Introduction
This chapter presents the critical findings and recommendations that emerge from the four study reports summarized in the previous chapters. While these reports are the main sources for this chapter, it also draws on discussions with the resource persons and panel of African experts. Though the four teams had different tasks and carried out their research in different ways, using different materials, each came to roughly the same understanding of a set of factors that inform and underlie their reports and inform the presentation that follows.
Some cross-cutting issues
The "continuum" of relief, rehabilitation and development
The Rwanda crisis in some respects does not represent a linear "continuum" from relief-to-rehabilitation-to-development. Rehabilitation efforts necessarily began soon after the new government assumed power in July 1994. Massive relief operations continue, 18 months later, in refugee camps on Rwandese borders. In other respects, a shift from one stage to the next has occurred, as for example, when IDPs, who had been sustained by relief for almost a year, returned to home communes where they received agricultural rehabilitation assistance and should now be moving to self-sustaining status.
The evaluation did not systematically address all the issues surrounding the relationships between relief, rehabilitation and development in the Rwanda crisis. However, the studies have identified instances where linkages between relief and development were and were not taken into account. In the first example, there has probably been on balance an adverse impact on the development status of local populations surrounding the massive refugee camps in Tanzania and Zaire. While the relief operations have created employment and provided an injection of income into local areas, these effects will end with the repatriation of refugees. On the other hand, physical security, infrastructure and the environment have deteriorated for local populations, who also tend to perceive services to refugees as being superior to their own. Another example suggests a positive relationship in which the forging of a "Corridor Group" by WFP with the Tanzanian Railways Corporation and Tanzanian Harbours Authority resulted in more efficient transport of massive food shipments and should also rebound to the longerterm efficiency of Tanzania's transportation system.
The third example refers to the continued free provision of seeds and tools kits to Rwandese farmers. Study IV raises the issue of whether this effort has gone beyond the point of rehabilitation, potentially creating dependency among farmers and inhibiting the development of private channels of production and distribution. It is possible that the continuation of this programme, without effective targeting on needy farmers, may be detrimental to Rwanda's longer-term agricultural development prospects.
The impact of previous development aid
It is clear that substantial development aid to Rwanda over a 30-year period before the crisis did not prevent it. On the other hand, the crisis can not be attributed to aid as a primary cause. While the evaluation did not attempt to assess the net influence on the crisis of development aid, it did undertake some analysis of a major preÐcrisis component of aid. The Structural Adjustment Programme of 1991 contained some provisions that should have ameliorated tensions (a "safety net") and others that may have fanned resentment (civil service and parastatal reform, and abolition of the coffee equalization fund, had the government implemented the abolition). It is not clear whether other donor-supported programmes favoured one political or ethnic group more than another. The evaluation did not systematically examine this question, which could be a worthwhile subject for future research and analysis.
It should be noted that UN/DHA has initiated, in collaboration with Brown University, a research project to study the role of development assistance activities in conflict-prone settings.
Responsibility of the crisis country
Throughout the various phases of a complex emergency the constituted authority of the country in crisis always bears major responsibilities for resolving it. This has been true at virtually every stage of the Rwanda crisis since there has always been a duly constituted authority, with perhaps the exception of several weeks during May-July 1994. The responsibilities range from protecting human, civil and refugee rights to peaceful conflict resolution; to ensuring an open and fair system of justice; to creating a stable and open enabling environment for economic activity; to protecting the poorest and the most vulnerable. As concluded by Study IV, the responsibilities for rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction belong to the Rwandese.
A current example is repatriation. With the possibility of significant external impediments being removed by the recent arrests in Zaire of former extremist leaders, political, judicial and economic conditions inside Rwanda have become even more important for successful repatriation. However, the international community, which has urged progress on these fronts, needs to continue to find ways to assist Rwandese and their government in their efforts to rebuild society.
Upholding international law: a reproach and admonishment to UN member states
The Rwanda crisis is replete with instances of violation of international law by some member states as well as derelictions of responsibility of others to champion action directed at violators.
The types of international law that were violated fall into three broad categories:
First and foremost is The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 1948. The perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda clearly stand guilty of violating the Convention. The rest of the international community violated the spirit if not the letter of Article VIII of the Convention, which states that "Any contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III".
