Journal of Humanitarian Assistance
8. The Bukavu influx
The majority of the Burundian refugees who crossed into South Kivu in October 1993 were concentrated in the Uvira area and only a limited number settled in Bukavu. Following the start of the genocide inside Rwanda, approximately 10,000 Rwandese (principally of Tutsi origin) crossed into the Bukavu area, settling in temporary camps on Ijwi Island, on the Birava shore and in the town itself. Subsequently, these were moved to planned camps at Nyakavogo, Nyangezi and Nyatende. In July, when refugees of Hutu origin began arriving in Bukavu in massive numbers, the Tutsi discretely returned to Rwanda and within a few days the population of the three camps changed completely.
As with Ngara and Goma, some preparations were made by relief agencies to cope with a large influx of refugees. The ICRC opened an office in the town and at the end of April UNHCR dispatched ERT members and consultants to Bukavu to assist the sub-office with the Tutsi caseload and to plan for a larger influx should the need arise. In June CARE-UK opened an office in Bukavu. However, by July when the large influx began it appears that these personnel had left the area and UNHCR's level of preparedness was limited. From 19 June until the end of August, Bukavu was used as a rear base by the French-led force involved in Opération Turquoise.
The major influx occurred in two waves. The first wave occurred around mid-July and, as with the simultaneous influx into Goma, contained a substantial proportion of military personnel from the FAR, while the Bukavu influx also included a large number of civil servants and wealthy merchants. The second wave took place during the week from 14-20 August in anticipation of the departure of the French forces from the Safe Zone. A feature of both waves was the amount of removable assets (much of it looted) that were carried over the border, including zinc sheeting, furniture, doors and even toilets. Some refugees made several return trips to collect more items.
Figure 8
Location of the camps in the Bukavu area
The total number who crossed during this period was approximately 250,000. Both waves crossed the Ruzizi River at two bridges. Though some were moved out to the existing camps, the majority were forced to settle on available open ground in the town, which quickly became choked. To prevent more entering the town, the Zairian authorities officially closed the border on 19 August, though refugees were still permitted to enter at the Ruzizi II crossing south of the town, on condition that they were transported directly to camps.
Within the town, by far the largest concentration was at the Alfajiri Seminary/College in the centre that by 23 August had an estimated 20,000 people in the grounds. Other locations where large numbers were temporarily camped included Panzi (5,000), Mukukwe (9,600), Nguba (5,000), Anglican Cathedral (3,500), Athenée de Bagira (6,000). Thousands more were settled on any available open sites such as roundabouts, school grounds and roadsides. The local authorities, local NGOs/ churches and other agencies present responded as best they could. For instance, the seminarists at Alfajiri organized food and water distributions to those settled in the college grounds with the assistance of Caritas, while CEPZa/CELZa (Communauté d'Eglise Pentecôte du Zaire/Communauté d'Eglise Libre du Zaire, which was supported by Norwegian Church Aid), organized food distributions and medical care for over 20,000 refugees located at five sites around the town. Other local NGOs involved were AUCUN/AntiBwaki and Parosiss.
In addition to the relief provided by these agencies, three factors appear to have been crucial in assisting the refugees to cope during this period, namely:
General ration distributions were deliberately not undertaken in the town, partly to discourage permanent settlement; instead, efforts by WFP and the other agencies were concentrated on the existing and newly-opened camps. However, fearing a deterioration of nutritional status of groups of refugees in the town, the local authorities and agencies working there decided to undertake large-scale wet-feeding (i.e. cooked) distributions at the main sites; these commenced in the third week of August.
From late July onwards, the number of international agencies working in the Bukavu area increased and began to complement the efforts of the local NGOs, churches and municipal authorities. An MSF-France medical team and a WFP Rapid Response Team designed to reinforce the WFP-Bukavu sub-office arrived on 18 July. Coordination meetings were held every morning attended by WFP, UNHCR, ICRC, UNICEF and NGOs. Because of his seniority and emergency experience, the meetings were chaired by the WFP RRT Leader. Subsequently, other agencies arrived and worked in either the town and/or the camps. These included CARE-Canada, Oxfam, the Swedish Rescue Board, World Vision, UNICEF, IFRC, GTZ, THW, Order of Malta, CARE-Deutschland, AICF and AMDA.
