C. Management of Relief
This section presents additional findings and recommendations that relate to the management of humanitarian relief assistance to refugees outside Rwanda and to displaced persons and survivors of genocide and violence within Rwanda. These are topics covered by Study III.
While not framed as a finding or recommendation, there is an issue of balance between attention to relief needs of refugees and survivors within the country. Given the refugees' near total lack of resources of their own, it is perhaps understandable that the largest portion of international relief assistance committed for the Rwanda crisis has been allocated to ÒoutsidersÓ rather than to "insiders," even though those in need of relief within the country may have at one point considerably outnumbered those outside. Given both their visibility (e.g. in international media) and immediacy of their needs, international attention focused initially on refugees, then on the internally displaced and finally - and belatedly - on survivors.
While some agencies sought to achieve a balance between humanitarian aid provided to refugees and those in need inside the country, a real problem was that information on the needs of vulnerable groups, such as widows and unaccompanied children, within Rwanda was much poorer than information on needs of refugees. Also, agencies' organizational capacities to serve these needs were generally less well developed, especially in the early months, within Rwanda. By the autumn of 1994 donor attention within Rwanda was shifting from relief to rehabilitation and recovery.
Finding C-1:
Insecurity in Refugee Camps
Physical protection of refugees and displaced persons in camps can be problematic even in "normal" circumstances. In the Rwanda crisis, this issue quickly became of paramount importance. The continued dominance of former commune and other leaders, some of whom were perpetrators of the genocide, and the presence of armed elements in refugee camps, inflicted more trauma, insecurity and diversion of resources destined for bona fide refugees; and posed a security threat to relief agency staff. Occasional ostentatious or other forms of reckless or imprudent behaviour of agency staff unnecessarily increased the risk of security problems as well. Experience from complex emergencies has shown that behaviour of staff and the way they choose to interact with the beneficiary community has a major influence on the refugees' and their own security.
Recommendation:
Refugee Camp Security
To the High Commissioner for Refugees, the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Heads of NGO Network Organizations for Follow-up, in Consultation with the Components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and to the Security Council, Member States and Donor Agencies for Necessary Action and Support
In situations where the international community has assumed humanitarian responsibility at refugee and/or IDP camps, take the following actions with respect to camp security measures:
a. Give UN peace missions authority and the appropriate means to ensure protection, in coordination with host governments or otherwise, of camp populations and staffs of relief organizations.
b. Work with host governments to take other measures, such as disarming camp residents, separating genuine refugees from those not entitled to refugee status, barring arms trading, preventing military training of residents, expelling hostile leadership from camps, halting the operations of hate media, and splitting up large camps into smaller ones at a greater distance from the border.
c. Advise official and non-governmental agency staffs on prudent patterns of behaviour that will not invite security problems as well as on how effectively to maintain an open and continuous dialogue with the beneficiary community.
Finding C-2:
Inadequate Early Warning of Population Displacements and Sudden Increases in Relief Needs
Detailed study of the information flows and decisions leading up to the Goma influx reveal that an integrated mechanism for gathering and analyzing information that could provide advance warning of large population displacements did not exist. The UNREO Information Cell came closest to fulfilling such a role but its objective was to collect and share information for coordination rather than warning purposes. It was heavily dependent upon a) relief agencies or UNAMIR contingents being present in an area and b) providing regular monitoring reports on developments/events in their area. These conditions were not met in much of north-west Rwanda during the critical period of May and June 1994. Study III also highlighted the need for information to be circulated as widely as possible among all agencies involved in the response, including NGOs, and to all agency sub-offices, many of which did not receive situation reports sent to headquarters.
Recommendation:
Development of an Integrated Humanitarian Early Warning System
To the UN Secretary-General and Inter-Agency Standing Committee, in Consultation with the Components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGO Network Organizations
Establish an Integrated Early Warning Cell, adequately resourced, within the DHA region coordination office once emergency operations have commenced. All agencies governmental, inter-governmental and NGO - operating in the region should be encouraged to feed reports on developments within their area of operation into the Cell.
Where coverage of areas is incomplete the integrated early warning cell should have capacity to place field observers/monitors to complement relief agencies or, in those areas where security is very poor, to call upon aerial reconnaissance capacity through standby arrangements with suitable military forces.
Information from all sources should be combined and analyzed and the likelihood of events requiring substantial humanitarian responses estimated.
