US deployment of 20,000. It is far from clear how NATO will address the very complex situation in Kandahar, Helmand and Uruzgan within its peacekeeping mandate as the International Security Assistance Force. Britain and Canada have already committed themselves to play a role within a previously planned expansion of ISAF to the six southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan, Zabul and Daikundi. For some other NATO members, this is proving to be a contentious issue because of the scale of the insurgency in the area, one that would appear to be strengthening, and the power of those linked to the drugs trade. The Netherlands, which had provisionally agreed to take responsibility for security in Uruzgan Province, is now reviewing its plans in the face of internal opposition. Critics are said to be concerned about sending troops into potentially front-line combat operations as opposed to a strictly peacekeeping role. The US has lost 87 soldiers in 2005 out of a total of 186 killed since the 2001 military intervention may be a factor. However, Denmark looks likely to provide a small number of troops in support of the British presence in Helmand.
There has also been controversy over a proposal to have a single command structure for all operations by international forces in Afghanistan. A compromise has been agreed whereby the NATO commander for Afghanistan will have three deputies, one of whom will be accountable both to this commander and to the US-led coalition forces. The UK will take command of ISAF in May under the new command structure. The expansion could involve the deployment of up to an additional 6,000 personnel which would bring the total ISAF deployment to 15,000. Part of the increase will come from Sweden, which will commit more troops when it takes over responsibility from the UK next year for security in Mazar-i-Sharif.
Drugs
The UN Office for Drugs and Crime has published its 2005 Opium Survey. This indicates that the area cultivated has declined by 21% from 131,000 hectares in 2004 to 104,000 hectares in 2005. However, because of favourable weather conditions, the overall yield has increased by 22%, resulting in a fall of only 2.4% in the total production of opium. Production in 2005 is estimated at 4,100 MT as compared with 4,200 MT in 2004. At this level, Afghanistan produces 87% of the world's opium. Opium is grown on 2.3% of the agricultural land.
The drug economy is reported to represent 52% of Afghanistan's Gross Domestic Product and to be valued at $2.7 billion, including both production and trafficking. Based on an increase in GDP from $4.7 billion in 2004 to $ 5.2 billion this year, the total export value of opium has decreased from 61% of GDP to 52%.
The decline in the area cultivated masks a significant change in the distribution of opium production. Thus, while Nangarhar has reduced the area cultivated with opium by 96% and Badakshan by 53%, the area cultivated in Farah increased by 348%, that in Balkh by 334% and the area in Kandahar by 162%. Significant increases were also found in Nuristan, Takhar, Badghis, Sar-i-Pul, Samangan and Nimroz. This has resulted in a regional shift, with the major producing areas now in the southern provinces (an increase of 30% in the combined total opium production in the provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan and Zabul), the northern provinces ( an increase of 106% in the combined total in the provinces of Balkh, Badghis, Faryab, Baghlan, Jowzjan, Sar-i-Pul, Samangan, Kunduz and Bamyan) and western Afghanistan ( an increase of 98% in the combined total in the provinces of Herat, Farah, Ghor and Nimroz).
Helmand is now the largest producer, having a cultivated area allocated to opium which represents 25% of the area cultivated nationally. The three south-western provinces of Helmand, Kandahar and Farah between them contain 47.81% of the area cultivated. The northern provinces listed above contain 27% of the cultivated area, with a particularly large concentration to the immediate north-west of Mazar-i-Sharif. What is particularly significant is that, whereas Helmand has traditionally been the largest producer of opium, the northern provinces only started producing in about the year 2000 and Kandahar and Farah have only recently started to grow opium on any scale. It is also significant that Nangarhar and Badakshan, traditional growing areas, have cut back, massively in the case of Nangarhar.
The UNODC report estimated that 50,000 people were using heroin, 15% of whom were injecting. The highest level of drug use was said to be in Kabul, followed by the provinces bordering Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in the north-west and north of the country.
Aid
Afghanistan and the European Union signed a new partnership agreement on 16th November through which the EU committed itself to provide ongoing support to Afghanistan, with a particular focus on initiatives relating to political and economic governance, the human rights situation, security and counter-narcotics.
The Afghan Government is to present its National Development Strategy at a donors conference to be held in London on 31st January and 1st February 2006. This will comprise a five year programme and will provide a framework for a further commitment by the international community to Afghanistan following the recent completion of the process determined in the Bonn Agreement of December 2001.
Economic developments
Participation in regional cooperation structures has been high on the agenda during November.
It was announced on 6th November that Afghanistan had joined the Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) programme. CAREC now brings together Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The programme was set up in 1997, with the support of the Asian Development Bank, with the aim of strengthening regional economic cooperation through improvements in transport links (especially by road), energy, trade policy and trade facilitation (especially customs cooperation).
On 9th November, the Afghan Government hosted a meeting, in Kabul, of the Economic Cooperation Organisation. The participant states are Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey,Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan,
Afghanistan was also admitted to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) on 12th November. This comprises representatives of India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Nepal and Bhutan and seeks to strengthen economic integration within the region.
On 16th November, the Afghan Minister of Commerce, Hedayat Amin Arsala, announced that Afghanistan had launched its accession process to the World Trade Organisation. It currently has observer status.
An article in the Financial Times of November 23rd reports that the number of mobile phone subscribers in Afghanistan is now over one million. 650,000 of these are linked to Roshan, which has overtaken its main rival, Afghan Wireless Communications Company. The number of subscribers may have increased as a consequence of the recent elections if anecdotal reports that some candidates gave out mobile phones as an inducement to potential voters have any foundation.
A recent article reports that, in addition to the Indian personnel engaged on the construction of the Zaranj to Delaram highway, about 2,000 Indian nationals are working on reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, including the laying of a power line from Pul-i-Khumri to Kabul, an electricity sub station in Kabul and the construction of the Salma Dam power project in Herat Province.
This report is published by the British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) Project, based at the Refugee Council, London. The Project is funded from a number of sources, including the UK Government's Department for International Development and individual British and Irish NGOs operating in Afghanistan. However, the views expressed are those of the BAAG Project alone and do not represent any official view of its funders. In producing this Review, every effort has been made to achieve accuracy, drawing on the many information sources available.
For more information, please contact: The Secretariat, BAAG at Refugee Council, 240-250 Ferndale Road, London SW9 8BB; Telephone: 00 44 207 346 6773; Fax: 00 44 207 346 1140