Assisted by NGOs such as CARE, Oxfam and MSF, UNHCR attempted rapidly to identify potential sites for new camps and to make arrangements for them to be opened and for refugees to be moved out of the town to them. However, this process took considerable time as a result of inadequate preparedness, limited personnel capacity, lack of suitable sites and problems encountered with the owners and local authorities over permission to use the land.
The sequence of the opening of the new camps was as follows:
On 15 December, the town was declared to be free of refugees and the transfer process halted [37]. Refugees were taken to the new sites by bus and lorry, with the Anglican Cathedral and Alfajiri being the collecting points. Some refugees organized their own transport. Once they were in the camps, the provision of services and registration was the responsibility of the lead NGOs or those NGOs involved in the provision of particular services. CARE, IFRC, Order of Malta, Caritas and CEPZa/CELZa were the lead agencies in setting up and managing the camps. In most cases, the lead agency also took responsibility for organizing food and non-food distributions. A larger number of NGOs were involved in providing health care within the camps.
Formal counting of the refugee population took place between 28 February and 7 March. This resulted in a reduction of the estimate from 350,000 to just under 300,000. By March 1995, the estimated population was 307,951 spread between 25 camps and four unaccompanied children's centres (UCCs). The camps range from the largest, Inera (52,294), to the smallest, Bideka (939). The approximate distance between Chimanga camp in the far south-west and Kabira camp in the far north of the Bukavu group of camps is 120 kilometres. Kashusha camp is referred to variously as the government-in-exile camp or the intellectuals camp. Two military camps fell outside HCR obligations: one at Panzi (near Ruzizi I bridge) and the other at Bulongwi (west of Bukavu). Lack of food in these camps resulted in thefts and violence in neighbouring camps. In early 1995, Caritas began supplying food to them to reduce the level of insecurity.
9. Humanitarian activities in the south and west of Rwanda (April-December)
9.1. April to the start of Opération Turquoise
The genocide was extended to the south of the country in the third week of April, following the arrival of elements of the Presidential Guard in Butare. The sudden worsening of the security situation forced the withdrawal of the MSF team, which had remained in the area. Between then and the start of Opération Turquoise in the third week of June the insecurity was so great that relief efforts were very limited and only three agencies were able to deliver assistance - ICRC, CRS/Caritas and WFP (with a small Trocaire medical team setting up in Gikongoro just prior to the start of Opération Turquoise).
Of these agencies, the ICRC had the greatest freedom of movement, and personnel operating out of Bujumbura and Bukavu undertook regular, albeit slow and often extremely hazardous missions in the area. Beginning in April, the ICRC office in Bukavu began providing medical and food supplies to some 8,000 displaced Tutsi at Nyarushishi near Cyangugu and some 2,500 at other locations near the town. In May, at the request of the transitional government then located in Gitarama, the ICRC opened a sub-delegation office at Kabgayi to provide food (much of it supplied by WFP) and medical care to displaced persons in the area. A five-person surgical team worked in the mission hospital in Kabgayi until June, when the RPF offensive forced a move initially to Nyanza and then to Rilima in the Bugesera area in July. Throughout May, June and July a water and sanitation specialist based in Bukavu toured the FAR areas extensively, enabling the ICRC to make a significant contribution to the restoration and maintenance of water supplies in several of the large towns and a number of orphanages, hospitals, IDP camps and ICRC medical facilities. In the towns, the officials of Electrogaz38, who remained, were contacted and supported with supplies of equipment and water purification chemicals [39] purchased in neighbouring countries and delivered by ICRC. In all, the ICRC distributed approximately 800 tonnes of food, relief supplies and water purification chemicals in the FAR area during May and June.
In May, discussions between WFP and ICRC about how to rationalize their activities resulted in agreement that, in the south of the country, WFP would take responsibility for supplying Burundian refugees located in camps along the border and for Rwandese IDPs and conflict-affected persons between the border up to and including Butare. ICRC took responsibility for supplying Rwandese IDPs and conflict-affected persons to the north of the line, including the area from Rusumo to Rwamagana and to the north of Butare up to and including Gitarama. Initially, distributions were undertaken using supplies from WFP stocks in Butare by MSF (for the first two weeks after the Presidential plane was shot down until deteriorating security forced the withdrawal) and the Rwandese Red Cross, which continued to operate in the Butare area until the end of May. Thereafter, the insecurity and WFP's lack of implementing partners severely limited its ability to distribute relief food in the agreed area. Support was given to the Father Vjeko/CRS cross-border effort (see below) and food was supplied to ICRC's efforts further north. However, the amounts of food aid involved during the period were very limited. Approximately 400 tonnes of food were distributed in the Butare, Gitarama and Nyamata areas during April, May and the beginning of June, about 80% of which was drawn from the Butare stores and the remainder provided from Burundi.