Second is International Humanitarian Law, in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their additional Protocols of 1977. Member states have an obligation to disseminate knowledge of international humanitarian law as widely as possible and to adopt any national measures and enact any legislation to provide for effective implementation of international humanitarian law.
Third are international norms, particularly well-developed in African regional international law, regarding the rights of refugees to repatriate and stability of relations among states. Member states must take invasions across borders seriously, initially at sub-regional and regional levels, to defuse and contain the resulting conflict. The international community must also support states most directly concerned to ensure that refugees are not left in limbo, but within a reasonable time obtain secure membership in a state. Had effective and prompt action successfully addressed these issues involving Rwanda and Uganda in the 1980s and in 1990, the tragedies of the ensuing years could have been averted.
Member states must uphold and adhere to these international laws and norms.
Findings and recommendations
The following presentation of key findings and recommendations is grouped into six sections relating to major issues and phases of the Rwanda crisis.
A. Critical Findings and Recommendations
B. Detection, Prevention and Suppression of Genocide and Civil Violence
C. Management of Relief
D. Supporting the Rebuilding of Society
E. Roles of the Media
F. The Regional Dimension
The first section consists of seven critical sets of findings and recommendations that require high priority attention by key actors of the international community, such as the UN Secretary-General and members of the Security Council, heads of bilateral and multilateral agencies and NGO network organizations, and representatives of the components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The recommendations in the following five sections are not necessarily less important than those in the first section, but they tend to be more operational in nature or they may in some cases require further review or study before being acted upon.
Various members of the international community, prompted by their experience with complex emergencies, including that of Rwanda, have launched initiatives that could well lead to the adoption of some of the recommendations presented below. These initiatives include studies, discussion papers, working groups and task forces intended eventually to produce new policies, strategies and operating procedures. Among the groups involved in such efforts are the Inter-Agency Standing Committee of the UN System, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the European Union and the World Bank, as well as several bilateral agencies. One product resulting from reviews conducted by the ICRC and the IFRC, together with several NGO organizations affiliated with the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, has been the promulgation of a new "Code of Conduct" for the provision of humanitarian assistance. The UNHCR is currently developing new guidelines on contingency planning and, in consultation with WFP, will soon be issuing new guidelines for food distribution.
The issue of funding
Implementation of a number of the following recommendations will require additional financial support from member states of the international community. With several major contributors far behind in their financial obligations to the UN system, it may be argued that it is not a propitious time to put forward recommendations with financial implications. These recommendations are nonetheless made in the belief that leadership will emerge from the international community that will understand that their implementation will save financial resources and lives.
However, the increased effectiveness promised by these recommendations will not be realized without the political will from member states that will be required to adopt some of the recommendations, nor without the will, dedication and competence of agency managers to carry them out.
Follow-up to the evaluation
As part of an assessment of the efficacy of this evaluation, the evaluation Steering Committee will be reconvened in six to eight months, or between July and September 1996. The purpose of the meeting will be to assess the reactions of the international community to the evaluation, the degree of implementation of its recommendations and the lessons to be learned from the evaluation process itself.
Some positive findings
Evaluations tend to focus on negative findings in an attempt to draw lessons and recommendations for the future. While the main findings and recommendations of this chapter tend to fall into that category, the positive experiences in the responses of the international community to the Rwanda tragedy should not be ignored. Preparation for response to future complex emergencies should also build on these positive experiences. Following is a selection of some of the salient "positive lessons" that emerge from the evaluation studies and materials provided by Steering Committee members.
A. Critical Findings and Recommendations for the Attention of the UN Secretary-General and Security Council, Heads of Donor Agencies and NGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Member States
Finding A-1:
Lack of Policy Coherence
Humanitarian action cannot substitute for political action. This is perhaps the most important finding of this evaluation.
One of the hallmarks of a complex emergency is that the political/diplomatic (including conflict resolution), human rights, humanitarian, military/peacekeeping, and development aspects get inextricably intertwined - before, during and after the peak of the crisis. The Rwanda experience is a prime example. The problem in Rwanda was that policy and strategy formulation by the international community seldom, if ever, took these elements into account in an integrated manner.
