Journal of Humanitarian Assistance
73. Cable from Booh-Booh, UNAMIR, to Annan/Goulding, UNATIONS, New York, 8 April 1994.
74. Agence France Presse. "Un scandal dont tout le monde est responsable," Le Monde, 27 May 1994.
75. Commenting on the work-pace when the crisis broke, one official in the Secretariat wrote: "After April 6, UNAMIR and the DPKO desk officer were flooded with inquiries from governments, NGO's, etc. for information about their personnel in Rwanda and for possible arrangements of search-and-rescue missions which, though... important, reduced their effectiveness as the inquiries were time-consuming. The botton line here is that there was no organizational rearrangement in the Secretariat to deal with the crisis. Those involved just worked harder and longer hours." Communication to the authors, 30 October 1995.
76. On 7 April, when the crisis broke, Boutros Boutros-Ghali was in Minsk. The next day he flew to Geneva; when the Belgians decided to pull out (12 April) he was in Bonn; when the Security Council debated what that meant for UNAMIR, he was in Madrid. With this travel schedule, it was impossible to stay on top of developments in a week of complex and fast-moving events. The essential decision-making during the first critical week fell to two high-level officials in the Secretariat, Kofi Annan and Iqbal Riza. Lacking decisive leadership from the Secretary-General, the DPKO seemed caughtin a political culture that made it inappropriate to confront the Security Council and futile to present proposals it would not readily approve.
77. Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, 13 April 1994. The letter was not well received by the Council, where some members saw it as an attempt by Boutros-Ghali to place the responsibility for UNAMIR withdrawal squarely on the shoulders of Belgium. In a letter to the Security Council the same day, the Belgians had publicly pointed to "the chaos in Rwanda." The Belgian government concluded that it was "obvious that under these conditions the continuation of the UNAMIR operation has become pointless...and it is imperative to suspend the activities of UNAMIR forces without delay" (S/1994/430). DPKO reinforced this interpretation by telling the Security Council (13 April) that with the Belgians about to leave, the Force Commander could no longer guarantee the security of the airport or that of even his own men. DPKO did not relay to the Council the more differentiated appreciation of the situation made by the Force Commander in Kigali.
78. Invoking NATO solidarity as well, the Belgian Foreign Minister phoned his counterparts in Washington, London and Paris to plead for withdrawal. "Willy Claes panicked a bit", a Belgian official later commented. Outcries from the public and the press over the brutal murders of the Belgian soldiers had placed enormous pressure on Belgian political leaders to withdraw, similar to that faced by the Americans in Somalia half a year earlier.
79. The United States had been traumatized by the Somalia crisis, which had been imprinted on the minds of American TV-viewers by the picture of a mob dragging the body of an American soldier through the streets of Mogadishu. Although no American soldiers were in UNAMIR, the experience had given peacekeeping a bad name in the United States. Washington apparently considered total withdrawal as soon as the Belgian peacekeepers were killed. When the Belgian decision was known, the US position in the Security Council progressively favored withdrawal. In the informal consultations on 12 April, the American Ambassador expressed serious doubts about the viability of UNAMIR in the circumstances, noting that it could not carry out its original mandate and might even be a de-stabilizing factor. The next day, he suggested withdrawing, leaving only a skeletal force. On the 14th, the US claimed the Security Council needed a resolution for orderly evacuation of the force; on the 15th there was no doubt: the US delegation expressed firm oppositionto keeping UNAMIR in place.
80. Reports from the informal consultations in the Security Council make no mention of such canvassing. It should be noted, however, that even Nigeria, which circulated a draft resolution to strengthen UNAMIR, did not itself volunteer troops. Although a major military power in Africa, and a contributor to other peacekeeping operations, Nigeria claimed it lacked logistics to send reinforcements. However, Nigeria had military observers in UNAMIR and made no move to withdraw them.
