In recent years the epicentre of the crisis in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa has shifted quickly from country to country:
Background
Warning signals of a looming socio-political crisis in eastern Zaire and along its borders with Rwanda and Burundi had been evident ever since the refugee camps were established in the middle of 1994. In early 1996, ethnic tensions broke into violence in Masisi when elements of the Hutu-led ex-Armed Forces of Rwanda (FAR) and the Interahamwe militia joined local Zairians of Hutu origin to attack the local Zairians of Tutsi origin. In October, unrest spread from Uvira to North Kivu province, this time pitting the Zairian Tutsi population against the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ), allegedly supported by armed Hutu elements of the Burundian Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD), as well as the Rwandan ex-FAR and Interahamwe. In November 1996, the Tutsi rebels joined with the Alliance Démocratique des Forces de Libération du Congo-Zaire (ADFL), a political alliance of four Zairian opposition parties forged by Laurent-Désiré Kabila as an instrument to topple President Mobutu. By April 1997, the rebel alliance had gained control of more than half of Zaire including the vital river port of Kisangani and the second largest city, Lubumbashi and was progressing towards the capital Kinshasa, intent on taking control of the entire country.
One of the first steps taken by ADFL was to assume control of the huge refugee camps in Uvira, Bukavu and Goma, along Zaire's borders with Burundi and Rwanda. This resulted in the repatriation of approximately 600,000 refugees back to Rwanda during November 1996, with 150,000 more returning over the following months (see map II overleaf). A similar repatriation movement of 400,000 refugees took place from the camps in Tanzania in December 1996. By January 1997, 1.2 million refugees had returned to Rwanda from Tanzania and Zaire.
This massive return, while a positive development, posed a major challenge for Rwanda. Within two months, 15 per cent of its population had to be reintegrated, straining the political and social structures of the country and complicating its economic reconstruction efforts.
In Burundi, the ongoing political crisis peaked in July 1996 after a coup d'état by Major Pierre Buyoya, the former Tutsi leader who had taken power in 1987 and played a significant role in bringing the country to democratic elections in 1993. Both Hutu opposition groups and extremist elements of the Tutsi minority subsequently intensified their anti-Government activities, first in the countryside and then in the capital, Bujumbura.
Major Buyoya's coup was interpreted in the region and by the broader international community as an anti-constitutional act which could lead to further instability in Burundi. On 31 July 1996, neighbouring countries imposed comprehensive economic sanctions covering food, medicines, medical supplies, agricultural implements, vehicles, spare parts, industrial equipment, supplies and fuel. No exemptions were made on humanitarian grounds. International flights were also affected, resulting in the virtual isolation of the country. The sanctions were substantially relaxed by the Fourth Arusha Summit on the Conflict in Burundi in April 1997 and food and medicines are now exempted.
All observers agree that these interrelated crises in the Great Lakes are in essence, political and that their implications are regional. Thus any outside political initiatives must be crafted for the entire region. A number of peacemaking efforts have been undertaken since 1993 by the United Nations in Burundi and Rwanda, and by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the European Union (EU) and individual countries throughout the region.
After the fighting in eastern Zaire escalated in October 1996, the United Nations sought to address the political aspects of the crisis by appointing Mr. Raymond Chrétien as Special Envoy of the Secretary-General. In November, the Security Council authorized the deployment of a Canadian-led multinational force (MNF) which was intended to facilitate humanitarian assistance, the voluntary repatriation of refugees and the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes (resolution 1080 (1996)). The MNF was not fully deployed, however, partly due to the unexpectedly rapid massive return of Rwandan refugees from eastern Zaire. At the turn of the year, an estimated 400,000 Rwandan and Burundian refugees were believed to have remained in eastern Zaire.
In order to address the escalating fighting in Zaire and the security problems in Burundi, as well as the difficulties experienced by Rwanda in reintegrating the returnees and the risk of further instability spreading throughout the region, the United Nations and OAU Secretaries-General appointed, in January 1997, Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun as their Joint Special Representative for the Great Lakes region. The Security Council subsequently adopted resolution 1097 (1997), containing a five-point peace plan proposed by Ambassador Sahnoun. The plan stipulated:
On 27 March 1997, an OAU summit meeting at Lomé adopted a declaration which, in substance, mirrored the United Nations plan.
Humanitarian needs
The volatility of the conflicts in both Zaire and Burundi, the limited access to affected civilian populations and the deteriorating security situation in western Rwanda have made it very difficult to determine the exact locations and numbers of refugees, IDPs and other war-affected persons in the Great Lakes region and to make comprehensive assessments of humanitarian needs.
However, by April 1997, United Nations agencies estimated that at least 2.9 million Rwandan, Burundian and Zairian persons in the Great Lakes region were in need of external humanitarian assistance to avoid imminent malnutrition or death. Approximately 330,000 refugees from Rwanda and Burundi were still in eastern Zaire, and 16,000 Rwandan refugees in Uganda. About 160,000 Zairian refugees were also scattered in the region and an uncertain number of Zairians was internally displaced. Some 280,000 refugees from Burundi were in Tanzania, and there were an estimated 500,000 IDPs and regrouped people in Burundi. In addition there were 1.4 million recent returnees in Rwanda.
In Zaire, the major humanitarian challenge has been to gain access to the refugees as well as the growing numbers of internally-displaced and war-affected persons. Access to provide humanitarian assistance is limited for several reasons:
Living conditions dramatically worsened for Rwandan and Burundian refugees who lost their main source of subsistence when they left the camps in October/November 1996, as well as for internally displaced Zairians who were forced to leave their land or urban dwellings. There have been disturbing reports of serious human rights violations.