Reports containing information on key developments in each area and assessments of likelihood of substantial population displacements should be disseminated widely to all sub-offices of agencies involved in the response that have a proven record of treating sensitive information confidentially. In extremely fluid and tense situations, reporting should be daily.
Finding C-3:
Mixed Performance in Coordination
Coordination mechanisms existed at many different levels within the system.
At least seven UN agencies and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs were directly involved in the response. Collaboration and coordination among UN agencies was affected by overlapping mandates and a regrettable rivalry. Overall coordination was characterized by what Study III termed a "hollow core" with a small, ad hoc, not highly regarded body with a coordination mandate only within Rwanda (DHA/UNREO) attempting to coordinate very large operational agencies (notably WFP and UNHCR) supporting refugees in neighbouring countries as well as programmes inside Rwanda. Responsibility for technical and sectoral coordination within Rwanda was further split between UNICEF and WHO. All these agencies relied to a significant degree upon NGO implementing partners, some 250 organizations, which presented coordinating agencies with extremely wide variations in terms of experience, professional qualifications and attitudes toward coordination efforts (see Study IV, Chapter 6).
There was also lack of clarity in division of responsibilities among senior UN officials who had various leadership and coordination functions (i.e. UNAMIR Force Commander, Special Representative of the Secretary General, Humanitarian Coordinator/Head of UNREO, Special Envoy of the High Commissioner for Refugees) and their relationship vis a vis senior personnel from UN agencies and departments. Such overlaps and lack of clarity hampered operational effectiveness.
At lower levels there were instances of successful coordination, notably in relation to refugees where UNHCR's Technical Coordinator structure performed well and the agency's ability to encourage NGO cooperation and team efforts among all agencies was enhanced by substantial financial support from ECHO. The best case of operational coordination was Ngara where UNHCR, backed up by the government of Tanzania, limited the number of NGOs working in camps and provided strong leadership. Within Rwanda, in a context where a large number of NGOs were involved in operations, the DHA/UNREO-supported Integrated Operations Centre (IOC) was obliged to adopt a less directive approach to coordination but nevertheless, by providing excellent information and facilitating collaboration among agencies, was able to achieve an impressive level of coordination.
Recommendation:
Effective Coordination Among and By Official Agencies
To the UN Secretary-General and Inter-Agency Standing Committee
Three options are formulated below to address the weaknesses identified in the above finding. The options vary in the degree of reform required. Each has relative advantages and disadvantages.
(i) Strengthen and extend existing inter-agency coordinating arrangements and mechanisms through:
a) use of inter-agency Memoranda of Understanding (such as that between UNHCR and WFP);
b) strengthening DHA by assuring its funding base and giving it responsibility for providing common services to UN and other agencies (air cell management responsibility, integrated humanitarian early warning system, etc.);
c) structure UN coordination meetings as inclusive task forces, chaired by DHA, and to which representatives of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, major bilateral donors and key NGOs would be routinely invited to participate;
d) reducing the number of senior officials with coordination and leadership roles and clarifying lines of authority of those present.
(ii) Considerably strengthen the central coordinating role of UN/DHA. Under this option humanitarian assistance funding for UN agencies and their NGO implementing partners would be channelled through DHA, which would decide on priorities and determine the amount of funds each agency would receive. To perform effectively this expanded role, DHA would need additional expert staff, including those with technical backgrounds, to be posted to the field as well as headquarters.
(iii) Consolidate in a new, expertly-led and staffed and fully operational mechanism of the United Nations, the emergency response functions of the principal UN humanitarian agencies (UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF and DHA). This is the option recommended by Study III.
Option (i) would be the least costly and disruptive, but the findings of Study III suggest that these efforts would not be enough to eliminate the confusion and competition experienced during the Rwanda emergency. Option (ii) would entail some additional cost but it would also strengthen the coordinating function at one focal point, with control over resource allocation. This would not require the creation of additional organizations but would strengthen one that is already there. Option (iii) would ensure coordination by centralizing all policy and operational responsibility in one agency/department. It should be noted that this agency/department need not be created outside the existing agency structure, but could be created within one of the existing agencies, such as DHA. Nonetheless, it would be the most disruptive of the three options. It has also been argued that there is a value to having some specialized institutional competence as well as possible cross-fertilization from having relief and development functions in the same agency (as in the cases of UNICEF and WFP). A similar case has been made regarding the value of having relief and refugee protection functions in the same agency, as currently is the case in UNHCR. But an opposite case can also be made that the two functions can come into conflict and compete for attention and resources, suggesting that each would be performed better in separate agencies.