Among the member states and within the UN system there were:
As observed in Study II, one crucial manifestation of the lack of policy coherence was a pattern of behaviour in New York headquarters marked by not drawing on critical information coming from the field in order to formulate a full range of strategic options for the Secretary General and the Security Council. This pattern contributed to the fateful 21 April Security Council decision to withdraw the bulk of the UNAMIR forces from Rwanda. The Secretariat and the Security Council continued to see the issue in terms of an intervention between two opposing armies engaged in a renewed civil war rather than the need to protect civilians from systematic killings. With a Security Council unwilling to contribute troops or to finance member states willing to do so in a crisis that was of strategic marginality to the major powers, that lacked clear terms of reference and obligations and where the parties to the conflict were once again at war, the Secretariat rejected the requests of the UNAMIR Force Commander for increased resources and the latitude to protect civilians. Other factors, such as the "shadow of Somalia" that restrained the US in the Security Council, and cumbersome and inflexible UN procedures, also played a role in leading to this outcome, but greater coherence in policy formulation would have at least clarified the central issue at stake and might have overcome the "shadows."
As noted in Study III, some agencies worked on the premise that refugees would return quickly, while other agencies maintained that the refugee situation would be a protracted one. There was no overall agreed understanding of the complexity of the situation, the preponderance of factors weighing against early repatriation and the resulting policy implications.
The underlying problem has been and continues to be political. But the international community failed to come to grips directly with the political problem. Thus it has in effect, and by default, left both the political and the humanitarian problems generated by the Rwanda crisis in the hands of the humanitarian community. This is untenable. It puts burdens on the latter that it cannot and should not assume.
Recommendations for Policy Coherence:
a. Foster Policy Coherence in the UN Security Council and General Assembly
To the UN Security Council and General Assembly
First and foremost, a crisis of an essentially political nature requires action at a political level effectively to address it. However, the consequences of such a crisis are often humanitarian in nature and require humanitarian action. To ensure that the humanitarian dimension is adequately considered in decisions regarding complex emergencies, it is recommended that the Security Council establish a Humanitarian Sub-Committee. Its purpose would be to inform fully the Security Council of developments and concerns regarding humanitarian dimensions of complex emergencies and to make appropriate recommendations, taking into account both inter-related and distinctive aspects of political, military and humanitarian objectives.
In the General Assembly an integrated approach to complex emergencies could be fostered through, for example, its incorporation in principles of a "new international humanitarian order", to be taken up again by the UNGA in 1996.
b. Ensure Policy Coherence in the UN Secretariat
To the UN Secretary-General and Security Council
Constitute a team of senior advisers for all complex emergencies, charged with synthesizing crisis information and bringing coherent policy options to the SecretaryÐGeneral. The purpose of this team would be to ensure that humanitarian, political and peacekeeping concerns are all taken into account in formulating options for the Secretary-General, the Security Council and in the General Assembly; it would not be charged with making operational decisions regarding humanitarian action. Its duties and responsibilities should be distinct from those of the Secretary-General's Task Force on UN Operations. The team should consist of the Under-Secretaries General for Political Affairs (DPA), Peacekeeping (DPKO), Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). It should also draw on information and counsel from the High Commissioners for Human Rights and Refugees, the Directors-General of UNICEF and WFP and the components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent movement. The team should:
(i) Reinforce the discipline of the UN civil service as an impartial and independent resource, presenting analyses and options to member states for UN crisis-response based on the identified needs of that crisis, not on the supposed reactions of any one or more governments.
(ii) Formulate the essential framework for an integrated UN line of command between headquarters and the field, and within the field, for political action, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance to ensure that the system speaks with one voice and that there is mutual reinforcement among the three types of actions.
Finding A-2:
Insufficient Support for Prevention and Suppression of Genocide and Protection of Victims
While there are arguments on both sides, a case can be made that with a modest expansion of peacekeeping forces with a clear mandate to protect civilians, the international community could have halted or at least substantially checked the killings, especially during the first weeks. Some suggestive evidence in support of this proposition is provided by the experiences of the greatly-reduced UNAMIR force and the French Opération Turquoise, whose protective efforts in Kigali and in south-western Rwanda saved tens of thousands. In addition ICRC protected similar numbers through repeated calls for respect of humanitarian principles and regular visits where persons at risk stayed.