Because of the insecurity, WFP was able to carry out only three assessment missions into Rwanda during this period. As a result, information provided by distributing partners could not be properly checked. The requirement that UN personnel receive permission before crossing into Rwanda and communication problems between WFP-Bujumbura and UNREO in Nairobi delayed one assessment mission for several days.
At the end of April, CRS-Rwanda personnel who had earlier evacuated to Bujumbura made contact with a Catholic priest, Father Vjeko, from the mission in Kabgayi, who had crossed into Burundi to procure supplies for IDPs who had gathered at the Kabgayi Mission. CRS supported his efforts to provide food to concentrations of threatened Tutsi and Hutu at various locations in the south and west of the country. The first two truck convoys carrying food at the beginning of May quickly developed into regular convoys operating two or three times a week and delivering anywhere between 100 to 400 tonnes of food commodities, blankets and medicines each week. Other agencies contributing to the CRS/Caritas-Rwanda cross-border operation included Caritas-Neerlandica, Caritas-Germany, Caritas-Spain, CAFOD, OFDA, WFP, UNICEF and World Vision International (WVI). Towards the end of June, the number of NGOs based in Burundi and supporting the operation had grown and this enabled the rationalization of the trucks available and the provision of complementary assistance. Solidarité française provided trucks and drivers to the CRS-led operation and this enabled the redeployment of smaller trucks to the dioceses in Butare and Gikongoro. Trocaire, in conjunction with Medical Missionaries of Mary, placed a four-person medical team at the IDP camp growing up at Cyanika. AICF, Merlin and CARE joined the overall efforts around this time.
9.2. Opération Turquoise and its aftermath
The mandate for Opération Turquoise provided by Security Council resolution 929 on 22 June invoked Chapter VII (enforcement) rather than Chapter VI (peacekeeping) wording and set the objectives as ending the massacres in Rwanda, protecting the surviving groups, facilitating humanitarian operations and handing over to UNAMIR after the two-month period judged necessary to bring UNAMIR up to the force level agreed under Security Council resolution 918 of 17 May.
The force was composed of 2,555 French troops and 350 other troops, principally from Senegal but also including contributions from six other Francophone countries. It contained a substantial "punch" including 12 Jaguar and F-1 jet aircraft, artillery, light armour and helicopters. Though the force structure may have contributed to the initial international questioning of the mission's precise motives, it carried a clear but unspoken message that neither the RPF nor FAR forces should interfere with the mission. Contact established in Brussels with the RPF was maintained indirectly through the RPF Liaison office within UNAMIR and directly through a specially-established satellite telephone link. By these means the RPF was briefed on the mission so as to reduce the chances of confrontation between the Opération Turquoise forces and the RPF. Apart from two incidents, one near Kibuye and the other in Butare [40], there were no violent confrontations with the RPF. Within the safe zone there were apparently a number of unrecorded confrontations with elements of the FAR and the civilian militia as the Turquoise troops sought to disarm the militia.
Movement of the troops to the rear bases of Goma and Bukavu began on 19 June but the first reconnaissance mission into Rwanda was delayed until authorization had been obtained from the UN Security Council three days later. On the first day, accompanied by film crews, troops began protecting the large, predominantly Tutsi camp at Nyarushishi near Cyangugu to which the ICRC had been providing food and medical assistance for several weeks previously. From Goma and Bukavu infantry and armoured columns pushed eastwards to a north-south line running just west of Gitarama. By the end of the month, the force was concentrated on a so-called safe zone covering the south-west quadrant of the country and its presence in the north-west withdrawn. The decision process that led to the concentration on the south-west is unclear. A civilian adviser to the French military has claimed that it was influenced by the absence of Tutsi requiring protection in the north-west of the country [41].
