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Return to Afghanistan? - A study of Afghans living in Tehran

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Summary

Since the installation of the internationally supported interim authority in Afghanistan in 2003, Tripartite Repatriation Agreements between Afghanistan, Iran and the UNHCR have facilitated the voluntary repatriation of around 770,000 Afghans from Iran. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has legislated to further accelerate repatriation by raising the cost of living for Afghans in Iran. At the time of this research in 2005, approximately one million documented Afghans remained in Iran, with over 95% living outside government settlements known as mehmanshahr. Additionally, up to 500,000 undocumented transitory labour migrants from Afghanistan were working in the agricultural and construction sectors in Iran. This multi-sited study was conducted in Iran in the cities of Tehran, Mashhad and Zahedan, and focused on both Afghan household groups and single labour migrants. The study moves beyond the quantitative data on repatriation and projected return figures to explore the perceptions and concerns of Afghans in Iran about the prospect of returning to Afghanistan or remaining in Iran in the medium term. The intentions and strategies of Afghan respondents living in Tehran can be summa-rised as follows:

Afghan labour migrants in Tehran experienced substantial unemployment and preferred to be working in Afghanistan; household respondents, unlike labour migrants, rarely submitted regular remittances to relatives in Afghanistan, and struggled to sustain their own households in Iran; both study groups (households and single migrants) utilised mainly regional social networks in Iran as safety nets; over two thirds of household respondents did not intend to return to Afghanistan in the medium term; respondents intending to return to Afghanistan planned to do so as intact family groups; households least willing to return to Afghanistan were those resident in Iran for 8 -- 10 years, or over 20 years; housing, health and education facilities as well as employment opportunities in Iran encouraged Afghan households to remain, and the perceived absence of these facilities as well as insecurity in Afghanistan discouraged their return; and respondents could not rely on relatives in Afghanistan to support or sustain their reintegration in the event of return, and regardless of region of origin, respondents aspired to return to Kabul or another major city as they perceived urban centres to be more secure and better resourced.

1. Introduction

1.1 Rationale for the research

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979 -- 89) caused massive migration of some 2.6 million Afghans into Iran. A period of Afghan repatriation from Iran following the withdrawal of the Soviets in 1989 was terminated by the onset of war in Afghanistan in 1991 that endured for the next decade. The period 1991 -- 2001 is characterised by substantial migration (both forced migration and labour migration) of Afghans from Afghanistan to Iran, as well as substantial repatriation (both voluntary and involuntary) of Afghans from Iran back to Afghanistan.

From the 1990s, as a result of domestic economic and social concerns, Iranian refugee policy shifted to emphasise prevention and repatriation.3 Iran's first repatriation programme for Afghans was formalised in late 1992 with the establishment of a Tripartite Commission (comprising Afghanistan, Iran and UNHCR). During 1993, about 600,000 Afghans returned to Afghanistan -- over 300,000 of them under the repatriation program.4 In 1998 -- 99, the Iranian authorities engaged in a parallel deportation campaign of up to 190,000 undocumented Afghans.5

In 2003, following the installation of an internationally supported interim authority in Kabul, the government of Iran signed a revised Tripartite Agreement with the government of Afghanistan and UNHCR to facilitate the voluntary return of Afghans by March 2005. While return to Afghanistan was voluntary, domestic legislation aimed to accelerate repatriation from Iran. In 2003, under Article 138 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran,6 various "regulations on accelerating repatriation of Afghan nationals" were introduced. In 2004, the Iranian government implemented further measures intended to "induce a more substantial level of repatriation of Afghans in 2004" by raising the cost of living for Afghans in Iran.7 These measures included the introduction of school fees for Afghan children at all levels, and the re-registration of all Afghans who had been registered under the 2001 BAFIA exercise (including payment of a US$6 -- 8 fee).

This was the backdrop against which voluntary repatriation of some 770,643 Afghans occurred in the period 1 March 2002 -- 31 October 2004.8 It is also the backdrop against which a little over one million documented Afghans (1,009,354 individuals) remain in Iran including 190,765 households and 113,201 single Afghans,9 and as many as 500,000 undocumented single transitory Afghan labour migrants.10 The scale and speed of the return programme (particularly the period March -- September 2002 when 1.7 million Afghans returned from Iran and Pakistan) provoked discussion about the sustainable reintegration of Afghan returnees.11 A report commissioned by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit during the period of assisted return movement in 2002 drew attention to the lack of sustainability of large-scale and rapid assisted return. The Turton and Marsden report (Taking Refugees for a Ride? The Politics of Refugee Return to Afghanistan, 2002) focused on returnees' internal movement, their continued multi-directional movement across boundaries, and their participation in regional and transnational social networks. The final recommendation of the report made explicit a connection between sustainable reintegration and transnational social networks, proposing "undertaking in-depth, qualitative research to improve our knowledge of refugee decision-making and the regional and transna-tional networks that sustain the incomes of Afghan households and families."