Whichever option is chosen, a plan of action should be formulated, including a full review of staff needs by a special panel of international experts, governments and NGOs. A report containing the reasoning for selecting the option as well as the plan of action should be submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly.
Finding C-4:
Mixed NGO Performance
The performance of NGOs in providing humanitarian assistance was mixed. A number behaved professionally and compassionately and delivered high-quality care and services. But, as reported by Study III, other NGOs performed in an unprofessional and irresponsible manner that resulted not only in duplication and wasted resources but, in a few egregious cases, in unnecessary loss of life.
Recommendation:
Professional NGO Performance
To address the problems identified in the above finding, it is imperative that NGOs operating in complex emergencies:
field qualified professional staff with previous work experience in such settings and appreciation of the need to be sensitive to the local culture;
establish partnership with local organizations;
include at least some staff or advisors with considerable experience in the country or sub-region;
be prepared to work collaboratively with UN, donor and host-government officials.
a. To Heads of Non-Governmental Organizations, their Network Associations and the Components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
A set of standards is being developed by several NGO networks that is intended to supplement the Code of Conduct promulgated by ICRC, IFRC and NGO associations. Both the Code of Conduct and set of standards should be widely disseminated and promoted among NGOs, official agencies and governments.
b. To above Entities, UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Donor Agencies and OECD Development Assistance Committee for FollowÐup and to Member States for Necessary Action
While voluntary adoption and implementation of the Code of Conduct and standards is clearly preferable to edicts imposed on NGOs from outside, the Rwanda experience indicates that it will not be enough to rely on voluntary adoption alone. Some form of regulation or enforcement is needed. Two options are formulated below, followed by a brief discussion of pros and cons of each.
(i) Self-managed regulation. Under this option, NGO networks could be assisted in acquiring greater capacity to monitor member compliance with the Code and standards.
(ii) An international accreditation system. Under this option, core criteria for accreditation would be developed jointly by official agencies and NGOs. These criteria would need to be adapted and supplemented for a specific complex emergency. This is the option recommended by Study III.
As stated, the second option is stronger than the first in terms of enforcement, but it raises a number of issues that would have to be resolved, such as selection of an entity to administer accreditation, funding, reporting relationships, etc. Self-regulation under the first option would be encouraged if donors and donor governments agreed to restrict their funding and tax-free privileges to agencies that have adopted the Code and standards. Similarly, hostcountry governments could restrict registration, work permits and duty-free importation privileges to adopting agencies. If implemented, these incentives and disincentives would compensate for the enforcement weakness of the first option. Donors and governments must, of course, be prepared to hold NGOs accountable to the Code and standards and employ disincentives in the event of non-compliance. The media have played and can play a positive role by exposing instances of unprofessional and irresponsible conduct by NGOs.
Finding C-5:
Military Contingents
Military contingents from OECD countries have played increasingly significant roles in support of humanitarian operations in complex emergencies - both in the provision of relief assistance and in support of relief agencies. They played such roles in Rwanda and eastern Zaire. However, in view of the inability of Study Team III to obtain sufficiently precise and comparable data on costs and performance, it was not possible to make definitive comparative assessment. The Rwanda experience with military contingents does raise questions about predictability, effectiveness, costs and ability to participate collaboratively in operations involving several official agencies and numerous NGOs.
Recommendation:
Systematically Assess Comparative Cost-Effectiveness of Use of Military Contingents in Humanitarian Relief Operations
To Donor Countries and Agencies and OECD/DAC
Undertake a systematic study of the performance and costs of military contingents in humanitarian relief operations as compared with that of official agencies, NGOs and the private sector performing the same functions.
Finding C-6:
Weak Accountability
The availability and quality of performance data and reporting by official agencies and NGOs involved in emergency relief operations were highly variable. In some locations (e.g. Goma) the situation was more satisfactory but in others (e.g. within Rwanda) available data did not provide a sufficient basis for assessing impact or performance, or - just as importantly - for making adjustments in programme activities. A tendency by some official agencies and NGOs to emphasize or inflate positive accomplishments and play down or ignore problems resulted in distorted reporting. Even basic data on staff, finances and activities were difficult or impossible to obtain from a number of NGOs.