With seven weeks remaining before the withdrawal date stipulated in the Security Council resolution, French efforts were concentrated on policing the safe zone and encouraging relief organizations to establish programmes for the IDPs in the area. First estimates by the Turquoise forces of the number of IDPs in the Gikongoro area at the beginning of July were 250,000, with another 100,000 in the Cyangugu and Kibuye areas. With the rapid advances being made by the RPF in the north and central areas, the collapse and withdrawal of the FAR forces in the north-west, the numbers of IDPs in the safe zone grew rapidly, particularly from the beginning of July. By 12 August these estimates had increased dramatically to 600,000 in Gikongoro and with a further 800,000 in Cyangugu and 300,000 in Kibuye [42]. Several assessments of the situation were carried out during June and July by inter-agency teams, with personnel from the French Humanitarian Cell, UNREO, and the OFDA Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART) playing a central role. The policy that evolved was to commence relief distributions to the IDPs as quickly as possible so as to discourage their westward movement and thereby prevent a repeat of the Goma exodus. In early July, WFP and ICRC reviewed their earlier division-of-labour agreement and it was agreed that they would jointly share responsibility for supplying food to the IDPs concentrated around Gikongoro, with WFP taking responsibility for providing food to the IDP camps to the north of the Butare-Cyangugu road and ICRC the area to the south.
Many NGOs were initially reluctant to commence operations in the area, being suspicious of the motives underlying Opération Turquoise and reluctant to work with Hutu officials and IDPs who had been involved in the genocide. The initial lack of implementing partners made it difficult for WFP, UNICEF and other UN agencies to establish programmes rapidly to meet the needs of the IDPs. WFP's own transport capability was limited pending the arrival in Bujumbura of additional trucks from the WFP Transport Operation in Ethiopia (WTOE) fleet; both UNAMIR and Opération Turquoise maintained that they could not spare vehicles for WFP use in the south.
French officials became frustrated at the slow response, seeing the situation in the south-west as a forgotten humanitarian catastrophe at a time when attention was focused on Goma and to a lesser extent Kigali and the north-west. WFP in particular was criticized for its delay in commencing distributions to the IDPs north of Gikongoro - distributions that included French-donated food aid [43]. In July, ECHO practically obliged NGOs it was funding in Burundi to establish operations in the safe zone, using funds remaining from its allocations to the Burundian refugee and IDP emergency of late 1993.
The main camps north of Gikongoro for which WFP had taken responsibility were:
Camp and Approximate Population
Cyanika 85,000
Rukondo 48,000
Kaduha 25,000
Musenge 5,000
Agreements were reached with AICF to manage food distributions in Cyanika and with CARE for the other three camps. WFP supplied food to stores in Gikongoro [44] and AICF and CARE, with assistance from the French logistics NGO Equilibre [45], moved the food to the camps for distribution. WFP began deliveries to Gikongoro in July, but was unable to build up sufficient stocks to enable full general ration distributions in the camps until August. However, CARE was able to borrow over 400 tonnes of food from CRS-Burundi and commence distributions in the Rukondo, Kaduha and Musenge camps in July.
There were eight IDP camps south of Gikongoro for which ICRC took responsibility for supplying food:
Camp and Approximate Population
Kibeho 100,000 (of which 60,000 actually in camp)
Ndago 60,000
Nuyamigina 25,000
Kamana 20,000
Munini 12,000
Buhoro <5,000
Ruramba <5,000
Rwamik <5,000
The ICRC transported the food from Uganda initially across RPF/Opération Turquoise lines. Approximately 600 tonnes were distributed to the IDPs in July, increasing dramatically to over 4,000 tonnes during August and slightly 3,700 tonnes in September. However, the agency experienced considerable difficulties in estimating the camp populations, as it had not been able to conduct a census and its chosen method of distribution within the camps was inequitable (see Section 5.5).
Despite the initial reluctance of NGOs to work in the south-west, there was a rapid increase in the number of agencies in August. Some worked camps supplied by both ICRC and WFP, whilst others established programmes for the host population. The earlier CRS-Caritas operations were expanded and in July, MSF, CARE, AICF and Equilibre opened offices in or near Gikongoro. Trocaire, Merlin, Feed the Children, UNICEF, SCF-UK and several other agencies set up programmes involving non-food distributions, health care and supplementary feeding during August. On 20 August, the British Army field medical team that had initially been based in Ruhengeri in the north-west was redeployed to the south-west and ran treatment facilities in Kitabi and Kibeho camps and provided mobile services to several other IDP camps. Oxfam and UNICEF46 began water supply and distribution operations for IDPs during September.
In accordance with Security Council resolution 929, Opération Turquoise forces withdrew from Rwanda on 22 August. The withdrawal created considerable fears amongst the IDPs for their security and thousands moved across the border to Bukavu, though efforts were made by UNREO to encourage them to remain. By agreement with UNAMIR and the SRSG, the RPF did not immediately assume control of the area. Préfets were placed in Cyangugu, Kibuye and Gikongoro on 12 September, each accompanied by a platoon of RPF troops, and civilian customs officers were stationed in Cyangugu.
