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Iraq

The Shi'ite gamble: Rolling the dice for Iraq's future

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Anthony H. Cordesman

It is becoming clearer and clearer that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's offensive in Basra is more of a power struggle with Sadr than an effort to deal with security, 'militias,' and 'criminals.' What is far less clear is how this power struggle will play out, and what its implication will be for the US and Iraq as a whole.

There are three options and none of them have a predictable outcome: First, Maliki can win, defeat Sadr's militia-the Mahdi Army, or Jaish al Mahdi (JAM)-and marginalize the Sadr movement. Second, Maliki can provoke Sadr into open violence and a new form of insurgency. Or, both sides become locked in a lingering intra-Shi'ite power struggle that mixes violence with political power plays.

Maliki's Focus on Sadr

Maliki's effort to suppress the Sadr movement is clear. What is not clear is where Maliki is headed in terms of the overall structure of Shi'ite politics. One can pass over the irony that he obtained the Prime Minister's office largely because Sadr used the votes of his bloc to give him the position once it became clear that his predecessor Ibrahim al-Jaafari would have to leave office.

This, however, leaves many unanswered questions regarding how Maliki's break with Sadr have affected the relationships between Maliki, his relatively small Dawa Party, and main Shi'ite party in the country-the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). There has been a near silence about how Maliki's faction is interacting with the SIIC faction, led by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and his son. It is hard to believe that Maliki acted without some arrangement between Dawa and the SIIC, particularly with the prospects of local and provincial elections at the end of this year and national elections in 2009. But this is Iraq, and almost anything is possible.

So far, Maliki seems to have avoided any challenge to the SIIC and the Badr Organization-the supposedly 'civil' branch of the SIIC that is its de facto militia. Maliki faces the problem that Dawa Party really does not have a meaningful militia of its own. The SIIC, however, not only still has a de facto militia but it controls some elements of the Iraqi Army and substantial elements of the police at the national and provincial levels.

Maliki seems to have been careful to avoid provoking the other Shi'ite parties in ways that might lead to a violent reaction. While he may talk about 'militias' and 'criminals' in a broad sense, almost all reporting to date indicates that he has focused almost exclusively on the Sadr militia and the Sadr faction. He has used largely political means to reign in the smaller Al-Fadhila Party, which split from Sadr and played an important role in controlling the government in Basra. Moreover, he seems to have paid at least some tribal leaders to give him local security forces, at least in the Basra area-using central government funds to create what could become elements of a local security force tied to his control.

The Uncertain Balance of Shi'ite Power

The fate and power structure of the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), the largest party or faction in the government and the Shi'ite Islamist coalition that dominates Iraqi politics, is now unclear. The UIA emerged out of the 2005 election with 4.1 million (48 percent) out of 8.5 million votes cast and with and 140 seats in Iraq's 275-seat assembly. It then included the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, Islamic Dawa Party, Badr Organization, Sadrist Movement, Islamic Virtue Party, and Iraq Organization.

Since that time, the UIA has become increasingly divided, and the Shi'ite leadership has become more fractured. The SIIC's leader, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, is dying of lung cancer, and his son is an unproven leader. The more secular Iraqi National Congress, led by Ahmed Chalabi, is back in the game. Some members of the Sadr faction in the National Independent Cadres and Elites Party may now be aligned with Maliki. It is also worth noting that there are some Sunnis affiliated with the UIA, along with the Turcoman National Front.

The Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and the other senior Shi'ite clerics in the Marja(h), are another uncertain element in this power struggle. Sistani approved the UIA before the election, and his approval played an importance role in the result. His influence may since have declined as Iraq's political leaders have risen in status, but he and the senior clerics still retain great influence.

Sistani has so far seemed to back Maliki after the initial wave of fighting in Basra, Sadr City, and southern cities like Hillah, Kut, Karbala, Najaf, Diwaniyah, Nasiriyah, and Amarah. Sadr had previously said that his militia would disarm if Sistani and the other senior religious leaders said it should. On April 9, Jalal el Din al Saghier, a senior leader of Sadr's rival the SIIC, is reported to have said that Sistani had authorized him to say that Sistani did not sanction the Jaish al Mahdi and called for it to disarm.

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