Journal of Humanitarian Assistance
The Synthesis Report is comprised of five chapters. The first four summarize the main themes, issues and conclusions of each component study of the evaluation, beginning with an historical overview of the causes and development of the crisis in Chapter One; an analysis of early warning and attempts to contain the conflict in Chapter Two; an evaluation of the international humanitarian response in Chapter Three; and an assessment of the prospects for reconstruction and development in Chapter Four. These chapters have been prepared by the lead authors of the respective studies. Chapter Five presents main findings and recommendations addressed to members of the international community.
The fifth chapter as well as this introduction are based on the four study reports and also draw on contributions from the panel of African experts, the resource persons and members of the Steering Committee. The individual study reports contain more in-depth analyses as well as a number of additional conclusions and recommendations. Thus not every study recommendation is reflected in this volume. While the bulk of the issues addressed in the Introduction and Chapter Five come directly out of the four studies, some are "cross-cutting" in nature, deriving from an overview of all four studies, or reflect the complementary perspectives of the African panel, resource persons and Steering Committee members.
The majority of the recommendations set forth in the last chapter are framed to be applicable to future complex emergencies. In view of the continuing crisis in Rwanda as well as the grave situation in neighbouring Burundi, a number of the recommendations are also very relevant to the immediate future. Further elaboration is provided in Chapter Five.
The overwhelming reality of the genocide
The planned, deliberate effort to eliminate the Tutsi population of Rwanda that culminated in the massive slaughter[1] of April-July 1994 fully meets the definition of genocide articulated in the "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide," adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948 (see the summary of key articles of the Convention in Chapter One, below). In this evaluation, the overwhelming reality of the genocide soon became clear in ways that had not been envisaged at the outset. As a result, the approach of a ÒtraditionalÓ evaluation with emphasis on impact, efficiency and cost-effectiveness analysis was not always appropriate or sufficient, but had to be supplemented with qualitative analysis of cause-and-effect assessed in relation to contractual obligations or international legal norms. Similarly, the documentary research and, especially, the interviews and field work, repeatedly demonstrated how the genocide, its victims and its perpetrators, shaped the prospects for rehabilitation and recovery, probably for decades to come.
A basic premise of the evaluation was that it would yield applicable lessons for the international community, both in responding to emergencies and helping to rebuild societies. Despite the unique character of the Rwanda experience, it also shares many of the characteristics of other complex emergencies. An evaluation of this experience should therefore be able to frame recommendations that have relevance for complex emergencies more generally.
The dynamic nature of the crisis
The dynamic nature, unpredictablity and complexity of the Rwanda crisis raise many difficult issues for the international community in terms of timing, nature and scale of response. For Rwanda, with almost two million refugees just outside its borders, the crisis is far from over.
Most of the field research for this evaluation was conducted in the spring and early summer of 1995. Efforts have been made to update the field work findings through documentary research and long-distance communication. However, as the situation continues to evolve, there is an inescapable tradeoff between timeliness and completeness. There has already been sufficient experience regarding the response of the international community to yield findings with important implications for the future.
The range of responses to the Rwanda crisis may be categorized as follows:
The continuation of the crisis has imposed a limitation for the evaluation with respect to this last category. A complete evaluation of the repatriation and rehabilitation experiences of refugees who fled from Rwanda in 1994 has not been possible. Most have resisted repatriation due to intimidation from camp leaders and the perpetrators of genocide, and out of fear of reprisals inside Rwanda. An assessment of the impact of assistance for recovery and reconstruction has not been possible because until recently little of the pledged assistance had been committed and disbursed.
A related limitation is incomplete analysis of the important regional context. While account is taken of the recent evolution of the Rwanda crisis and its implications for the surrounding Great Lakes Region, neither the Synthesis nor the four studies have analyzed the situation in Burundi and the other Great Lakes countries sufficiently to provide a definitive assessment. Notwithstanding this deficiency, several of the recommendations set out in Chapter Five are believed to be relevant for the international communityÕs response to the current crisis in Burundi and should receive urgent attention. These considerations are discussed further in the fifth chapter.