Among the reasons this option of modest expansion was not pursued were the already described lack of policy coherence at the top of the system as well as a lack of understanding of the situation and the risks of intervention. Cumbersome procedures and a gap in the UN Charter Chapters regarding peacekeeping and related operations contributed to this lack of understanding: the Rwanda situation was defined in April as having moved from a low-cost, consensual peacekeeping mission to a crisis where only a full-fledged, high-risk enforcement operation would have an impact. The consequences of this assessment were particularly important because the Security Council had a low threshold for risk in the case of Rwanda, reflecting the country's strategic marginality to the major powers.
Recommendation:
Effective Prevention and Early Suppression
To the Security Council, the Secretaries-General of the UN and the OAU and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, in Consultation with the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and to Member States
a. Urgently develop a UN-sponsored programme through governments, NGOs, and other organizations to sensitize leadership of the international community to genocidal conspiracy and incitement anywhere and to obligations of all governments to prevent and suppress it. Adopt in the General Assembly criteria for proclaming a Genocide Emergency when justified and review Article VIII of the Genocide Convention with a view to strengthening the obligation of Contracting Parties.
b. Develop standard operating procedures for UN peacekeeping operations, with a clear mandate to protect civilians when large numbers are threatened by violence; in effect, a "6.5" mandate between the UN Chapter VI and VII mandates. In addition:
(i) Establish procedures for rapid deployment of forces under UN authority as both deterrent and actual capability; encourage and support development and first use of rapid-response capabilities under regional organizations like the OAU and the OAS, with UN authorization and support where needed.
(ii) Provide terms of engagement sufficiently broad to political and military field officers, including those of "6.5 mandate" operations, to permit them to respond to changing circumstances with innovation and dispatch.
(iii) Expand the use by the UN and regional organizations of speciallytrained civil policemen and policewomen in complex emergencies.
(iv) Deployment, by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, of an independent Human Rights Monitoring Unit along with every UN peace operation. Member states must provide the requisite funding for this initiative, which is already in force but has been impeded by lack of funding.
(v) Ensure ICRC access for monitoring the application of international humanitarian law and humanitarian basic principles by all parties concerned.
Finding A-3:
Non-Reading and Mis-Reading of Early Warnings of Genocide
There were increasing warning-signs from NGOs, academics, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, UNAMIR and others of intent and preparation for an organized genocidal attack on Tutsi and an assassination of moderate Hutu from early 1993 onwards. But the apex of the international community in the UN Secretariat and Security Council did not recognize the signs for what they were, nor did they strategically analyze them. Lack of any effective response to these increasingly open indications gave intending perpetrators no reason to pause in their preparations; the weakness of UN peace forces both in numbers and mandate provided further reassurance.
Recommendation:
A More Effective Conflict Early Warning System
To the UN Secretary-General
Establish a unit for strategic analysis of early warning of conflicts, including genocide and political assassination, directly under the Office of the SecretaryGeneral, drawing on, but not substituting for, the information provided by UNHCHR, UN/DHA and a worldwide network of states, regional organizations, institutes and NGOs. This unit should have the capability to analyze, interpret and develop strategic options to be presented to the Secretary-General, but should not have other operational responsibilities. The head of this unit should have guaranteed direct access to the Secretary-General. The unit would not substitute for a Humanitarian Early Warning System (see Recommendation C-2, below).
Finding A-4:
Insufficient Reliance on Regional Organizations and Sub-Regional Groupings
Despite rhetoric emanating from the international community about greater reliance on regional and sub-regional organizations, such as the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (Communauté économique des pays des Grands Lacs - CEPGL), and the neighbouring states individually, these were given neither the mandate nor the resources nor the actual cooperation at some critical stages in the Rwanda emergency. In fact, as brought out in Study II, the OAU, which had played a vigorous and effective role in mediating the Arusha Accords, was discouraged by the UN Security Council and Secretary-General from playing a significant role in their monitoring and implementation. Given the paucity of its own resources and the limited capacity of its member states to contribute financially, the OAU would have had to rely on financial and/or matriel support from the UN or wealthier states outside the region. But with such support the OAU could have played the more significant role it was willing to play in conflict resolution and peace monitoring efforts, a role that could have made a major difference to the genocidal outcome.