81. While recognizing that the Belgian departure was leaving the force quite vulnerable, General Dallaire and his deputy, the Ghanaian Brigadier-General Henry Kwami Anyidoho, were making dispositions to dig in, did not recommend withdrawal, and asked for emergency supplies to carry on. The Ghanaian battalion, considered the most professional and second in strength to the Belgian unit, was redeployed from the DMZ to Kigali to protect the airport. On 13 April, one day after Dallaire was informed by the Secretary-General's office that the Belgians were pulling out and that the Secretary-General was inclined to withdraw the entire force, UNAMIR sent DPKO a long list of requests for emergency supplies, including medicine, water, fuel and heavy machinery, plus cargo trucks and 1, 900 flak jackets. On 14 April, Dallaire noted in his log the ironic differences in perception: the Belgians were telling New York that the UNAMIR staff in the field did not realize how the situation was deteriorating by the hour; "they say we are too optimistic here."
82. Setting up an airlift capacity in Kigali, Canada was the only country to send armed forces personnel to help UNAMIR in this period.
83. Whether a larger - or only a much larger - force would have made a difference is a matter of considerable controversy and remains speculative. If the symbolic force of 540 that stayed on helped to protect thousands of civilians, the force of almost 2,000 which pulled out after the Belgians withdrew would arguably have had a somewhat greater impact. The force, however, was targeted intermittently by both side (including the militia) as well as taking indirect fire.
84. For example, outside Kigali the ICRC provided protection at the Sainte Famille and Saint Michel church precincts, the church complex Kabgayi, the stadium at Cyangugu, and the camp at Nyarushishi.
85. See Goffin, 1995, op.cit., and a series of articles in De Morgen (Brussels), November 1995.
86. The RPF maintains that the Security Council was following French interests by seeking to stop RPF advances and save the remnants of FAR behind a cease-fire line. (See RPF communiqués 10-16 April, 1994).
87. Both ICRC delegates and UNAMIR staff have commented on the apparent dynamic of killings, whereby retreating government soldiers and Hutu civilians who were fleeing the advancing RPF armies pounced on Tutsi behind the lines with extra vengeance. Close UN military observers claim that a cease-fire would have freed up government troops to rein in the militia. This line of reasoning is strongly refuted by the RPF and sympathetic NGOs (African Rights, 1995: 1068).
88. There were, of course, articles in the specialist periodicals of human rights organizations and those specializing on Africa. The only US television story on Rwanda during the period was on the mountain gorillas. The New York Times did cover the UN Security Council decision to renew UNAMIR and bring it up to full strength. Two and a half weeks later (26 January), in the same paper, a very short story appeared on the Human Rights Watch Arms Report on the French role in arming and training the Habyarimana forces. It was a month later (23 February) when Reuters reported on the assassination of Public Works Minister Félicien Gatabazi and the subsequent murder of the head of the hardline CDR Hutu party. This report implied that Gatabazi was part of the Hutu-Tutsi "tribal" killings, ignoring the fact that Gatabazi was Hutu. Le Monde did carry the Agence France Presse report on the delay in setting up the BBTG on 27 March and the potential this had for renewal of the civil war. For the reader of The New York Times, only a brief report on 13 March that the US Department of State had issued a travel alert for Rwanda provided a clue to the looming crisis.
89. Livingston and Eachus (1995).
90. Le Monde, 12 April 1994, "Le Rwanda à feu et à sang."
91. The Times, 8 April and The New York Times, 9 April. Four days later, however, The New York Times had a dispatch by William Schmidtquoting Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe, the Hutu chairman of the RPF: "This is not an ethnic war. It is a war against a dictatorship." The consensus by scholars is now that the evidence points to the Presidential Guard itself as the source of the missile that shot the plane down. The Presidential Guard also killed the Premier. The Belgian UN soldiers were killed by the members of the FAR reconnaissance battalion after being told that the Belgians had shot down the President's plane.
92. The New York Times, 10 April 1994 and The Times, 11 April 1994.
93. Libération 18 May, "Rwanda: les amitiés coupables de la France"; L'Humanité, 20 May, "Les responsabilités françaises dans le drame rwandais". See also Prunier, Report prepared for Study II (1995) and Verschave (1994).