While the evaluation teams did not undertake an in-depth review of the evaluation procedures of agencies, they did become aware of efforts by both UN/DHA and UNHCR to evaluate their operations in the Rwanda crisis. Such efforts led DHA in mid-1995 to embark on a programme of evaluations and lessons-learned studies covering the full range of its operations.
The availability and quality of data collected and made available by donor governments varied considerably. Some donors rarely if ever provided data to the UN/DHA Financial Tracking System. Donors tended to compound the problem by asking for information with widely varying formats from agencies and NGOs they funded.
Recommendation:
Ensure Accountability
a. To the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Bilateral Donors and Multilateral Development Banks, OECD/DAC and Heads of NGO Network Organizations
Several options are formulated below to address the problems identified in the above finding. An additional recommendation is addressed to donor governments and bilateral agencies.
(i) By strengthening the effectiveness of official agency coordination and standards of NGO conduct along the lines recommended in C-3 and C-4, above, accountability would be strengthened, especially if implementation of these recommendations includes standards for data collection and reporting. The current Red Cross/NGO Code of Conduct commits signatories to "hold ourselves responsible to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources." Full implementation of this commitment would entail establishment of NGO mechanisms for consultation with people affected by humanitarian emergencies.
(ii) Establish a unit in UN/DHA that would have no other responsibilities but to conduct the following functions:
undertake regular field-level monitoring and evaluation of emergency humanitarian assistance, and review adequacy of standards followed;
serve as ombudsman to which any party can express a concern related to provision of assistance or security;
set up and manage on behalf of the international community a database on emergency humanitarian assistance operations; and
prepare periodic status reports for the public domain.
(iii) Identify a respected, independent organization or network of organizations to act on behalf of beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance and member states to perform the functions described in option (ii) above. This is the option recommended by Study III.
Option (i) would entail least cost and disruption to the humanitarian assistance system, but it would not provide one focal point for a database or for dissemination of information throughout the system. Option (ii) provides the focal point but as part of a UN unit it could be viewed as lacking independence. Option (iii) provides both independence and a focal point but poses issues in terms of selection of the entity, accessibility, and reporting relationships (its own accountability). While both options (ii) and (iii) would have cost implications, their contribution to effectiveness and accountability should also be kept in mind. It is essential that either option be adequately resourced. It should also be noted that option (iii) need not require the creation of a new entity, but could well entail the selection of an existing institution to assume the functions outline above.
b. To Donor Governments, Bilateral Agencies and OECD/DAC
Donors have a responsibility to improve accountability both to their taxpayers and to the beneficiaries of their assistance. They have a responsibility to improve their own performance information and reporting (including on any humanitarian role played by military contingents), but they also have a leadership role in promulgating consistent standards, including adequate breakdown of data by activity and area, for the humanitarian assistance community as a whole. Finally, donors have a responsibility to standardize among themselves the formats they use for reporting requirements of agencies to whom they provide funding.
The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD should develop guidelines for adequacy, consistency and standardization of performance data and reporting on humanitarian assistance activities.
Ensure adequate support to the DHA Financial Tracking System and prompt provision of requested data.
Finding C-7:
Adverse Impacts on Local Populations and Environment
There were clear environmental and other costs imposed by the large refugee camps on local populations in the neighbouring countries of Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi as well as on local populations surrounding displaced person camps. Some of these costs resulted from flawed agency policies, e.g. not taking into account environmental impact of fuelwood requirements of the massive refugee population. Moreover, armed elements in refugee camps posed a security threat to local populations. While certain groups and enterprises derived at least some temporary benefits from hosting large refugee or displaced populations, these were distributed unevenly.
Recommendation:
Minimize Adverse Local Impacts
To the High Commissioner for Refugees, the Director-General of the World Food Programme, UNICEF and Other UN Development Agencies, NGO Implementing Partners and Bilateral Donor Agencies, in Consultation with the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGO Network Organizations
Prepare and issue standard operating policies and procedures that will minimize and mitigate adverse impacts of relief operations (whether refugee or IDP) on surrounding populations and their environment. These will have implications for donors as well as UN agencies and NGOs. The following specific recommendations, drawn in part from Study III, are relevant:
(i) Provide food that minimizes cooking requirements (e.g. flour) or includes milling costs in the transportation and storage costs funded by donors.
(ii) Establish a quick-disbursing fund, or draw from the existing UNHCR Emergency Response Fund, to provide early compensation to host communities adversely affected by refugee concentrations.