This recommendation laid the ground for the development of AREU's long-term Transnational Networks project, which also coincided with UNHCR's reappraisal of repatriation elaborated in its paper Afghanistan: Challenges to Return (March 2004). The paper acknowledges the need for a new framework for approaching repatriation that is not formulaic, and instead develops context-specific reintegration strategies that take into account the mix of Afghan refugees, asylum-seekers and different categories of economic migrants in Iran and Pakistan. "Repatriation is subject to a diverse array of influences including the original reasons for flight, the differing experiences of exile and displacement, family capital and assets, the motivations and strategy for repatriation, the risks and challenges inherent in return and reintegration in different locations, and the policy and institutional actions that shape the overall return process."12

This case study of Afghans living in Tehran draws on a limited respondent group of 50 households and fifteen labour migrants to explore:

- how respondents perceive their livelihood and other prospects in the event of returning to Afghanistan or remaining in Iran;

- participation in and function of regional and transnational networks;

- processes of decision-making;

- and respondents' current intentions in relation to returning or remaining in the medium term.

The study was preceded by related research undertaken by AREU in the Afghan provinces of Faryab and Herat, and in the city of Kabul, in 2004, and it was undertaken concurrently with related research in Pakistan, and in Nangarhar Province in eastern Afghanistan. Each of these studies aims to enhance understanding and appreciation of transnational networks as a key livelihood strategy, "to support bilateral negotiations, as well as to advise the government of Afghanistan on how to provide minimum standards of security and income of Afghan migrants in the longer term."13

While there is now extensive literature on transnational networks as they relate to migration, until four years ago, little research had been undertaken into regional and transnational social networks between Afghans in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Several recent field-based studies conducted in Afghanistan offer accounts of regional and international mobility and social networks -- providing a context for this study. Alessandro Monsutti's research into remittances among Hazara Afghans14 found that even before the massive return in 2002, the majority of Afghans had returned to Afghanistan at least once, and most households had one or two members abroad. Monsutti claims that many Hazaras:

- move constantly between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran;

- are engaged in multiple registers of solidarity within and outside their own lineage;

- practise a diverse basis of cooperation;

- and remit a large amount of money to Afghanistan.

Elca Stigter's two case studies conducted for AREU in 2004 on the transnational networks and migration of Afghans from Herat to Iran, and from Faryab to Iran, further elaborate the practice of Afghan migration both inside Afghanistan, and across the international border. Stigter makes the important point that return to a country of origin does not necessarily combat insecurity and vulnerability, and that return may "prompt onward passage, leading to a pattern of multi-directional cross border movements."15 Stigter concluded that channels of pre-established transna-tional networks exist between Afghanistan and Iran, and that migration to Iran constitutes a strategy for Afghan men which is both social and economic. Stigter proposes that migration functions as a coping strategy, with remittances covering subsistence costs and debt repayment, as well as contributing to a further accumulation of assets (e.g. mahr, house, land).

One final note on the use of terminology in this report: in the West, the description of an asylum-seeker as a migrant rather than a refugee is considered to deny the "political" character of their claim. The case of Iran complicates this classification. Turton and Marsden make the distinction between refugee status as a legal obligation and the Iranian classification of Afghan as mohajerin or "involuntary religious migrant".16 In 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan coincided with the Islamic Revolution in neighbouring Iran. The Islamic principle enshrined in the Quran 17 of hosting refugees and displaced people was given particular respect in light of the revolution in Iran. The Islamic principle of hijrat asserts that practising Muslims fleeing their own country on the grounds that they are unable to properly practice their faith deserve the noble status of mohajerin. Rather than the simple English translation of mohajerin as migrant or refugee, the term mohajerin refers specifically to an "involuntary religious migrant". Mohajerin were issued with identification cards known as "blue cards", and granted indefinite permission to stay in Iran legally. Until 1995 they had access to subsidised health care and food, and free primary and secondary education.18 After the withdrawal of the Soviets in 1989 and the subsequent civil war between various mujaheddin factions, Afghans seeking refuge in Iran after 1993 were categorised not as mohajerin, but as refugees or panahandegan. After 1993, the Iranian government started issuing temporary registration cards to undocumented or newly arrived Afghans. Whereas "mohajerin" was considered to be an honorable term, "panahandegan", or refugee, was considered to have a pejorative nuance, even connoting impoverishment.19