Conditions in the camps were poor. Congestion, lack of water, inadequate sanitation arrangements and problems with either the supply of food and/or its inequitable distribution within the camps resulted in those camps where surveys were carried out experiencing high rates of malnutrition, morbidity and mortality. A dysentery outbreak appears to have begun in early August and affected many camps, reaching its peak in at the end of August. These problems appear to have been worst in Kibeho camp, where mortality rates reached 20 times normal in September. Lack of experienced ICRC medical personnel and delays in the provision of clean water appear to have been critical factors there. A lack of technical coordination amongst agencies working in the south-west also appears to have been a contributory factor (see Section 6.3), at least until late September.
10. Humanitarian activities in the rest of Rwanda after July 1994
With the exodus to Goma in mid-July and the installation of the new government in Kigali, the July-September period saw substantial efforts being focused on the immediate repair and rehabilitation of infrastructure through individual agency initiatives and under the UN Special Representative's Rwanda Emergency Normalization Plan (RENP). In addition, there were efforts to encourage and facilitate the early return of the refugees in Goma.
These efforts were truly multi-agency, involving not only UN agencies, ICRC and NGOs but also several military contingents operating within the UNAMIR framework, two that operated outside the UNAMIR framework (the US Army and the Canadian bilateral contingent) and, subsequently, commercial contractors. The ending of the conflict and the May 17 agreement by the Security Council to build up UNAMIR to a force of 5,500 troops resulted in the arrival of several new military contingents in August, including those from Britain, Canada and Australia. Many of these contingents deliberately included medical, logistics, mechanical repair and communications units to assist in the relief and immediate rehabilitation efforts.
Thus, the British contingent (Operation Gabriel) of 550 personnel included a field ambulance and engineering and vehicle repair units. The field ambulance unit rehabilitated the hospital in Ruhengeri and on 20 August was redeployed to Gikongoro, where it operated treatment facilities in IDP camps. The vehicle repair unit established workshops that serviced UNAMIR and other agency vehicles. The engineering unit's principal activity was the repair of the main road from the Ugandan border to Kigali. The Canadian contingent included a field ambulance that took over the operation of Ruhengeri hospital after the redeployment of the British field ambulance [47]. A Canadian signals unit played a key role in the restoration of Kigali's telephone system and reopening its international links. The Australian army medical contingent operated the Central Hospital in Kigali, together with NGOs, including Samaritans Purse and Italian Emergency, and medical teams worked in conjunction with CARE-Australia in the Butare area. The US military contingent based at Kigali Airport helped increase security and handling capacity at the airport and enabled the resumption of limited scheduled civilian flights in September.
Other immediate rehabilitation activities in Kigali included the restoration of power supplies through a collaborative effort involving UNAMIR engineers, the commercial contractor Brown and Root [48] and GTZ, which involved the repair and/or replacement of damaged equipment and rebuilding the capacity of Electrogaz. ICRC, UNAMIR and UNICEF assisted with the resumption of water supplies across the city by providing generators to district pumping stations. MSF-France operated the King Faysal Hospital and WHO and UNICEF supported the rehabilitation and restocking of the central medical stores. UNICEF provided lines of credit to 12 ministries and other support, including vehicles.
The cholera in Goma and the ending of the conflict led to a spontaneous repatriation of approximately 100,000 refugees at the end of July. To respond to the needs of those making their way back towards Kigali and to encourage others to follow them, several agencies, including UNHCR, CARE, AICF, Concern, German Emergency Doctors and the Canadian Field Ambulance, MSF and SCF set up waystations and medical posts along the Gisenyi-Ruhengeri-Kigali route. The waystations provided space for overnight halts, cooked food and "start-up kits" comprising dry rations and household items. The IOM organized trucks (many of them WFP trucks returning from food deliveries to Goma) for those unable to walk. A crisis committee was set up in Ruhengeri to assist coordination of these efforts. The number of returnees was much less than originally hoped and gradually the 1994 refugees were replaced by returning Tutsi who had left the country up to 30 years earlier. Agencies operating the waystations had considerable difficulty differentiating returnees from the local population, who tried to benefit from the assistance. During September 1994, UNHCR commissioned an investigation into conditions within Rwanda to assess the appropriateness of any repatriation efforts. The report of the investigation - referred to as "the Gersony Report" after its principal author - claimed to have found evidence of "an unmistakeable pattern of killings and persecution" by the RPF. The report was suppressed and few people have seen the document. However, sections were leaked to the international press in the third week of September and in effect thwarted any hopes of an early major repatriation [49].