94. Associated Press, 20 April 1994; Michael Binyon in _The Times, 2 May.
95. The U.S. Committee for Refugees used the term "genocide" in a public appeal on 3 May 1994, the (French) Médecins sans frontières did so on 15 May.
96. After travelling to Kigali in mid-May, Ayala recommended that the Commission appoint a Special Rapporteur for Rwanda, to be fully supported by a field operation (E/CN.4/S-3/3, 19 May 1994).
97. In Johannesburg for Nelson Mandela's inauguration, Salim A. Salim met on 9 May with several African heads of state to discuss troop and other contributions to Rwanda. All (Mugabe, Rawlings, Abacha, Zenawi, Chiluba, Mandela, Nujoma) expressed their support. The next day Salim met with Boutros-Ghali and told him he had firm offers: "The issue of troops is settled." (Interview, Copenhagen, 15 November 1995).
98. In a letter of 30 April (S/PRST/1994/21) and a resolution of 17 May (918(1994)), the Security Council "recalls that the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part constitutes a crime punishable under international law."
99. During the second half of May, the Secretary-General sent a high-level mission led by his chief military advisor, GeneralMaurice Baril, to Rwanda to prepare an assessment
100. The US delegation to the UN was instructed to use the term "acts of genocide" so as to downplay the relevance of the 1948 Genocide Convention and associated obligations. The term was adopted by the Security Council in its implementing resolution for UNAMIR ("acts of genocide have occurred", Res.925/1994, 8 June 1994). Initially, Council resolutions and statements avoided the question of whether or not genocide had occurred in Rwanda (see e.g. S/PRST/1994/21, 30 April and Res. 918/1994, 17 May) by using the conditional form. The Secretary-General declared on 31 May that there had been genocide in Rwanda (S/1994/640).The Special Rapporteur for Rwanda appointed by the UN Commission on Human Rights likewise did so in his report of 28 June (E/CN.4/1995).
101. Communication, British Foreign Office, United Nations Department, 7 July 1995.
102. Médecins sans frontières claims Juppé made his statement because MSF the previous day had appeared on French television, calling the killings genocide and critizing the French government. (Interview, Washington, March 1995).
103. For UNAMIR II, the Belgian government outfitted one Malawi company consisting of 135 men. With training, paperwork and transfer of equipment, the process took one month, which the Belgians prided themselves on as beeing efficient.
104. Only one Congressman was recorded in May as arguing that it was in the enlightened self-interest of the US to stop genocide wherever it occurred (Hearings, 5 May). Even a significant refugee outflow (200,000) in late May did not lead to the conclusion that by reducing violence within Rwanda, refugee outflows would probably also be reduced, hence touching more directly on US interests. The point was demonstrated only after Goma (mid-July), when the United States responded with a major and costly humanitarian relief operation.
105. United Nations Peace-keeping, UN/DPI, December 1994.
106. This was the proposed American strategy of "outside-in", designed to reduce the chance of military encounter with either of the combatants. The original proposal of the DPKO, by contrast, was an "inside-out" move whereby UNAMIR II units would fly in to Kigali and fan out from the capital. In the end, a combinationof the two strategies were adopted. S/1994/565, 13 May, 1994 and The New York Times, 14 May 1994.
107. According to the US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, the RPF called her on 4 May and said they did not want UN forces in Rwanda (Statement to the Congress, House Appropriations Committee, 5 May 1994). On the eve of the 17 May resolution authorizing UNAMIR II, both Rwandese parties said they would accept a new UN force if it was only for humanitarian purposes, but RPF warned that it would attack UN forces if they came between its own units and the government troops (NET 18 May 1994). Towards the end of May, when the Security Council went an extra round to give a second authorization to UNAMIR II, the RPF reiterated that it would cooperate with UNAMIR II if it had exclusively humanitarian functions, but was adamant they would have nothing to do with the UN mission if the latter talked to the "interim government" (NET 25 May, 1994.)
108. On 25 July UNAMIR's troop strength was still around 500 - i.e. unchanged since the scaling down decided on 21 April.