Recommendation:
Strengthen and Involve the Mediation and Peacekeeping Capacities of Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations and Local Parties
To the Secretaries-General of the UN, OAU and OAS for Follow-up and to Member States for Necessary Action
a. Ensure that regional participation in preventive diplomacy carries over into peacekeeping so as to establish continuity between mediation and peacekeeping.
b. Allocate adequate resources to regional and sub-regional organizations and neighbouring states to enable them to be effective in preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping, taking into consideration that most of the world's conflicts occur in regions where these parties have the fewest resources to deal with them.
c. Ensure that the UN sanctions action, sets parameters and monitors implementation of forceful intervention and, where needed, helps finance and otherwise support such actions, but remains the body of last resort for implementation.
d. Accelerate current plans for strengthening OAU's peacekeeping functions with the support of the UN.
Finding A-5:
Flawed Human Rights Mechanisms and Performance
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights/Centre for Human Rights and the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, were involved in the different phases of the Rwanda crisis. The performance of these mechanisms has been mixed for a number of reasons, including a lag in evaluating and reporting accounts of threatened genocide and failure of member governments to take action when reports were submitted. The Human Rights Field Operation for Rwanda, the first under the High Commissioner and back-stopped by the Centre, has encountered a range of internal and external problems, enumerated in Study IV, that have impeded its effectiveness. One underlying factor has been lack of regular budgetary funding, which has _created uncertainty and staff discontinuity.
Recommendation:
Strengthen Human Rights Machinery
To the High Commissioner for Human Rights and Member States
a. Establish a small high-calibre unit under the High Commissioner for Human Rights, with the sole function of analyzing and interpreting information on indications of conspiracy to genocide and all other escalating violations of human rights. This unit should have direct access to the proposed early warning unit in the Secretary-General's office (see Recommendation A-3). Its performance will partly depend on the effectiveness of an adequately-funded field presence for information-gathering and fact-finding.
b. Effective human rights machinery must have adequate standing procedures for vigilance over threatened genocide and for prompt investigative action. It requires adequate budgetary resources, clear mandates and qualified professional staff at both headquarters and field levels.
c. In seeking improved effectiveness of human rights machinery, complementarity should be ensured with activities of other organizations mandated for protection of victims of conflict or other vulnerable groups.
d. Fund and conduct an independent evaluation of the Human Rights Field Operation for Rwanda and charge it with making highly professional and specific recommendations for optimal UN machinery and response to threatened genocide and human rights deprivations.
Finding A-6:
Contingency Planning, Preparedness Measures, Choice of Interventions and Donor Response
Humanitarian response of official multilateral and bilateral agencies and NGOs to massive population displacements, triggered by the Rwanda genocide, was extraordinary. While it is impossible to estimate what the toll would have been in the absence of these efforts, it undoubtedly would have been staggering from starvation alone. Even so, an estimated 80,000 died in camps in Zaire, Tanzania and inside Rwanda in 1994, primarily from cholera and dysentery. It is true that agencies and NGOs had to confront extremely difficult and often dangerous conditions in Goma, Zaire, and an inhospitable physical and political environment as well. Nonetheless, more attention to needs and capacities assessments, contingency planning, preparedness measures, and adoption of the most cost-effective interventions by UN agencies, NGOs and donor governments, including military contingents providing humanitarian assistance, would have resulted in better allocation of relief resources and, more importantly, could have saved even more human lives.
One problem regarding such concepts as contingency planning and preparedness measures is lack of consistent working definitions among agencies. As discussed in Study III, it is important that preparedness be broadly conceived to include the advance placement of key technical and logistics staff and adequate mapping and communications equipment. The development and promulgation by UNHCR of "service packages" was an important innovation during the Rwanda crisis. In continuing efforts to improve this approach, better standby arrangements for larger strategic equipment items, such as bulldozers and water tankers, are needed.
