In civil conflicts, societies tend to become pervasively militarized. Civilians are deliberately targeted and terrorized to achieve military goals; whole regions or populations are taken over by armed groups whose main motivations are political control and/or financial self-interest; and people of all ages, including the very young, are recruited as fighters.
Much more than a cease-fire is needed to bring sustained peace to societies caught up in civil strife. If functioning political institutions are to be restored, widespread militarization must be reversed. The first stage of such demilitarization is disarmament, followed by demobilization: inducing armed fighters to give up their weapons and to adopt a civilian way of life.
All wars end with some sort of demobilization, however partial. But, in a society torn by internal conflict, ex-combatants must learn to live at peace in the same society with those they have so recently targeted. Although it might seem that allocating substantial resources to demobilizing combatants would be prejudicial to other needy groups, the fates of these larger populations are, over time, closely tied to the success of the demobilization effort. Indeed, many internally displaced persons and refugees have identified demobilization of combatants as a key factor encouraging them to return to their home communities.
Demobilization can only begin once violence has ceased and a peace agreement has been reached. For this, all parties to the conflict must be committed to pursuing their goals through political rather than military means. Equally important, individual fighters must be willing to give up arms as a means of survival and personal gain. If not, they may well resort to banditry or enlist in other armed gangs, even if their leaders are committed to peace. Outside organizations can promote the first of these goals through political mediation and moral persuasion, and the second, through training, education and material assistance to demobilizing soldiers.
A full demobilization generally entails four related phases:
While the international community has recognized the importance of effective demobilization for sustaining peace, implementing such demobilization is a daunting task, for several reasons:
Given the widely recognized need for demilitarization to begin after civil conflicts are brought to an end and the absence of a United Nations or other international organization with the designated responsibility to assist in this area, in certain recent post-conflict situations, DHA has had to take the lead in managing the demobilization process. Its role has been most evident in Angola, since 1995, and in Liberia, since 1996. As of 31 March 1997, demobilization activities are still under way in both countries. The completion of the demobilization and reintegration process will no doubt take several more years. Moreover, the results achieved to date remain uncertain, given the persistence of political tensions and the fragile evolution of political institutions in both countries.
Even at this early stage, however, the differing conditions of demobilization in Angola and Liberia are suggestive:
Hence, these two countries offer two distinct perspectives on the essential process of redirecting a society away from armed strife towards peaceful pursuits.
The resumed fighting soon escalated to full-scale civil war, spreading hunger and disease among millions of Angolans. Recognizing the need for an effective large-scale relief operation, and following a decision of the IASC, DHA established the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) in early 1993 to coordinate the work of humanitarian agencies in Angola. With the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994, these agencies began to shift their attention from life-saving relief activities to the resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons, demobilization and the pervasive anti-personnel land-mine problem.
Angola was the first instance of intensive involvement by DHA in a demobilization process. The Department assumed a central coordinating role because it recognized demobilization as essentially a civilian task. A Demobilization and Reintegration Office was set up within UCAH to organize the contributions of the humanitarian community to this important component of the peace-building process. At the same time, the United Nations peace-keeping operation - the Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) - played key roles: constructing and maintaining the quartering areas for UNITA troops; collecting and registering their weapons; and maintaining a stable security environment in the vicinity of the quartering areas.
While the Lusaka Protocol recognized demobilization as a key to peace, it provided no details about how the process should proceed. It did, however, establish certain basic parameters:
Given the high level of mistrust between the parties, it proved difficult to agree on the location of the quartering areas and to persuade UNITA to begin disarming its fighters (see map VI overleaf). Moreover, the construction of the 15 quartering areas - some in very remote parts of the country - was an extremely challenging task. It was only in November 1995 that the first quartering area was opened, with the rest opening during the ensuing months.
Since the beginning of the quartering process, UCAH has been responsible for designing and managing a comprehensive programme of humanitarian assistance that includes:
This multi-sector programme has been implemented in association with 11 international NGOs which have professional staff working in the quartering areas, and with the assistance of UNICEF, WFP, WHO and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).
To prepare for the return of former combatants and to help them find a stable livelihood in areas of resettlement, the Government reintegration agency, UNDP and UCAH have designed special training and employment projects, as well as counselling and referral services. UCAH's development of a comprehensive database on the socio-economic profiles of the demobilized soldiers has been particularly useful in the reintegration process.