109. On 30 April, the Security Council requested that Boutros-Ghali consult with OAU for troop contributions to UNAMIR II. The same day, Boutros-Ghali discussed the matter with the OAU Chairman, President Mubarak, and approached his OAU counterpart, Salim A. Salim, as well as leaders of African states who previously had contributed troops to UN peacekeeping operations. (S/1994/530, 3 May 1994).
110. In the words of General Lafourcade, the Force Commander, the operation "était une intervention militare à but humanitaire et non une simple mission d'aide humanitaire. La mise en ouevre de moyens militares avait pour but d'arrêter les massacres et de créer les conditions de sécurité permettant l'exercise de l'action humanitaire internationale." "L'Opération Turquoise au Rwanda", speech, Geneva, 29 February 1995 (Document/DAM, Paris).
111. By this time, the Secretary-General had firm troop offers from 8 African countries, totalling 5 battalions and 4 companies, and a modest equipment list from 4 Western states, totalling 2 aircraft, 50 trucks and 50 APCs (S/1994/728, 20 June 1994).
112. A small contingent of 500 African troops, mainly from Senegal, was added to the French core unit (2,500 men) largely to wardoff criticism that this was a French rather than a multinational intervention.
113. The human rights organization, African Rights, estimated that 85-90% of the Tutsi in the préfecture of Cyangugu had been murdered by the time the French arrived (African Rights, 1995: 455).
114. According to Prunier, who was a participant-observer in the process, confusion rather than a clear strategy marked the preparation of the campaign. The Ministry of Defense at first considered moving into the north-west, Ruhengeri and Gisenyi, but was informed that this would appear as collusion with the government forces since the area was the stronghold of the old regime. As a result, the planning shifted to focus on the south-west, also because it was believed that surviving Tutsi might be trapped in this area and thus enable Opération Turquoise to fulfill its humanitarian objectives (Prunier 1995).
115. "Opération Turquoise. Rwanda. June 22-August 11, 1994". Official briefing note. Mimeo.
116. Col. Didier Thibaut told Reuters on 5 July that the head of the southern command, Col. Jacques Rosier, had given him orders to stop the rebels if they tried capturing Gikongoro or going beyond. A statement from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 5 July affirmed that French units would stop RPF rebels from entering the zone in order to protect the refugees (Financial Times, 6 July, 1994).
117. Force Commander General Lafourcade emphasized that his men were not wearing helmets or flak jackets - in contrast to UNAMIR (Connaughton 1995). In part, this reflected a relatively more friendly environment.
118. "Opération Turquoise. Rwanda. June 22-August 11, 1994". Official briefing note. Mimeo
119. UNHCR SitReps for August 1994. Some of these soldiers could have retreated before the French entered on 23 June, but this is unlikely since the war was then being fought in the east (causing an exodus into Tanzania by late May). The next major refugee flows occurred in mid-July, both in the north into Goma and the south-west into Bukavu. On 19 July, UNHCR reported that about 100, 000 had arrived (UNHCR SitRep, 20 July 1994). By that time, the Frenchzone had been in existence for over two weeks.
120. Col. Musonera, Bukavu, in interview with human rights investigators. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Rwanda/Zaire. Rearming with Impunity. May 1995, vol.7. no.4. p.3.
121. A UN official who coordinated relief in Ngara described a typical tactic as follows: commune - level officials would provoke unrest or riots in the camps; UN and NGO personnel would be faced with an unmanageable situation; the same persons would approach them and offer to help control the population. Having no ready alternative, the agencies would agree and hence treat them as camp leaders for purposes of distribution and maintaining order.
122. In November 1994, UN/DPKO had proposed a variation on the ZCSC in the form of an International Police/Military Observer Group, where Zairian troops would serve under an international military/police supervisory unit. The Zairian government, however, refused to place its troops under the authority of officers from another state. Zaire did not object to the DPKO proposals to send a peacekeeping force to the camps on its territory.