(iii) Provide other kinds of assistance, such as fuel for cooking, extension of camp infrastructure and services (water supply, health care, etc.) to surrounding local populations and rehabilitation of physical infrastructure damaged in meeting relief needs (e.g. roads and airstrips).
Effective implementation of Recommendation CÐ1 on "Refugee Camp Security" will also address security threats to host populations.
Finding C-8:
Inequitable Food Distribution
The use of former leadership in many camps as an expedient mechanism for food distribution reinforced its power and resulted in rations being manipulated by extremist leaders and diverted from refugee consumption. There is evidence that in such circumstances direct distribution of food to the household results in a higher proportion of rations actually being received by intended recipients. While the evidence in terms of impact varies and may depend on cultural context, direct distribution to women is an option that should be explored.
Circumstances often confronted by agencies and NGOs in the face of rapid influxes of large masses of refugees and displaced persons made it difficult to implement quickly alternative distribution systems. The fact that the former leaders and their command structures often arrived intact with refugees, accompanied by high levels of insecurity and violence, especially in the large camps, made it extremely hazardous to distribute food directly. Difficult terrain and lack of heavy equipment that precluded establishing more than one distribution site per camp in the Goma area also made direct distribution to families, particularly in the large camps, unfeasible. Yet, some organizations were able to move to direct distribution systems considerably earlier than others in spite of the difficulties.
Recommendation:
Equitable Food Distribution
To the High Commissioner for Refugees, DirectorÐGeneral of WFP, NGO Implementing Partners, in Consultation with the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
Develop and get inter-agency and, to the extent feasible, from the relevant governmental authorities, advance agreement on operational guidelines for food distribution. These guidelines should provide for direct distribution of food at household level if there is a risk of exploitation of the food distribution system by camp leadership. They should also recommend exploring the desirability and feasibility of direct provision to women.
D. Supporting the Rebuilding of Society
This section presents additional findings and recommendations that relate to efforts of the international community to assist in the rehabilitation and rebuilding of a society attempting to recover from a complex emergency. These are topics covered by Study IV.
Unfavourable comparisons have made between international assistance provided to Rwandese refugees outside the country and assistance provided for rehabilitation and recovery within the country. As indicated in previous sections, there are a number of reasons that explain the relatively large amount of assistance devoted to refugee assistance and the relatively small, but growing amount of aid devoted to recovery and development. Nonetheless, some of the delay in provision of external resources for rebuilding Rwanda's decimated human, institutional and governance capacities resulted from lack of mutual understanding between government and donors of their respective requirements and constraints. The level of attention and resources required for recovery and development must be defined through a process involving a meeting of the minds of government and international community.
As noted previously, the country's authorities and communities have primary responsibilities for achieving and shaping society; external support should aim at strengthening their institutional capacities. Clear understandings between donors and recipient country need to be achieved regarding re-establishment of capacity as well as minimal legitimate accountability requirements and the temporary need for expatriate involvement in implementation.
Finding D-1:
Non-Functioning Justice System
One prerequisite to repatriation of the majority of the huge number of refugees living just outside Rwanda is a functioning justice system that will put an end to the long-prevailing "culture of impunity." A functioning system will have to assess degrees of guilt among those accused of participating in the genocide and political killings as well as resolve disputes over property owned by recent Hutu refugees but now occupied by former Tutsi refugees.
Some donors have been slow to provide support in this area and in a few cases are precluded by their own legal restrictions from support to certain elements of the justice system such as law enforcement and penal institutions. The international community has also been slow in providing the resources needed for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to indict and try expeditiously those Rwandese accused of crimes against humanity who are living in exile.
The government has also been slow in taking certain essential actions, such as appointment of Supreme Court and lower-level magistrates, in expediting due process procedures for almost 60,000 detainees and ameliorating the extremely harsh conditions of their confinement. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that, as observed in Study IV, paralysis of the judicial process and inability to try suspected criminals has resulted not just from lack of staff and equipment but also from lack of resolve. The government's enthusiastic sponsorship of the International Conference on "Genocide, Impunity and Accountability: a Dialogue for a National and International Response," 2-6 November 1995, signalled resolve, but much more remains to be done.