There is a third and significant category of Afghans in Iran and that is the transitory labour migrant who may cross repeatedly between Afghanistan and Iran, leaving his family behind in Afghanistan. These transitory labour migrants are known in Farsi as kargar-e fasli (seasonal workers) or kargar-e Afghani (Afghan workers), and it has been estimated that more than 500,000 single Afghan labour migrants live in Iran, employed mainly in the agricultural and construction sectors.20

1.2 Main research questions

The Transnational Networks research in Iran comprises studies in twelve neighborhoods in three cities: Tehran, Mashhad and Zahedan. The study collects data on the previous livelihood strategies of Afghans before leaving Afghanistan, the current status of their assets in Afghanistan, and the relations they have sustained with Afghanistan. It also looks at Afghans' current livelihood strategies including their participation in regional and transnational social networks. The research offers insight into Afghan perceptions and plans in relation to their future, and it touches on the projected livelihood strategies of Afghans intending to remain indefinitely in Iran, and the projected livelihood and reintegration strategies of Afghans intending to return to Afghanistan.

The research questions focusing on transnational networks, livelihoods, reintegration and cross-border movement are: With Afghan households that have been based in Iran longer than eight years (both households in a city and households in camps):

- What are the reasons for households remaining in Iran?

- What livelihood strategies do these households have?

- What links, if any, do they have to Afghanistan, and how have these varied over time (e.g. remittances, visits, work)?

How do they see their long-term future in relation to Afghanistan? With transitory labour migrants from Afghanistan living in Iran:

- What is the nature of the life of migrants (both in terms of work and lifestyle), and how is this similar to, or different from, their experiences of life in Afghanistan?

- What are the positive and negative aspects of being migrants (opportunities and constraints)?

- What are the reasons for becoming migrants?

- What are their future intentions in terms of return, mobility etc?

1.3 Methodology

The principal research tool used was an extensive structured questionnaire comprising an introductory sequence of closed questions eliciting demographic data, followed by several sequences of open-ended questions on the subject of migration history, livelihood strategies, social networks and future intentions. The mixed closed and open-ended format allowed for analysis of correlations or relationships between respondents' intention to return to Afghanistan and other factors such as gender, ethnicity, children's educational level and duration of residence in Iran.

Comprising 80 questions, the principal questionnaire was organised in terms of linear time:

- life in Afghanistan before leaving;

- initial arrival to Iran;

- livelihood strategy in Iran and participation in social networks;

- decision-making in relation to returning or remaining;

- and livelihood strategy in the event of return.

An introductory sequence of questions provided demographic data on the region of origin, education, occupation and household structure. The questionnaire was trialled in the interviewers' neighborhoods in Tehran, and it was revised in response to feedback from the interviewers and respondents. Each questionnaire took approximately two hours to complete, and interviewers carried out a total of 50 interviews in four neighborhoods in Tehran: Shahr-e Rey, Bagherabad, Nematabad and Kan. The sample was selected based on the proportion of Afghans living in each of the four neighborhoods. Features that were selected for in the sample included: widows as household heads, ethnicity, age and phases of arrival to Iran (i.e. communist-led coup and subsequent Soviet occupation 1979 -- 89; conflict between the Najibullah government and mujaheddin 1989 -- 1992; interfactional fighting and rise of Taliban 1994 -- 2001; and coalition intervention and overthrow of the Taliban 2001.21

A second open-ended questionnaire that specifically targeted the migration experience of single, Afghan labour migrants in Iran was then conducted with fifteen labour migrants in Tehran. It was assumed that this respondent group would be unlikely to hold residency permits, so respondents were not asked disclose this sensitive information. For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that this group was unregistered, and therefore representative of the large group of undocumented Afghans in Iran. The design for this questionnaire was influenced by data from Stigter's Herat and Faryab case studies, and utilised Alessandro Monsutti's migration time -- place matrix. This second questionnaire comprised 40 questions including an introductory sequence of closed questions eliciting demographic data, followed by several sequences of mixed closed and open-ended questions on the subject of livelihood resources and strategies prior to migration, function of the labour migrant's social network in Iran, remittances and savings, and future migration strategies. Features that were selected for in the sample included: place of origin in Afghanistan and occupation in Tehran.