The audience: the international community
The audience for this evaluation is the "international community," defined to include all those who are affected by, and/or respond to, a "complex emergency" (as defined in the Preface). This includes governments, official international and inter-governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement [2]. The audience includes such entities based in neighbouring countries, the region and the world-at-large. The governmental and official entities can be further differentiated as bilateral donor agencies; various elements of the United Nations; international financial institutions; and other inter-governmental organizations such as the OECD, the European Union and OAU. In addition to entities at the apex of bilateral and multilateral policy-making, such as foreign ministries and the UN Security Council and General Assembly, included are organizations devoted to such functions as the protection of human rights and refugees, to the provision of humanitarian emergency aid, and to longer-term development aid. Some organizations concentrate exclusively on one of these functions and others combine two or more functions.
The primary audience for the evaluation is the leadership and management of the above-mentioned entities who make decisions regarding responses to complex emergencies. In the last chapter of the Synthesis, recommendations are targeted to the greatest extent possible to specific entities for suggested follow-up responsibilities.
Some salient findings and issues
To set the stage for the following chapters, several significant findings and issues that emerge from the evaluation are set out below:
1. A complex, interacting combination of factors, some based in the history of Rwanda and others more proximate, contributed to the genocide in Rwanda.
2. There were significant signs that forces in Rwanda were preparing the climate and structures for genocide and political assassinations. However, people both in the region and the broader international community ignored, discounted or misinterpreted the significance of these signs, thereby not only indicating an unwillingness to intervene, but communicating that unwillingness to those who were planning genocide. Key actors in the international community thus certainly share responsibility for the fact that the genocide was allowed to begin.
3. Moreover, as it began, through hesitations to respond and vacillation in providing and equipping peacekeeping forces, the international community failed to stop or stem the genocide, and in this regard shares responsibility for the extent of it.
4. Thus the essential failures of the response of the international community to the genocide in Rwanda were (and continue to be) political. Had appropriate political decisions been taken early on, it is apparent that much of the humanitarian operation subsequently required would have been unnecessary. In effect, humanitarian action substituted for political action. Since key political issues have yet to be resolved, the crisis continues, as does the necessity for massive allocation of humanitarian resources.
5. As the extent of flight of people from Rwanda became clear, the international humanitarian assistance system launched an impressive and, on the whole, effective relief operation. In spite of the extreme challenges of massive cross-border population movements, the international response saved many lives and mitigated large-scale suffering. Nonetheless, improved contingency planning and coordination, increased preparedness measures and adoption of more cost-effective interventions could have saved even more lives, as well as relief resources.
6. Several distinct factors shape the current prospects for Rwanda's recovery. These include the following:
a. Overt rearming and reorganization of the former leadership, military and militia in or beside internationally-supported camps in Zaire have posed a threat of war in the region for well over a year. However, with recent arrests of a number of former Rwandese government officials by Zairian authorities and proposed joint plans with UNHCR to begin substantial repatriation in the latter part of January 1996, a significant barrier to repatriation may be reduced. The inability or unwillingness of numerous refugees to return also results from insecurity, harsh detention and uncertain or conflicting government policy inside Rwanda.
b. While some donors have been quite forthcoming, the failure of the international community as a whole to provide adequate support for the government of Rwanda has also undermined future stability and development efforts. In particular, insufficient attention and resources have been given to the survivors of genocide and the war inside Rwanda.
c. An essential element of reconstruction in Rwanda must be the establishment of an effective system of justice through which perpetrators of genocide are held, and seen to be accountable and punished, thus thwarting the "culture of impunity" that has been allowed to persist over the decades by Rwandese governments and by the international community.
The return of pre-1994 refugees, many of whom left Rwanda after the 1959 "social revolution," raises serious problems regarding property, land use rights and other requirements for their successful economic and social integration. These issues and those surrounding successful repatriation of the 1994, "new caseload" refugees, weigh heavily on the government.
d. Real and lasting resolution of problems in the Rwandese political arena will be achieved only in the broader context of:
(i) the creation of a domestic inclusive political system that reflects the underlying principles of the Arusha Accords, and
(ii) the Great Lakes Region, itself confronted by similar issues, especially in Burundi, where politically-motivated violence has created an explosive situation that threatens regional security and stability.
Notes:
1. References in the evaluation to numbers killed in Rwanda during this three-month period are expressed in terms of a range of five to eight hundred thousand. Single estimates that have some reasonable basis behind them fall within this range. Some estimates fall outside the range, but there are reasons to doubt their validity.
2. The components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent movement include the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) along with the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.