Recommendation:
Expand Support for Justice System and Law Enforcement
To Bilateral Donors and Multilateral Agencies, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the OECD/DAC for Follow-up and to Member States for Necessary Action
a. Develop with the host government a comprehensive plan for assisting reconstruction of the justice system, including assistance to civilian law enforcement and penal institutions.
b. Review and adjust legislative restrictions that preclude some donors from providing assistance for justice and law enforcement systems in order to permit such assistance to countries attempting to recover from a complex emergency.
c. Strengthen the International Criminal Tribunal mechanism:
In the short-term this requires that the Tribunal has an adequate budget and delegated authority to carry out its responsibilities.
The Tribunal's effectiveness also requires that UN member states give prompt and full cooperation to its requests.
For the longer-term, the proposed International Criminal Court must be established on a permanent basis in order to expedite the prosecution of those accused of genocide and other crimes against humanity.
Finding D-2:
Barriers to Repatriation
Very few of the over two million refugees who fled from Rwanda in the aftermath of genocide have returned to Rwanda. Much of their resistance to repatriation is due to actual fear of returning, whether grounded or not. This fear, in turn, springs from several major sources. Attempts by refugees to repatriate, or even discuss repatriation, have been met by threats, intimidation and repression by camp leaders and militia. Physical insecurity and a nonfunctioning justice system inside Rwanda have also been major factors discouraging repatriation. Both actual and false accounts of violent reprisals, arbitrary arrests and harsh detentions have contributed to this outcome. Lack of detailed and widely-promulgated government policies regarding re-occupation of property and land have also discouraged repatriation. Lack of basic services and productive employment have also been sources of concern. Finally, the relatively large numbers of people in refugee camps who were involved to some degree in the genocide and killings have undoubtedly resisted repatriation, especially in the absence of clear policies regarding degrees of guilt and corresponding penalties for participating in the killings. For all these reasons, the view in some quarters of the international community that major repatriation and reintegration could occur quickly was clearly unrealistic and mistaken. The recent arrests in Zaire of extremist leaders, as well as an agreement to accelerate voluntary repatriation, may portend weakening of a major repatriation barrier. But even if these developments turn out to be significant, several additional substantial impediments remain within Rwanda.
Recommendation:
Remove Barriers to Repatriation
To the High Commissioner for Refugees, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Bilateral Donors and Multilateral Development Banks and Agencies and NGO Network Organizations for Follow-up, and to Member States for Necessary Support
Implementation of Recommendation C1 on "Refugee Camp Security" will remove the source of intimidation and repression that has acted as one important barrier to voluntary repatriation.
The following measures would both alleviate the concerns of refugees and improve conditions for people inside the country. The government of Rwanda must play a very active part in these efforts:
(i) Support the government's current efforts to establish and promulgate degrees of guilt and punishment for participation in the genocide and other killings, as well as efforts to strengthen the justice system in other ways (see Recommendation D-1, "Expand Support for Justice System and Law Enforcement").
(ii) Insist on compliance with the rule of law and observance of fundamental human rights principles, and monitor closely abuses by the government.
(iii) Provide expanded support for strengthening local capacities to provide basic governmental and related services, such as education, health and agricultural research and extension, and for income-generating activities (e.g. microenterprise, rural works programmes, etc).
(iv) Provide further support, as appropriate, to the government to develop and implement land tenure and property rights legislation, especially the right of women to inherit and own land; and to develop clear procedures and identify institutions for dispute settlement.
(v) Provide support for experts under auspices of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to work with authorities and local NGOs to design and implement human rights training and education programmes, in accordance with OAU, UN and Red Cross Conventions.
(vi) Facilitate establishment by the government of broadly-based "peace committees" in communes to monitor security of returnees; screening of returnees should be performed in close proximity to home communes, so as to give them confidence in the process.
Finding D-3:
A Potential for Reconciliation
Women's groups and some elements of the church have been providing support to the vulnerable and building bridges across ethnic boundaries. Some church denominations have made an effort to examine critically their role and behaviour during the crisis. But the role of the church as a whole as an agent of healing and reconciliation will be limited until it confronts and admits more directly that some of its elements were involved in the genocide and assassinations. Attempts at reconciliation will make little progress until tangible progress is made in administration of justice.