It is important to underline that donor governments can be just as deficient in inadequate planning and preparedness as other agencies. Study III found instances of donors being prepared to fund transportation of inappropriate commodities (bottled water being an egregious example) and others where UN agencies had made timely identification of appropriate needs, but donor governments did not live up to their commitments to provide them, or did not provide them in a timely manner. Long delays in providing water tanker trucks and bulldozers to the Goma area are the most serious examples, examples that did result in deaths that could have been prevented.
Recommendation:
Policy and Funding for Preparedness Measures
a. To the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee and Agencies, Bilateral Donors, OECD/DAC, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGO Network Organizations, and to Member States for Necessary Support
Each group to whom this recommendation is addressed should develop policy guidelines and operating procedures appropriate to their functions for undertaking needs and capacities assessments, contingency planning, preparedness measures and procurement of supplies and equipment for cost-effective interventions (e.g., bucket chlorination for water purification, oral rehydration salts), as well as for cost-effective investments in mitigating critical logistical bottlenecks, such as key transportation links.
However, there should be as wide agreement as possible on consistent working definitions of contingency planning and preparedness measures to be used by agencies and organizations involved in humanitarian relief operations. The UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee, with the participation of NGO implementing partners, would be a logical forum to agree on a common set of definitions from those that have been developed by such agencies as DHA and UNHCR. Consultations should also take place with the components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent movement and with OECD/DAC.
In order to fulfil its purpose of anticipating possible developments, contingency planning should project a range of scenarios and analyze factors bearing on the likelihood of each scenario. An important basis for drawing up contingency plans should be information and analysis drawn from the integrated humanitarian early warning capacity recommended in C-2 below. Just as important, the contingency plan must then be updated to reflect relevant changes in the environment.
Preparedness measures should be conceived broadly, to include needs for advance placement on-the-ground of technical and logistics staff, adequate mapping, appropriate communications equipment and standby arrangements for larger strategic equipment. They also require a coordinated approach, and should therefore come under the sphere of improved coordination efforts as recommended in C-3 below.
b. To the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee and Agencies, Donor Governments, Bilateral Agencies and OECD/DAC
i. Donors should be prepared to provide increased up-front funding to agencies for contingency planning and preparedness measures for major complex emergencies and honour pledges to do so. For activities that draw on funds channelled through the UN, the existing contingency fund overseen by DHA should be expanded and procedures for its utilization streamlined.
ii. Donor funding sources and implementing agencies need to be brought together, perhaps through OECD/DAC, to seek a common understanding regarding mutually acceptable levels of investment in contingency planning and preparedness measures and accompanying levels of risk.
iii. Donors should be prepared to fund costs for appropriate and cost-effective interventions and they should implement expeditiously commitments made to agencies to supply equipment and supplies.
Finding A-7:
Slow and Restricted Recovery Aid
In the aftermath of the genocide, donors were generally not well-prepared to assist in the recovery _of Rwanda. Significant pledges of development aid were made by the beginning of 1995, but the flexible, fast-disbursing aid needed by the government to restore basic capacities was slow in materializing.
Among the reasons for this lag have been: donor government concerns regarding the legitimacy of the post-genocide government; normal agency procedural requirements that resulted in prolonged processing, leading to delayed commitments and disbursements; frequent turnover of key personnel and political rivalries within the government; and continuing incidents of violence within Rwanda. But a major factor has been the inability to achieve a mutual understanding between donors and the new government over their respective requirements and constraints. To provide fast-disbursing aid (programme or budget support), donors need assurance about the transparency and accountability of the government's budget preparation and execution processes.
Recommendation:
Rapid Availability of Flexible Resources for Key Functions
To the Bilateral Donors, Multilateral Development Banks, UN/DHA, UN Development Agencies and the OECD Development Assistance Committee
a. Initiate, at the earliest possible stage, consultations between donors and the government to address concerns on both sides, and to agree on the conditions under which donors will provide assistance.
b. Develop guidelines through DAC for countries recovering from complex emergencies that:
B. Detection, Prevention and Suppression of Genocide and Civil Violence
This section presents additional findings and recommendations that relate to issues dealt with by Study II.
