Development aid has always been subject
to a protracted debate concerning its effectiveness with arguments given
on both sides. A major part of this debate, especially for the period covering
the cold war has been to what extent aid to developing countries is enmeshed
with political and strategic considerations on the part of donor countries.
Humanitarian aid, referring to aid following disastrous events, has mostly
stayed on the sidelines of this discourse, primarily due to the supposedly
moral and humanitarian components that are imbedded in it.
On the face of it, the principles that
underpin the humanitarian and relief sectors, namely proportionality, neutrality,
impartiality and independence should make it less prone to controversy.
However, the increased frequency and destructiveness of natural and man-made
hazards of the last few years have come to question that received wisdom.
In addition, the institutional separation model that characterizes the
relief and development sectors has largely failed in the past, bringing
to the forefront the twin concepts of risk and vulnerability, and the inextricable
links between natural disasters and human development.
As a result, risk reduction has gained
prominence and is increasingly seen, at least in rhetoric, as a critical
component of sustainable development. This is due to the increased recognition
that hazards can be considered an act of nature but disasters are essentially
man-made and are often exacerbated by the development process. Drawing
on recent examples in Ethiopia and Niger, recent floods in Mozambique and
India and the aftermath of hurricane Mitch in Latin America, this paper
will make the point that the set of barriers that impede on risk reduction
financing are mostly related to the perverse incentives-both political
and strategic-that drive donors and aid recipients after the onset of
a natural disaster, and how these impact the perceptions and financing
of risk reduction strategies.