Recommendation:
Support to Reconciliation Efforts
To Bilateral Donors, Multilateral Agencies and NGO Network Organizations
As the International Tribunal and the national system of jurisprudence begin to make progress in rendering justice, support should be expanded for local NGOs involved in activities attempting to open dialogue and build bridges among groups in society. This will be a long process marked with reversals as well as gains. In addition to women's groups and religious movements, there is an urgent need to work with young people who have been profoundly affected by genocide and conflict. This "intermediate generation" will become decisionmakers and opinion leaders in coming years. Unless they are actively involved in the reconciliation process, seeds for future violence will flower. Education of children and teachers (in problemsolving, non-violent conflict resolution, etc.) has a critical role to play in the process of reconciliation. The international community has a challenge and an opportunity to support innovative efforts in this area.
E. Roles of the Media
This section presents a finding and recommendation on the roles of the media, a subject that is addressed in both Study II and Study III.
Finding:
The Mixed Impact of the Media
By and large, the international media chose not to report on (or to publish, if news reports were filed) evidence of plans and organizing for large-scale massacres. This contributed to failure by the international community to perceive the genocide for what it was and to insist on an adequate response. This failure occurred in spite of local media, which became dominated in the early 1990s by a radio station and newspaper whose vitriolic propaganda incited hatred and violence.
Inadequate and inaccurate reporting by international media on the genocide itself contributed to international indifference and inaction. However, intense media coverage of certain aspects of emergency relief operations, particularly in Goma, influenced both political decision-makers and agencies to make ad hoc decisions that were not always in line with sound operating principles and resulted in a skewed emphasis on some relief activities at the expense of others. Neglect of the survivors and some instances of sub-optimal placement of relief resources reflected, in part, unbalanced and inaccurate reporting by the international media.
However, international media coverage also influenced agencies to act urgently and responsibly, and raised awareness of politicians and the public at large, which in turn helped to generate funds.
Recommendation:
Assess the Roles of the Media
To the Media
The media, individually and through professional associations, should review their reporting on Rwanda to explain and draw lessons for responsible reporting of future complex emergencies.
Organize a conference for and by the international media, under sponsorship of an organization such as Reporters sans frontières, to examine media reporting on Rwanda and draw lessons for responsible reporting on future complex emergencies.
F. The Regional Dimension
The Great Lakes region, which includes the countries of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Zaire and Tanzania, is important to the evaluation for two reasons: first, Rwanda has been and continues to be significantly affected by socio-political developments in the region; and second, the intensifying crisis and open conflict in Burundi, which shares a number of causes with the Rwanda crisis, is currently threatening to explode with grave repercussions for the stability of Rwanda and the region.
Another reason why a regional perspective is important is brought out in Study I: the two major population groups in Rwanda, Hutu and Tutsi, are part of a larger regional population group, the Banyarwanda. The Banyarwanda share the same language and culture and are found in large numbers in the border regions of Uganda, Zaire and Tanzania, as well as in Burundi, where they are close relatives of the predominant Barundi. While some Banyarwanda, especially in Tanzania, have become citizens and integrated into society at large, their fate and legal status have been more uncertain in Uganda and Zaire where they have been subject from time to time to discriminatory policies and actions. Over the decades there have been substantial and often destabilizing movements of Banyarwanda across national borders of the region. Recurring political upheavals and violence in Rwanda and Burundi have been major reasons, but not the only ones, for such population shifts. These movements have often imposed substantial burdens on receiving countries.
The current deterioration of the situation in Burundi has been described in very grave terms in the recent initial report by the Special Rapporteur for Burundi of the UN High Commission on Human Rights. The report underlines a "real danger that the deteriorating situation could explode any time in the country, with consequences as grave as those seen previously in Rwanda." A crisis in Burundi of the proportions of the Rwanda crisis would constitute an immense calamity for the Great Lakes region, for Africa and for the world. Further underlining the critical nature of the situation are recent proposals by the UN Secretary-General to station a modest UN rapid-reaction force in neighbouring Zaire, with the ability to intervene in Burundi, and an international police force to guard relief workers. The Secretary-General of the OAU has given highest priority to Burundi and engaged in intensive dialogue with its leaders to try to find ways to halt the escalating violence.
As shown in Study I, economic factors have interacted with sociopolitical factors in contributing to the recurring crises and violence that have impacted upon the region. Economic growth has been overwhelmed by rapid population growth, increasing fragmentation of land holdings, adverse weather, and destruction accompanying political violence and conflict.
In sum, a sustainable solution to the socio-political problems of any country of the Great Lakes region, but particularly Rwanda and Burundi at its heart, cannot be found in that country in isolation but must address and involve the region as a whole. Similarly, sustained socio-economic development of the region, accompanied by expanding human and civil rights for all groups, offers a main hope for stability and an end to the cycles of violence.