In Tehran, the two Afghan interviewers (male and female) were Seyed Shia. Given Afghan apprehension that the Iranian government was implementing campaigns to identify and deport undocumented Afghans, the coverage and timing of the research was highly sensitive. The trialling of the questionnaires and training of the interviewers was critical as the project's success depended on the capacity of the interviewers to carry out interviews with sensitivity and tact, and demonstrate trustworthiness in relation to respondents. Interviewers used a snowball technique rather than random sampling, asking willing respondents to refer them to other Afghans. Interviewers also worked through their own networks to identify respondents, and in the case of Tehran this has probably resulted in a higher proportion of tailors interviewed, reflecting the social network of one of the interviewers whose husband is a professional tailor. Interviewers were directed to explain to respondents that the transnational networks study was an international project carried out by research teams in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, funded by UNHCR Geneva, and managed by a Kabul-based research institution, and that in Iran the project was implemented by a team of researchers from the University of Tehran. Interviewers were also directed to advise respondents that every effort would be taken to protect the identity of respondents -- for example, identifying details such as name, street address in Iran, workplace in Iran, and village of origin in Afghanistan would not be recorded, and questionnaires would be coded for identification. Data was collected between February and April, 2005.

Along with the questionnaires, interviewers undertook social mapping of neighborhoods to identify the availability of utilities and services, schools, training centres, mosques, clinics and community organisations. Additionally, research team members made field visits to each of the four neighborhoods in Tehran, holding informal discussions with community figures, and making relevant observations. These field visits often resulted in spontaneous group discussions which were invaluable opportunities to gauge Afghan concerns at the local level.

1.4 Report structure

This report details the findings of the research and presents recommendations arising from these findings. Part 2 sets the context for the report by summarising the history of Afghans in Iran, followed by a selection of respondents' reasons for leaving Afghanistan, and concludes with a description of Iranian government policy towards Afghans from 1979 to the present. Part 3 focuses on households in Tehran comprising Afghan family groups living in Iran for eight years or more. This section provides data on current livelihood strategies and respondents' perceptions of their current situation in Iran compared to their previous situation in Afghanistan. It then examines participation in regional and transnational social networks, including the direction of movement, "objects" circulated, and relationships between senders and receivers. It concludes with a section on decision-making processes, strategies in the event of return to Afghanistan, and aspirations for third-country resettlement. Part 4 focuses on the experiences of transitory single Afghan labour migrants in Tehran who have left their families behind in Afghanistan and live with co-workers, friends or family members in Iran. This section considers the subjects' family histories of migration between Afghanistan and Iran, the impact of migration on their families in Afghanistan, and future migration intentions. Part 5 concludes with a discussion of the research results and patterns in terms of the main research questions.

Notes:

3 Rajaee, p. 62

4 D. Turton and P. Marsden, 2002, Taking Refugees for a Ride? The Politics of Refugee Return to Afghanistan, Kabul: AREU, p. 12

5 US Committee for Refugees in Turton and Marsden, p. 15

6 According to Article 138 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and in conformity with two prior decrees No. H23538T/58858 dated 22.12.1379 (12 March 2001) and No. H26697T/13521 dated 08.04.1381 (28 June 2002)

7 UNHCR Global Report 2003: Islamic Republic of Iran, http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/ opendoc.pdf?tbl=MEDIA&id=40c6d7500&page=home, accessed 2 May 2005

8 UNHCR Kabul, Operational information monthly summary report March 2002 -- October 2004, in E. Stigter, 2005a, Transnational Networks and Migration from Herat to Iran, Kabul: AREU, p. 19

9 Afghan population and family status in Iran as of 1 November 2004, Amayesh and Repatriation databases (note: there are some missing data values in the source).

10 US Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 2004 Country Report, http://www.refugees.org/countryreports.aspx?subm=&ssm=&cid=118, accessed 29 May 2005

11 Turton and Marsden

12 UNHCR, 2005, Afghanistan: Challenges to Return, Geneva, p. 6

13 UNHCR, 2004, Obstacles to Return in Stigter, 2005a, p. 2

14 A. Monsutti, 2004, "Cooperation, remittances and kinship among the Hazaras", Iranian Studies, (37)2, p. 219 -- 40

15 E. Stigter, 2005b, Transnational Networks and Migration from Faryab to Iran, Kabul: AREU, p. 1

16 Turton and Marsden, p. 14 -- 15

17 "The homeland of Islam (dar-al-Islam) is one. It is a homeland for every Muslim, whose movement within [its domain] cannot be restricted...Every Muslim country must receive any Muslims who emigrate thereto, or who enter it, as a brother welcomes his brother: 'Those who entered the city and the faith before them love those who flee unto them for refuge, and find it in their breasts no need for that which had been given them, but prefer the fugitives above themselves through poverty become their lot...'", Quran 59:9 in Rajaee

18 Rajaee, p. 57

19 Complicating this, prior to the 1979 revolution, a small number of Afghan were issued "white cards" stipulating their status as panahandegan (or refugees) entitling them to tax exemption, the right to work, and the right to obtain travel documents (Rajaee, p. 57 -- 8).

20 US Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 2004 Country Report

21 These phases of arrival are elaborated on in UNHCR, Afghanistan: Challenges to Return.

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