In Burundi, an estimated 500,000 persons are internally displaced or gathered in camps. Additionally, 200,000 Burundians have sought refuge in Tanzania since the 1996 coup, adding to the 70,000 Burundian refugees already there. Some 40,000 are estimated to be in Zaire. The escalating fighting and the negative impact of sanctions have resulted in a rapid deterioration in the living conditions of the civilian population. Even the rural population able to cope more easily than the urban populations at the early stages of the embargo has begun showing increasing signs of malnutrition as agricultural production has decreased. The Burundian Government's policy of forced regroupment of up to 270,000 mainly Hutu civilians from rural areas into camps poses a major dilemma for humanitarian organizations, which find themselves caught between their vocation to assist people in need and their principled opposition to policies which clearly violate human rights. The United Nations has established clear guidelines for the provision of humanitarian assistance to those in regroupment centres which must: encompass only life-sustaining supplies; require independent ongoing needs assessments and monitoring; and stipulate full and free access by human rights observers. In April, the communiqué of the Fourth Arusha Summit on the Conflict in Burundi and resolution 1997/77 of the Commission on Human Rights each condemned the practice of regroupment and called for it to be dismantled.
In Rwanda, in addition to the ongoing needs for humanitarian and reintegration assistance to the 1.4 million recent returnees, longer-term programmes for economic rehabilitation, development and social reconciliation must be mounted if the country's fragile society is to be rebuilt. Repair and construction of shelters, the reorganization of the patrilineal land tenure system so that it can accommodate the needs of the high number of female-headed households, and investment in economic activities that can absorb an excess agricultural labour force are all priority needs. As a necessary precondition for social reconciliation in Rwanda, in parallel with the work of the International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda, an efficient and fair national criminal justice system must be built in order to hold accountable the leaders and perpetrators of the genocide.
The Rwandan Government is preparing an Emergency Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme for submission to the donor community, but, thus far, international funding for such programmes in Rwanda has lagged far behind the requirements. The deteriorating security situation in the western part of the country further jeopardizes the effective use of available resources.
In addition to these needs in the three affected countries, the prolonged presence of refugees and internally displaced persons has imposed severe economic and environmental strains on local communities which have provided asylum. In both eastern Zaire and western Tanzania, large areas have been deforested and local economies disrupted by inflation, competition for resources and other distortions. This has resulted in growing local hostility against the refugees, particularly in eastern Zaire. Uganda also faces the prospect of more Rwandan, Burundian and Zairian refugees spilling over its borders, as do Angola, Malawi and Zambia. Unfortunately, the humanitarian needs in the Great Lakes region are likely to fester and spread until such time as peace settlements are reached in both Zaire and Burundi and social stability is achieved in Rwanda.
Humanitarian response
The continuing crisis in the Great Lakes has required one of the largest international humanitarian efforts in the 1990s. ( See figures 21 and 22 ). Until late 1996, DHA humanitarian coordinators in Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire worked at the country level while operational agencies such as UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP worked both on the country level and on a regional basis. In March 1996, donors which had joined together to analyse the 1994 response of the international community to the humanitarian crisis caused by the genocide in Rwanda, recommended, among other things, that regional humanitarian coordination be strengthened in the Great Lakes ( See box on Lessons from the Rwanda experience ). In November 1996, as the security situation in eastern Zaire rapidly deteriorated and massive outflows began from the refugee camps, on the advice of IASC, the United Nations Secretary-General appointed a Regional Humanitarian Coordinator (RHC) for the Great Lakes. Sergio Vieira de Mello, Assistant High Commissioner for Refugees, initially served in this capacity, followed by Martin Griffiths, Director of DHA, and Pierce Gerety, Regional Representative of UNICEF for the Great Lakes Region. ( See figure 19 )
The RHC has tried to facilitate the work of humanitarian organizations which are facing formidable challenges:
Assisted by a small office in Nairobi, the RHC has contributed much needed strategic guidance for the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinators based in Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire; the United Nations Resident Coordinators based in Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya; and the Regional Representatives from the operational agencies - mainly UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP. The RHC monitors the overall implementation of the regional programme, travelling regularly to negotiate with national and local authorities on access for humanitarian personnel and relief supplies to populations in need.
Given several fatal attacks on humanitarian workers in Burundi and Rwanda, and serious looting in Zaire, the RHC has also brought pressure on national and local authorities to prevent further attacks, and to better ensure the security of relief workers in accordance with humanitarian law. The RHC has raised the concerns of the humanitarian community with United Nations officials, Governments and regional organizations conducting political negotiations in the region particularly the Joint Special Representative of the United Nations and OAU, Ambassador Sahnoun, and the country-based Special Representatives of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General, the High Commissioner for Refugees, and the Emergency Relief Coordinator, Under-Secretary-General Akashi, have frequently pressed for continued access to those in need and for all parties to respect humanitarian principles and law.
At the operational level, DHA works through the existing coordination arrangements of the United Nations agencies. UNHCR coordinates all refugee-related matters, particularly in the border areas of Zaire; WFP coordinates food aid and logistics; and WHO monitors the health status of affected populations.
Many of the mechanisms for emergency coordination available to DHA have been utilized during the Great Lakes crisis:
Given the highly volatile situation in the region, in November 1996, the Secretary-General launched the United Nations Inter-Agency Flash Appeal for Eastern Zaire, seeking US$ 259 million to cover the three month period of November 1996-January 1997. In mid-March, a Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for the Great Lakes Emergency in Eastern Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania for 1997 was launched for US$ 325 million. At the request of the Government of Rwanda, that country was not included in the 1997 regional appeal; the United Nations is consulting with the Government to assist it in meeting Rwanda's current needs.
The appeal serves as a platform for all United Nations agencies and NGOs - UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, FAO, HCHR/CHR, UNESCO, UNV, ICVA and DHA - to appeal for funding of their emergency programmes in a coordinated manner.