Joint UNEP/OCHA Environment Unit

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME

UNEP/OCHA ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCIES SECTION

EU/AG/CG IV
27/11/2001 2:24 PM
English only

Core Group of the Advisory Group on Environmental Emergencies

First Meeting

Paris, 5 November 2001

Report of the meeting

The first meeting of the Core Group of the Advisory Group on Environmental Emergencies (AGEE) was convened jointly by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) on 5 November in Paris, France in accordance with the recommendations of the 4^th meeting of the AGEE.
The meeting recognized, with great appreciation, the UNEP Division of Technology, Industry and Economics for hosting the Core Group meeting at its UNEP Paris offices.
The meeting was attended by representatives from Canada, Chile, Egypt, Germany, Jamaica, India, Sweden, and the United States of America. Participating organizations included representatives from the European Commission, and UNEP Division of Technology, Industry and Economics representing the APELL Programme.
The meeting adopted the agenda as identified in document EU/AG/CG I with the requested addition of one agenda item addressing ways in which the Section could become more proactive in the area of response preparedness and response to environmental emergencies.
The meeting was informal in nature in order to foster an open and productive dialogue on the environmental aspects of terrorism. Given the informal nature of the discussion, the meeting was chaired by Ms. Patricia Charlebois of the Joint UNEP/OCHA Environment Unit/Environmental Emergencies Section (JEU/EES) representing the Secretariat of the AGEE, rather than the more formal election process used for full meetings of the AGEE.
The meeting recalled that the establishment of inter-sessional meetings of a Core Group of the AGEE (CG-AGEE) had repeatedly been discussed at previous meetings of the AGEE, and most recently had received support from delegations during the 4th meeting in November 2000. The purpose was to establish a core group that would meet between full AGEE meetings, which take place every two years, to discuss selected issues in greater detail and arrive at clear outcomes/solutions.
The main focus of the first meeting of the CG-AGEE was to address the topic of terrorism, and in particular, to examine the specific elements that make this a unique threat in comparison to other environmental and human threats and the potential role of the Joint Unit in this area.

Update on Joint Environment Unit/Environmental Emergencies Section Activities

Ms. Charlebois briefed the meeting on the activities and achievements of the JEU/EES since the 4^th meeting the meeting. In particular, the meeting was advised of recent restructuring in both UNEP and OCHA resulting in a name change of the Unit on the OCHA side to the Environmental Emergencies Section, while the original name of the Joint UNEP/OCHA Environment Unit has been retained for UNEP purposes. Other highlights included finalization of "Guidelines for Establishing a National Emergency Response Mechanism" and " Guidelines for Assessment following Natural Disasters", the development of rapid environmental assessment guidelines for emergencies, the deployment of a mission to the Philippines to assess environmental consequences from the Payatas dumpsite collapse, and the incorporation of a greater number of environmental experts and trained UNEP staff on the UNDAC Team roster.

Overview of Recent Experiences

Ms. Kathy Jones, United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), opened the discussion by providing a short presentation on the EPA's involvement in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attack in New York City. Ms. Jones reported that at the onset of the event EPA activated their Emergency Operations Centre in Washington, which still remains operational. All East Coast regions were brought in to support the activities of the New York office, which was only blocks from Ground Zero, through the nearby New Jersey office. A Federal On-scene Coordinator (FOSC) was immediately designated and dispatched to the site.

The EPA role was initially anticipated to be small but quickly became quite important as requests for air and water sampling and monitoring were forthcoming. Questions and concerns also arose about debris removal (i.e. contamination, toxic substances). Other areas in which the EPA were involved over the course of the incident were:

Provision of technical expertise and advice regarding office start up and building clean-up following the attack.
The lead for decontamination of rescue workers at the site.
Establishment of a database and development of protocols to standardize monitoring/sampling procedures and track results.
Creation of an integrated database and strategy for communicating monitoring data to the public.
Created model for use in future situations and share with region/local level agencies.
Anthrax threat: EPA played a support role to health organizations. Activities included sampling and decontamination of buildings.

One of the challenges encountered was in managing the large quantity of sampling and monitoring data from various federal, state and local sources, and subsequent risk communication to public of the results. Preparedness activities that have taken place since September 11 have included, among other activities, meetings with high-level chemical industry executives to discuss issues of improved site management and security. With respect to public information access, Risk Management Plans, have been temporarily removed from the Agency web site since September 11. EPA is currently considering how best to make this, and other similar data, available to the public.
A number of important lessons were learned from the event. In particular, pre-established partnerships and relationships are a key component to successful management. In hindsight, exercises should have been played all the way through to allow for more realistic insights on response activities.
Mr. Wayne Bissett, Environment Canada, provided a synopsis of the Canadian involvement following September 11 and the activities undertaken by the Canadian Government in this connection. In all, 140 aircraft and some 12,000 passengers were re-routed to Canada as US air space was closed following the attack. This caused a considerable strain from both a logistical perspective, since some communities were ill equipped to handle so many large aircraft, and from a security perspective. Follow-up activities include a revisiting and strengthening of security nation-wide, the establishment of a scenario matrix, developed interdepartmentally, to serve as a basis for planning at national, regional and local levels. Highlights of the plans and linkages that exist in Canada to cover such events were presented.
Mr. Juergen Wettig, representing the European Commission, provided an update of the EC's current activities for establishing an operational response and rapid deployment mechanism, similar to OCHA's established approach, for-disaster and emergency management occurring within the EU that will also be used in the broader international context. This initiative, which has progressed significantly over the last year, will have strong linkages to the existing structures within the United Nations, and in particular OCHA.
Mr. Wettig also provided a limited synopsis on follow-up activities to the Toulouse incident, since the representative for France was unable to attend the meeting. Though the investigation is still ongoing, the incident is believed to be accidental and not the result of terrorist activities. Follow-up activities include 3 reports. The first, commissioned by the French Ministry of Environment has been completed and is been posted to the Ministry's web site in both english and french (http://www.environnement.gouv.fr/infoprat/Publications/syntheses-ige/2001/1024-explosion-toulouse.htm). Two other reports, one by the French Attorney General's office and a second by Total Fina Elf, the company to which the Toulouse facility belonged, are pending.