Endnotes
1. As noted in Section 1.2., private resource flows are probably substantially under-counted by the available datasets.
2. For instance, in August road blocks forced the temporary suspension of the ICRC programme. In another incident, 26 Rwandese Red Cross volunteers were taken hostage and in November, a Belgian Red Cross truck was blown up in the demilitarized zone, killing an employee of the Rwandese Red Cross.
3. A WFP assessment in September concluded that as much as 30-50% of the maize and vegetable oil was being sold.
4. This episode led to tensions between the two agencies. WFP was critical of ICRC for not having alerted it to the extent of the diversions and sales and ICRC resisted closer monitoring by WFP, whose initial monitoring had not been expanded in line with the scale of operations, apparently because of inadequate funding by donors.
5. Burundi's first Hutu President, who had been elected only in June.
6. UNHCR/London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine cited in RNIS, January 1994.
7. The Committee on Food Aid Policies and Procedures, which is composed of donor and recipient nations.
8. The RPF contingent in Kigali also rescued and provided protection to threatened civilians.
9. For instance, when the President's plane was shot down, WFP had 9,000 tonnes of food and ICRC 6,000 tonnes.
10. In Ngara, some 2,000 were accommodated in Burigi camp.
11. 17,000 Burundian refugees were still in Lukole camp in Ngara District by April 1994.
12. The Kobero Joint Venture company was engaged in constructing a tarred road from Kobero on the Tanzania-Burundi border to join the Ruomo Falls-Isaka road just south of the Benaco site. The company had its base camp in Ngara town, which was
where many of the agencies involved in the response were initially based.
13. A small pontoon ferry operated across the Ruhuhu River and quickly became a bottleneck for agency vehicles. The Ruhuhu is a tributary of the Kagera River, which, in Ngara District, forms the border between Tanzania and Rwanda.
14. The Russian emergency response organization.
15. Though the approach was highly effective, several agencies were frustrated at not being allowed to work in Benaco. Some found other activities for involvement.
16. An attempt was made by Tanzanian police, with UNHCR collaboration, to arrest the former bourgemestre (mayor) of Murambi, who was strongly suspected of having been involved in the organization and carrying out of the genocide in his area. An angry mob formed and attacked UNHCR and NGO personnel, forcing them to barricade themselves into the UNHCR compound in Benaco. It was several hours before additional police arrived and the situation defused.
17. Many of those interviewed in Ngara commented on the downgrading of the Tanzanian operations and the difficulty of obtaining adequate resources after mid-July.
18. The limited size of the RPF force apparently meant that there were insufficient soldiers to ensure security in the areas coming under their control and that such screening had to be carried out before the troops could advance.
19. This began ahead of permission being given by either UNREO or the UNAMIR Force Commander who, despite being restricted to parts of Kigali city, felt his permission should have been sought in order that a balance be maintained between humanitarian aid delivered to RPF and FAR-controlled areas.
20. This group was frequently referred to as the sleepover agencies.
21. Because of personal links between UNICEF personnel and the RPF, some NGOs appear to have used the UNICEF office in Kabale as their liaison point with the RPF refugee affairs branch, which was based at RPF headquarters in Mulindi 10 kms inside Rwanda for much of the period.
22. Les Roberts, CDC, Atlanta interview, 4 May 1995.
23. Major-General Dallaire. Interview 22 March 1995.
24. Interviews with WFP-Kampala personnel, April 1994. This offer was made without the knowledge of WFP Headquarters in Rome and was motivated by a desire to ensure that the vehicles were in serviceable condition when they were eventually returned to WFP.
25. Between 20 July and the end of the first week of August the whole population was infected with the cholera vibrio. Of these, 10-15% developed clinical cholera symptoms, the epidemic being characterized by a high attack rate. Of those who developed the symptoms, the case fatality rate was high, probably ranging between 25-50%, as a result of lack of access to effective rehydration therapy.
26. Estimate by Ray Wilkinson, UNHCR Public Information Officer, Goma.
27. Because of the way the value of the assistance provided and the transport costs of delivering it were not recorded specifically with regard to Goma, it is not possible to ascertain the precise amount. This figure is therefore no more than a guesstimate.