123. Simultaneously, UNHCR launched an appeal to donors asking for pledges to finance the operation, and for personnel to form the international civilian contingent, the Camps Security Liaison Group (CLSG). The Dutch government responded quickly with an offer of 16 policemen; other European and four West African countries followed suit to provide a total of 45. UNHCR assigned a senior official and five support staff to the task, among other things, of training the new camp police in refugee law and doctrine. The operation was first planned for five months, but was later extended to the end of 1995.
124. By the first week of June, small arms had been seized, including 23 rifles or pistols, 30 grenades, four mines and a variety of ammunition.
125. Detailed evidence is provided by Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Rwanda/Zaire, vol.7.no.2, New York: May 1995, and Amnesty International, Rwanda. Arming the perpetrators of the genocide. London: 13 June 1995.
126. Interviews, Paris, January 1996. In a brief statement commenting on the allegations of French violations of the UN arms embargo made by the Human Rights Watch Arms Reports of May 1995, a spokesmanof the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said: "We categorically deny the allegations on this subject contained in the report." Porte-parole adjoint du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 30 may 1995.
127. Report on visit to the military cooperation mission in Paris, 9-13 May 1994 from Ll. Col. Ephrem Rwabalinda, to the minister of Defense. Gitarama, 16 May 1994. The document was obtained by the Belgian journalist Colette Braeckman and is reprinted in Dossier noirs de la politique africaine de la France, no. 1.5, Paris: Survie-L'Harmattan, 1996, pp. 23-26.
128. This interpretation of what occurred at Kibeho is derived from interviews with government and UN officials, and documents prepared prior to the incident, such as: the "Integrated Task Force, Briefing Note, 6 March 1995," the "Strategy for the Southern IDP Camps, 5 April 1995," "The Integrated Humanitarian Response, Concept Paper, DHA," "Appeal for Rwanda 1994 Review," Rwanda Humanitarian Situation Reports and assorted letters and cables. Further, a number of retrospective studies on Kibeho were extremely helpful including: the "Preliminary Report on the April 1995 Closure of IDP Camps and the Integrated Humanitarian Response" by UNREO, the "Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Events in Kibeho, April 1995," and Randolph Kent's unpublished manuscript, "The Integrated Operations Centre in Rwanda: Coping with Complexity," 1995.
129. On the basis of food distribution figures, the estimates in November yielded a figure of 350,000. Using health and medical figures, the estimate was 280,000. Given the daily flow in and out of the camps, and the estimated 80, 000 who had returned to their home communes, in mid-April, the camp population of the remaining 9 of the 33 original camps was estimated to range between 180,000 and 250,000, with greater verity attached to the lower figure. Almost half, up to 120,000, were in Kibeho.
130. Paul Kagame, Vice-President and Minister of Defense, who was viewed as the hero responsible for the defeat of the former government and as the real power in the existing government, initially set 30 November as the deadline for camp closure. He was also the one who took responsibility for the use of force on 18-22 April 1995.
131. The UN agencies operating in Rwanda included FAO, UNDP, UNHCR,UNICEF, UNIFEM, UNESCO, UNV, WFP, WHO and DHA's field team for coordination, the United Nations Emergency Relief Operation (UNREO). As of November 1994, 114 international and 20 Rwandese NGOs were operating in the country. "From the outset of the April-July events, the international community has been particularly preoccupied by the fate of the displaced populations in Rwanda... During the latter part of 1994, the displaced persons throughout Rwanda have been among the main beneficiaries of programmes carried out under the July-December Appeal. Parallel to the provision of relief assistance, considerable energy has been expended by the international community as well as the Government, to encourage and organise the return of the displaced to their home areas." Appeal for Rwanda, 1994 Review, 5.
132. The voluntary return had ground to a halt because of a combination of: the deteriorating security situation in home areas; the high numbers of arrests of returnees, including many who were widely believed to be innocent even by government officials; the consequent fears for safety if the IDPs return home; and the illegal occupation of homes in communes. The return of some people from home to camps reinforced this perception. But these factors were greatly exacerbated because of the misinformation, intimidation within camps, and killings by the agents of the former government, and the strengthened grip of hard core elements on the camp population. There was enormous and understandable concern by the government over security since the camps were believed not only to contain genocidal killers but members of the interahamwe who used the camps for recruitment and training. The government saw the camps as a potential "spearhead" for the fallen government in Zaire. Cf. Integrated Task Force Briefing Note, 6 March 1995.