Finding B-1:
Flawed Use of Conditionality
Some members of the international community did attempt to influence the government of Rwanda to curb increasing violations of human rights during the three-year period preceding the genocide. These efforts included diplomatic representations and, in one case, clear warnings that economic and military aid would be reconsidered unless the situation was rectified. While a few human rights cases were attended to, for the most part these efforts had no impact on the escalation of civil violence. In principle, most bilateral donors made economic aid, which had become very substantial by the early 1990s (almost US$50 per capita), conditional upon observance of human rights, but in practice virtually no donor reduced aid with specific and exclusive reference to human rights violations. Canada did indicate that its reductions were a result of human rights violations, even though other factors influenced the decision. Some bilateral donors hoped that "positive conditionality," by promoting democratization through support for a free press, local human rights organizations and the justice system would check human rights violations. However, violations continued to increase in severity. Severe drought and massive population displacements caused by the RPF offensive of early 1993 resulted in a substantial shift to humanitarian aid, which provided less leeway for conditionality. By suspending aid in late 1993 and early 1994 with reference to bookkeeping and project feasibility rather than human rights criteria, donors sent the message that human rights conditionality was preached but not practised.
Recommendation:
More Effective Conditionality
To the OECD Development Assistance Committee, UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee and International Financial Institutions.
Identify and be prepared to implement consistently a range of measures intended to pressure a government to halt severe civil violence and human rights violations. Between diplomatic representations at one end of the range and intervention of peacekeeping forces at the other, are such measures as implementation of economic and military assistance conditionality, freezing of foreign bank accounts and application of selective embargoes. As noted in the finding above, assistance conditionality may be either "positive" or "negative." An approach often used in conjunction with positive or negative conditionality is policy dialogue through day-to-day contact or in more formal settings, such as Consultative Group and Round Table meetings that bring all major donors together with the government.
Economic conditionality imposed by outside actors must be formulated with a view to its likely impact on human rights conditions and conflict in the receiving country. Actual measures adopted must be tailored to the specific situation, taking into account the possibility that a given measure might increase rather than decrease violence. For this reason, a systematic study of past experience, including an in-depth study of Rwanda, regarding timing, nature and effects of both positive and negative conditionality would be highly desirable.
Drawing from such a study, the formulation of a clear and uniform policy will require consultations within and among such bodies as the OECD Development Assistance Committee, the Development Committee for the Bretton Woods institutions and regional development banks, and the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee.
Finding B-2:
Illegal Arms Trade Fuelled the Violence
Outside arms suppliers contributed to and exacerbated the conflict in Rwanda in violation of the spirit if not the text of the Arusha Accords, preceding cease-fire agreements and the UN arms embargo. After the genocide, continued rearming of former government military and militia, as reported to have been occurring in Zaire, increased the threat of repetition of the cycle of massive violence. The recently established International Commission of Inquiry, charged with investigating these reports, will hopefully lead to a cessation of such arms shipments.
Recommendation:
Enforce Arms Embargoes
To the UN Secretary-General, Member States and the Media for Necessary Action
Finding B-3:
Flaws in the Peace Process
As reflected in the Arusha Accords process, negotiations and peace agreements entail risks, tending to further polarize those who reject the agreements. In particular, the problem posed by Hutu extremists who were left out of the Accords power-sharing arrangements was not addressed, or even sufficiently recognized as a serious problem by the international community at the time. Implementation and monitoring requirements, including the peacekeeping force called for by the Accords, received insufficient attention and action by the international community. In particular, the UN failed to make adequate use of the OAU and local African states, who had been intensively involved in negotiations, in the implementation phase.
Recommendation:
Sustainable Peace Agreements
To the Secretaries-General of the UN, OAU and OAS for Follow-up and to Member States for Necessary Action
Peace agreements require careful follow-up and monitoring to ensure their consolidation and implementation. This may require special measures to speed up demobilization of the warring parties, disarm or neutralize opponents of the agreement, and provision of incentives to maintain momentum. Regional organizations and neighbouring states should be actively involved at every stage of the process.
The UN Secretariat should undertake a study, in consultation with OAU and OAS, with a view to developing guidelines on follow-up and monitoring of peace agreements. Any guidelines would have to take into account the complexity of such agreements and the need for follow-up to be tailored to their unique characteristics.