Executive summary
As Afghanistan struggles to stand on its feet, the fragile democratic system is weighed down in corruption, persistent unemployment and rights abuses. The country remains at a dangerous cross roads. Frustration levels are rising and the expectations of the Afghan people remain unmet. This is in a context of extreme poverty, low capacity, deteriorating security and increasing illicit activities. This paper aimed to highlight those aspects of the aid effort that require renewed attention by the international community and the Government of Afghanistan. Whilst the state building agenda is critical, this paper argues that a more flexible, innovative and pragmatic response to Afghanistan's current situation is now imperative for the sustainability of progress made to date, and to build on these efforts. This response should recognise the importance of 'balanced, inclusive and broad based development' and 'meeting immediate needs'. utilization of 'expertise on the ground' to expedite development efforts and to facilitate the expansion of civil society also requires serious consideration. There is a pervasive feeling that 'there is no time to lose', especially if the aid effort is to contribute to sustainable change in Afghanistan.
This paper outlined those areas which require immediate attention if development progress is to be built upon and sustained in Afghanistan. These include reviewing levels of aid, government capacity and absorption (unspent aid), state building efforts and support to service delivery, transition plans for development, regional development, military support and donor support for front line services. This paper is written from the perspective of aid agencies on the ground and does not intend to cover all aspects of international assistance to the government / people of Afghanistan.
1. Inadequate levels of aid
Afghanistan receives a lower proportion of aid per capita than other post conflict nations; it also suffers from donor fatigue. Yet the extreme poverty of the country and unmet needs remain high. Against commonly held views, limited funds are now being disbursed directly to NGOs. With an increase in national programming and contracting in recent years (and decrease in direct grants), over 80 percent of NGO activities are currently tied to government programmes. Afghanistan's core development funds are thus primarily channelled through the Government of Afghanistan's National Priority Programmes (NPPs) with NGOs as key implementing partners. Amongst others, these include the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development's (MRRD) National Solidarity Programme (with over 205 million USD disbursed through NGOs), and the Ministry of Public Health's (MOPH) Basic Package of Health Services (with approximately 100 million USD disbursed through NGOs). However, contracts are often short, with inadequate / insecure funding. They also allow little room for flexibility and innovation. Meanwhile, this funding shift to predominantly government contracts has jeopardised the continuation of some key basic services not covered under the remit of the current government programmes.
2. Limited government and absorptive capacity
Midway through this financial year, the Government of Afghanistan has only spent 23 percent of what it has been granted for the development budget. This is primarily due to i) limited capacity in some ministries to turn plans into resourced programmes, ii) delays in approval processes within and between ministries, and iii) in some cases, delays amongst donors in giving money to the Afghan Government on time. With the exception of a few ministries, there is limited capacity within the government to often turn resources into activities on the ground. Further delays within and between ministries, for example with the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF), are inhibiting the approval of vital contracts, resulting in gaps in critical service delivery, and loss in staff and continuity in programming. Delays by donors and policy fluctuations for national priority programmes, in particular the NSP, are also creating serious bottlenecks and cash flow problems. The implications of these problems are extensive and considerable: NGOs are suffering backlashes in communities as expectations are not met / there are gaps in service delivery. They are also forced to pre-finance operations diminishing NGO enthusiasm for the programme (and in some cases forcing NGOs to pull out altogether). Further, national programme reputations are being jeopardised, communities are left frustrated and security is threatened.
3. Unbalanced state building
Whilst NPPs were designed to 'accelerate Afghanistan from a position of recovery and rehabilitation to that of sustainable development', and have been labelled as 'alternative livelihoods' programmes, they achieve these objectives only in part. They do not meet wider 'livelihoods' needs such as support to agriculture; they also do little to promote the growth of a strong civil society. A broad based and multi sectoral effort is required to meet the multitude of needs of the Afghan people. Whilst the global trend is to move away from NGO service provision, Afghanistan needs to consider its own unique position to meet these basic unmet needs. NGOs can be utilised more strategically to build up both sustainable community and private service provision with linkages to the government. Meanwhile civil society development is severely under-funded. At a time when human rights abuses are widespread and the democratic process still young, donors need to deliberately support NGOs / CSOs in the development of civil society to allow space for voices from civil society and the growth of independent associations / organisations.
4. Unrealistic development transition plans
Current and planned priority programmes aim to integrate community organisations into district, provincial and national development programming. However, this will take many years, and support for these programmes is short-term with inadequate exit strategies. There is also a lack of innovative thinking in terms of planning, coordination, collaboration and linkages between different aid and non-aid actors. As is well known across the developing world, both provincial and district government and local community institutions take longer than one-two years to act independently and to be sustainable. Yet hastened exit strategies are the norm in Afghanistan with little consolidation of programme activities. Civil society service providers are often prematurely expected to deliver essential services, despite having both little capacity and few resources. Planning and consultations with CSOs / NGOs also remain minimal both at a sectoral and national 'home country' level. This is a missed opportunity for Afghanistan to benefit from both technical and in-country expertise. Finally, a lack of cohesion between donor programmes at the provincial and district level is limiting joint planning and coordination.
5. Inconsistent regional development
Donor resources are unevenly distributed across predominantly opium poppy intensive or highly insecure areas in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, sustained development in traditionally peaceful areas is threatened because of weak government capacity and limited funding. International focus on the South and East is creating the false impression that the international community is only interested in insecure areas or those with high levels of opium poppy, triggering perverse incentives. Whilst this is creating inconsistent assistance, there are also absorption constraints. Other provinces which are often teetering on the edge and suffer from instability, or which conversely have shown great potential (and funding has thus been withdrawn) are in the interim ignored, frustrating both the local government and communities alike. Broad based development is critical for balanced development in Afghanistan. It is also critical to demonstrate both the international community, and Government of Afghanistan's commitment to all parts of the country.
6. Problematic development efforts through military forces
The cost effectiveness of aid delivered through military forces has not been assessed against costs of other development actors and sustained monitoring and evaluation has only recently started. Yet there are reports of poor quality outcomes due to the lack of (experienced) oversight and questions raised over cost effectiveness / sustainability. Military actors are not trained in development and their approaches are often undertaken with little community ownership or capacity to support community maintenance over time. Too often quick impact is synonymous with short-term and ineffective assistance. In the case of vaccination programmes for livestock, they can also threaten the privatisation process. These interventions can significantly damage the reputation of genuine aid agencies operating on the basis of community trust and acceptance; it can also threaten their neutrality.
7. Erosion of donor support for services delivered by NGOs
As funding expires for many essential services traditionally provided by NGOs, there is little support in the pipeline to continue to support this front line work. As well as a reduction in rural development programmes, there will also be fewer capable actors on the ground. Whilst NGOs have recognised their changing roles in service delivery, key services still remain absent across the country and communities underserved. NGOs, as key development partners, with valuable sources of knowledge, are a critical cost-effective resource for the international community and the Government of Afghanistan to meet both the gaps in service provision (whilst facilitating the development of local providers), as well as to build up civil society. They currently remain massively underutilized and are relegated to implementing short-term insecure contracts with little funding. It would be a missed opportunity for Afghanistan to lose these key development partners, and a withdrawal of NGOs from the provinces warrants serious attention. A key indirect benefit of their work is the creation of an enabling environment for other actors. Meanwhile, NGOs remain increasingly vulnerable in Afghanistan from their dependence on insecure government programmes, erosion of support for their broader services and increasing insecurity (shrinking the available humanitarian space). British NGOs remain particularly challenged due to little direct support from their national government.
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