28. The packages were: airport services; logistics base services; road servicing and road security; site preparation; provision of domestic fuel; sanitation facilities; water management; management of AirHead.
29. The precise role of the UNHCR request is unclear, as the intense media coverage of events was exerting considerable pressure on many governments to be taking exceptional measures in responding to the situation.
30. This was heavily criticized at the time as being a PR stunt by relief workers and media reporters. The aircraft were delayed, the pallets missed the drop zone by half a kilometre and retrieving them took some time and tied up part of the scarce vehicle capacity. The contribution to the overall efforts was very limited. According to a British photo-journalist present at the scene, the parcels contained perishable foods and ski-mittens apparently originating from US stores in Germany destined for use in the former Yugoslavia.
31. Between 16 July and 30 September, when the airlift officially ended, approximately 11,500 tonnes of commodities were airlifted to Goma (see Section 5.7).
32. The Air Cell was essentially an expansion and extension of the Sarajevo Air Operations Cell, which had been operational for two years in Geneva.
33. One journalist called this "the battle of logos and T-shirts". Richard Dowden, The Independent on Sunday, 4 September 1994, London.
34. The burial of the tens of thousands of bodies was initially undertaken by the French military, but this support was withdrawn without warning and the Irish NGO GOAL took over this role in collaboration with teams of Zairian Boy Scouts.
35. Though it should be said that some critical members did not arrive until several days after the influx. In the case of the Water and Sanitation Coordinator, this was 10 days.
36. This withdrawal meant that other agencies, in some cases less experienced than MSF-France, had to take-over the services provided by the agency. The Team were unable to assess the extent to which this had a negative impact on the quality of services provided to the refugees in those camps where MSF-France had worked.
37. Several hundred remained in the town, but were relatively well integrated.
38. The Rwandese power and water supply parastatal.
39. Principally, aluminium sulphate, calcium hydroxide and calcium hypochloride.
40. The incident near Butare occurred on 3 July, with a French reconnaissance mission, engaged to "rescue" orphans, Western journalists and nuns from the city, exchanged fire with the RPF. Following this incident, so-called "hawks" within the French force who were reputedly spoiling for a fight with the RPF and whose views were felt not to be compatible with the safe zone policy, were removed from the force and moved to other duties.
41. Gérard Prunier, 1995, The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide, Hurst, London.
42. It is possible that the start of relief distributions in the camps may have attracted IDPs to them and thus contributed unintentionally to the rapid growth in numbers during the July to early August period. The study was not able to clarify whether this was the case.
43. Prior to April 1994, France had approved a donation of 2,200 tonnes of maize-flour for use in the earlier IDP programmes in the north of the country. It was then agreed that WFP could allocate the shipment wherever it was most needed, but with the commencement of Opération Turquoise, WFP was specifically requested to distribute it within the safe zone before the withdrawal of the Turquoise forces. The shipment arrived at Dar-es-Salaam in the second week of July and was transported to Gikongoro by rail, barge and road via Kigoma and Bujumbura. Approximately half the shipment was distributed by AICF and CARE before withdrawal of the Turquoise forces.
44. During July and August the supplies were trucked from Burundi. From September they were trucked from Uganda via Kigali.
45. The agency previously had worked only in Bosnia, but was encouraged to work in Rwanda by the French government, which provided it with trucks. Because of its links with the French government and its use of expatriate drivers, the agency had difficult relations with the RPF and, in December, its trucks were impounded and its operations halted by the new government in Kigali.
46. UNICEF's input in the water sector included contracting PWSS, the private US company involved in pumping operations in Goma during July and August, to transfer its large-capacity pump and support vehicles to Kibeho. In addition, the Gikongoro town supply was repaired, trucks and trailers provided to NGOs and two of the Finnish milk tankers were detailed to supply Cyanika and other IDP camps.
47. When the Canadian platoon left in September, MSF-Holland, which had been providing health services in Ruhengeri alongside the military contingents, took over responsibility for supporting the hospital.
48. A US contractor company that provided civilian support to UNAMIR and a US follow-up to Operation Support Hope.
49. The official reason for its suppression was that its factual basis was weak. Had it been officially released at that time it would have reduced the legitimacy of the new government and severely jeopardized efforts by UN agencies and many of the donor organizations to assist the new government to establish an effective administration.