Owing to continuing distrust between the Angolan Government and UNITA, the quartering phase has lasted much longer than the three-to-five months originally anticipated, and the subsequent steps are proceeding extremely slowly. As of 31 March 1997, only 2,100 under-aged UNITA soldiers had been demobilized; 7,800 UNITA soldiers were incorporated in FAA and 18,600 were selected for the FAA, while 18,900 had deserted the quartering areas ( See figure 39 ). The consequences of the high desertion rate cannot be gauged, as the activities of the deserters are not known.
The protracted process has created a serious security risk and delayed withdrawal of UNAVEM III: placing severe financial strains on donor governments and humanitarian agencies. While demobilization is still in an early stage and large parts of the country remain outside the control of the Government, the formation of the new Government of Unity and National Reconciliation on 11 April is a sign of political progress which could translate into progress in demobilization.
Soon after the signing of the Abuja Peace Agreement of August 1995, the IASC requested DHA to establish the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Office (HACO) in Liberia. Given DHA's experience in Angola, it was decided to assign HACO responsibility for demobilization and initial reintegration. A Demobilization and Reintegration Unit was established within HACO to organize the demobilization of combatants and to coordinate programmes to facilitate their return to civilian life.
By March 1996 a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan had been completed. It was to be endorsed by the Liberian National Transitional Government when heavy fighting broke out the next month in Monrovia. Virtually all pre-positioned humanitarian stocks were looted during the subsequent factional fighting in April and May, including those set aside for the demobilization programme, and most of the demobilization staff dispersed.
After the signing of the Abuja II Agreement in August 1996, HACO established a Demobilization and Reintegration Task Force, to ensure a coordinated approach by all concerned. The Task Force includes representatives of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), the Monitoring Group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG) - the subregional peace - keeping force in Liberia, United Nations agencies, donors, Liberian Government authorities, and international and local NGOs. The new schedule of implementation of the peace process provided for disarmament and demobilization to begin in November 1996 and to end on 31 January 1997.
Despite the brief notice and an extreme shortage of personnel, logistical and financial resources, HACO began demobilization as scheduled, diverting all of its international humanitarian staff to the effort during the first few weeks. Demobilizing the fighters entailed:
A total of 15 demobilization sites were used during the demobilization process, each staffed by one international and some 30 national HACO staff. (See map VII.) WFP, UNICEF and WHO provided crucial support and expertise in their respective fields of competence. The number and location of sites changed as the needs of the programme shifted. At the January deadline, ECOMOG announced a short grace period and the process officially ended on 9 February 1997.
As of 31 March 1997, HACO had demobilized 21,315 of an estimated total of 33,000 combatants, including 4,306 child fighters, many of them suffering the effects of narcotic drugs and traumatized by having been forced to commit violent acts. In addition to those demobilized by HACO, ECOMOG reports having disarmed an additional 4,000-5,000 fighters at checkpoints throughout the country, although these fighters were not officially demobilized ( See figure 45 ).
Besides managing the operational aspects of demobilization, HACO has also taken the lead in coordinating initial reintegration of the combatants. These bridging activities, which are implemented by local and international NGOs and United Nations agencies, include civil reconstruction, vocational training and basic schooling. They focus on both combatants and civilians, in order to ensure the earliest possible reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life in their communities. A Funding Panel and an Advisory Board, both chaired by HACO and including United Nations agencies, NGOs and donors, have been established to provide policy guidance, review projects and oversee the day-to-day operation and management of projects.
The demobilization process - which led to the formal disbanding of the factions at the end of February - has improved the security situation throughout Liberia. It is one factor which has contributed to establishing satisfactory conditions for the scheduled elections which are the next phase of the peace process.
It is still too early to draw definitive conclusions from the demobilization efforts in Angola and Liberia, particularly because the crucial reintegration phase has not been started in earnest in either country. This phase will test two design principles that have been incorporated in the current programmes. The first is the importance of developing detailed profiles of the soldiers' socio-economic backgrounds and expectations as a basis for reintegration programmes. The second principle is to integrate assistance for demobilized soldiers with other community development programmes, so as to promote the quickest possible reintegration of former soldiers into civilian life.