The terrorist threat - environmental considerations, response issues, and capacity

As a starting point to the discussion, the threat of NBC incidents (nuclear/radiological, biological and chemical weapons threats) was discussed. Participants noted that while these threats are very real, as evidenced by recent anthrax attacks, sabotage of industrial facilities, or hijacking of industrial chemicals during transportation was also a likely scenario.
The representative of Jamaica highlighted that the Unit must be proactive, rather than reactive, in responding to the new threat. It suggested consultation of a U.S. Congressional report that clearly identified a number of possible scenarios that could be used as an important source of information regarding lessons learned and potential areas of risk. This could serve as the basis from which exercises and risk assessment scenarios could be developed.
The representative from Sweden emphasized the need for an integrated approach to terrorism situations, as well as for more conventional environmental emergencies. The need to plan for the 'worst-case scenario' was emphasised as these incidents occur even if they are unlikely and this focus is particularly important with respect to NBC type threats. He stressed that many of the preparations undertaken in connection with Y2K, as was the case in the US in respect of the 11 September, proved to valuable, for instance, in France during the serious storms of December 1999.
The representative from Egypt raised an important question regarding the development of 'worst-case scenarios' for planning purposes. In particular, he questioned how such scenarios would be defined i.e. universally or different scenarios for different countries/geographical areas. He further underlined the need for clear definition of what constitutes 'terrorism'.
Other participants responded by identifying that some scenarios could be universally applied, while others would need to be developed based on the specific risks identified for a given region/geographical area.
The representative of Chile shared one positive experience in the area of disaster/emergency preparedness that was carried out following large events. The actual event was used to develop the script to test domestic systems and included a blend of participants from various sectors including environmental, private, military, and civil organizations as well as non-government organizations, the Church and international organizations. This proved to be an effective means of incorporating all partners and significantly improving awareness and preparedness to disasters in Chile.
UNEP-DTIE recommended revisiting existing mechanisms and to identify the need for new structures where gaps are found. It was noted that a more concerted effort for addressing the environmental concerns at the earliest possible moment was essential, since these often tend to be
Many participants identified institutional constraints that made incident/crisis management more challenging. Points raised during the discussion included: a split in many countries between disaster management agencies and environmental agencies creating a barrier to an integrated approach to incident management; difficulties balancing and ensuring technical considerations are addressed in a politically charged decision-making environment; institutional turnover causing loss of corporate memory and of lessons learned from important events (e.g. Y2K).
The representative of Jamaica noted that there have been many lessons learned over the years, but many have been lost or temporarily forgotten due to institutional turnover and the passage of time. It was suggested that these lessons need to be revisited and compiled for use within the context of the terrorism issue.
UNEP-DTIE noted the importance of community-level involvement and preparedness in the face of the terrorism threat. It was suggested that the APELL process was an important and useful mechanism for communities to plan and prepare for such threats.
Access to and sharing of credible information during the emergency phase was identified as both a priority but also as a challenge, since it is often difficult to obtain valid information during the crisis phase. This was also identified as a critical requirement in terms of defining the specific skills needed to address potential environmental impacts. Participants suggested that this is would be a key role for the Unit during a terrorist event with environmental impacts.
It was further noted that the best available tool for sharing information was through the use of the web and that this should be maximised to the extent possible.
Participants noted that most of their respective organisations were re-evaluating information currently in the public domain, particularly on the web, and making decisions about restricting certain types of information in the aftermath of the attack. There were mixed views on the recent trend towards restricting or removing information that had previously been in the public domain. Some delegations felt that all information, with the exception of proprietary information, should be available to the public, while other delegations felt that certain restrictions were appropriate, putting the onus on the public to request the information through established 'access to information' channels. All agreed that a balance between transparency and the urge to restrict much information on the basis that it could be used for questionable purposes needed to be achieved.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Terrorism, and the environmental consequences of terrorism, should not be addressed independently, but should be planned for and managed in an integrated manner using standard risk assessment-based methodologies for identifying vulnerabilities and risk to develop appropriate preparedness and response strategies.
Specific recommendations for the JEU/ESS from the meeting included a number of elements. Some related specifically to terrorism and others to the Unit's standard work programme. They are as follows:

Maintain its usual role of information gathering, facilitating and brokering both information and assistance, with respect to prevention, preparedness and response to the environmental consequences of terrorism.
Serve as a focal point for collecting and collating 'worst case scenarios', and methodologies for identification of vulnerabilities to assist countries in planning for terrorist threats, with the input and assistance of National Focal Points.
Analyse and identify gaps within the international community for addressing the environmental components of terrorism.
Collect information on experiences and lessons learned on past emergencies in order to identify common themes and trends.
Increase the use of the Unit web site to facilitate sharing of information with partners and the general public.