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The role of the United Nations in Middle East conflict prevention

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By Elizabeth Sellwood

Introduction

Conflicts in the Middle East are of strategic, economic and religious importance to the world's most powerful states. For centuries the region has been at the centre of struggles for religious and economic dominance. In the past decade alone, both the United States and the European Union have invested immense political capital and many billions of dollars in efforts to transform the political and security dynamics of the Middle East.

A number of United Nations peacekeeping and political missions are deployed in this region.1 These missions are mandated by the Security Council to help maintain truces and ceasefires, to report to the Security Council on the actions of the parties, and to employ the Secretary-General's good offices to promote peace, security and the resolution of conflicts. These missions are generally well-resourced and enjoy the political support of member states; but despite these strengths the United Nations is not a powerful political actor in the Middle East. UN missions have no capacity to force recalcitrant parties to take particular courses of action, and cannot by themselves provide financial support or security guarantees. In this tough region, a Security Council Resolution or an intervention by the Secretary-General has less impact than it does in other less politically crowded and strategically important contexts. For this reason, the UN's record in Middle East conflict prevention is in some ways less than impressive: the Organisation has been powerless to enforce numerous Security Council resolutions calling for "Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied" in the 1967 war, "a just settlement of the refugee problem,"2 and for implementation of the Tenet Work Plan, the Mitchell Report recommendations3 and the Roadmap.4 It was unable to stop Israeli attacks on Gaza in early 2009, or force Iran to comply with resolutions relating to its nuclear activities. And the UN could not prevent the "illegal" US invasion of Iraq in 2003.5

The UN's reputation has certainly been damaged by the "gap", as one Arab diplomat put it, "between what the Organisation promises and its ability to make a difference on the ground."6 But while UN missions lack hard enforcement power, the Organisation does have immense scope to intervene in more subtle ways in the Middle East. The UN Security Council, often operating with advice or guidance from the Secretary-General, has a unique capacity to provide legal endorsement and legitimise particular courses of action: to endorse international borders, or to certify (or deny) that an occupation has ended. United Nations political envoys operate under broad mandates and routinely interact with a range of regional parties, often with the support of powerful member states. Meanwhile, UN peacekeeping, humanitarian and political officers are based in the region's most complex and sensitive areas, often in places that are inaccessible to other international actors. Many UN officials have been in post for several years and speak relevant languages. They have regular access to government and security officials, professionals and civil servants, militia leaders, religious authorities, refugees, and thousands of ordinary families. Through these contacts, and via this range of operations, the UN can open doors, initiate discussions, and cross borders in ways that are impossible for many other actors.

United Nations political and peacekeeping missions can deploy their tools most effectively when they are supported by powerful UN member states. The Organisation can be paralysed when there is no consensus among Security Council members. In Middle East peacemaking, the approach adopted by the US has long been of particular importance. We have recently witnessed important changes in the US approach: the Obama foreign policy team have indicated that they wish to work more systematically with international partners, and to adopt a multilateral approach where possible. The US has already made clear its intention to work closely with the UN as it withdraws from Iraq. The new tone adopted by the US Government has already helped to strengthen consensus in international policy coordination bodies such as the Quartet.

This growing international policy consensus regarding conflicts and security threats in the Middle East may enable UN missions in the region to operate increasingly effectively on the basis of their existing mandates. There may, in the coming years, be an increasing international appetite for the UN to take on additional conflict prevention tasks. To use the UN's tools to greatest effect, policy makers inside and beyond the UN need to understand what the Organisation can and cannot do to help prevent conflict in the Middle East.