Two collective efforts on the part of the international community to address the problems of Rwanda and Burundi on a regional basis are noteworthy:
The Regional Conference on Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in The Great Lakes Region, held in Bujumbura, 12Ð17 February 1995.
The Cairo Conference of Heads of State from the Great Lakes Region, held in Cairo, 28-29 November 1995.
The Plan of Action of the Bujumbura Conference and the Declaration signed by the heads of state at the Cairo Conference endorse a number of measures and commitments that are contained in the recommendations set forth above.
Recommendation F-1:
Immediate and Urgent Measures for Burundi
To the Secretaries-General of the UN and OAU, Bilateral Donors and Multilateral Development Banks and Agencies, Member States (including Governments of the Great Lakes Region), Components of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, Non-Governmental Organizations and the Media
The following evaluation recommendations should command immediate attention for their applicability to the crisis in Burundi:
Provide support to further strengthen OAU mediation and peacekeeping functions. (See Recommendation A-4)
Expedite contingency planning and preparedness measures for humanitarian relief, learning from the Rwanda experience. (See Finding and Recommendation A-6)
Support measures to ensure the physical security of refugees, displaced persons and relief workers who are attempting to provide humanitarian assistance. (See Recommendation C-1)
Provide adequate support for the deployment of effective human rights machinery in the field, with adequate standing procedures for vigilance over threatened genocide and for prompt investigative action. (See Recommendation A-5)
Expand assistance to Burundi for the restoration of an effective system of justice in order to break the vicious cycle of impunity (including support for assistance by magistrates from other African countries, as suggested by the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Burundi). (See Recommendation D-1)
Identify and be prepared to implement consistently a range of measures intended to put pressure on those who are inciting and perpetrating escalating civil violence. (See Recommendation B-1)
The international community should not send mixed signals to Burundi that would allow for manipulation of their potential contradictions. Rather, it should speak consistently and with one voice with respect to the positions it takes and the actions it implements.
Recommendation F-2:
Formulate a Supportable and Sustainable Development Strategy for the Region
To the Secretary-General of the OAU, Governments of the Great Lakes Region, the World Bank and African Development Bank, Bilateral Donors, UN Specialized Agencies and NGO Network Organizations
A sustainable, long-term solution to the cycles of civil and ethnic violence must involve the people and be a regional one. The countries of the Great Lakes Region must take the lead in developing this solution. But strong support from bilateral and multilateral development agencies and international NGOs is also essential.
Given the difficult-to-explosive situations facing Rwanda and Burundi and some other parts of the region, a recommendation to formulate a sustainable development strategy for the region may seem foolish and unrealistic. However, if the premise of the finding above is accepted, that the sustained development of the region offers a main hope for ending the cycles of violence, then embarking on such an effort is imperative.
Several tracks will be required:
First, the international community should provide full support to the implementation of the recommendations of the Bujumbura and Cairo Conferences cited above.
Second, as noted in the Introduction, the evaluation did not undertake an indepth examination of the regional dimension. Further research and analysis on this subject would be highly desirable as it would provide a firmer basis for the formulation of development strategy options. It would be very important to involve an African research institution in the work, perhaps teamed with a research institution based in Europe and/or North America. Funding and oversight would need to be provided by a donor agency or group of agencies. The research should be initiated as soon as possible, so it could make a contribution to the third track.
Third, an essential element of formulating a development strategy for the region would be actively to engage the population of the region in the formulation process. This should include dialogues in the form of meetings at local, national and regional levels that draw in a wide range of non-governmental and governmental representatives to discuss needs, priorities, alternative solutions and resources. Part of the dialogue should include such issues as how to ensure human, civil and other kinds of rights that will bring security and stability to the region; what kind of political system can best serve the deeply-divided societies of the region; culturally-sensitive approaches to non-violent conflict and dispute resolution, etc. Institutes and resource persons from other divided societies in other regions could be invited to participate. There are successful precedents, including in such African countries as South Africa and Togo, to the kind of broadly participatory development planning process outlined above.
Fourth, based on the strategy emerging from the second and third tracks, a carefullyplanned major donor conference should be called to marshal external support.
The challenges that this process will confront are formidable. However, in the absence of such an effort it is difficult to envision how a brighter future for Rwanda and its neighbours can be achieved.