133. There were 59 employees in the IOC, 21 full-time and 38 part-time. The task force governing the IOC consisted of the Director General of the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration; representatives of the Ministries of Interior, Defense and Justice and from the UN Operational Agencies (UNICEF, WFP, UNDP, etc.), UN Human Rights, IOM, and senior officials of IOC. Cf. Kent, 1995.
134. The reports came from medical NGOs and MILOBs. Cf. Integrated Task Force Briefing Note, 6 March 1995.
135. The six options included three main ones: 1 - The RPA goes in alone to close the camps by force; 2 - Close camps in series beginning with Kibeho and Ngado (the largest camps) by ceasing food distribution; 3 - Camps are consolidated and voluntary returncontinues with the remaining population receiving basic food until a judicial system is in place. There were three others based on reorganizing the camps into more controllable units as variations of the third option: 4 - Population would be transferred to small camps in home communes (a proposal with increased logistical problems and one that did not fit government policy); 5 - Reorganize the camps by communes after closing smaller camps (chaotic and also does not meet government policy, with the additional prospect of new intimidation); 6 - Population regrouped by communes in 4 camps (same problems as above).
136. The source of the initiative and confusion over starting dates in the micro-management of the operation was an immediate precipitating cause of the disaster. A 10 April agreement between Randolph Kent, head of UNREO, and the Minister set a starting date of 18 April. The prefect of Gikongoro and the local RPA agreed that camp closures would begin 16 April without the elements agreed to between Kent and the Minister on 10 April meeting, that is, the coordination of the information plan in the communes and the camps, increased security in both places, and the presence of an enhanced justice process. On 13 April, the RPA drove people by force out of a small satellite camp, Kivu Gizza. That is when Kent sent his warning to UN headquarters, but he still believed that the situation could be retrieved and the populations returned in a peaceful and humane way. On 14 April, a UN strategy position paper was adopted, "Resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons in Rwanda," spelling out a plan insisting on no rapid closure of camps, but an intensified information campaign plus quick action to deal with security in home communes. This was read as simply another delay and unwillingness of the UN and the NGOs to go along with the government policy or the previous agreements to expedite rapid closing of the camps. Between 15-16 April, an IOC team visited Gikongoro to outline a plan of action with the prefect and army commander. On 16 April, the préfet and the IOC agreed on a new start date of 24 April, with an end date set of 13 May. The préfet agreed to telephone the RPA commander on the new agreed date. Whether the préfet failed to communicate the message, or whether the RPA just saw this as a new stall and breach of previous agreements by the UN, or whether the RPA determined to take the initiative on its own, we do not know.
137. On 14 April, Oxfam representatives reported a large influx of heavily armed RPA soldiers into the region, and predicted the massive use of force. Randolph Kent, who headed UNREO, the coordinating body of DHA in Rwanda, in a mid-April cable to headquarters warnedthat, "There may well be at the same time serious pressures for public condemnations of any acts that are seen as overly brutal," because "the IDP operation could put the UN in an embarrassing position, one which will necessitate the distancing of UN agencies from possibly unacceptable initiatives by the Government." The warning was given, not in order to allow the UN to take steps to prevent anything happening, but so that the UN could be prepared to explain what happened and to put it in a context for outsiders. "I hope any statement will emphasize the complexity of the situation, including the security threat posed by the present IDP camps."
138. 18 April had been set as the date for closing the camps. Agreement had been reached on most points, but a meeting had been scheduled for 10.am. on 18 April to settle the final points and commence the closing. However, the camp had been surrounded three hours earlier. Though the commencement of the RPA operation took the NGO and UN community by surprise, it was evidently no surprise to the extremists, who began leaving the camp before the cordon could be drawn around it. It is estimated that up to 20,000 of the hard-core elements had fled the camp by 16 April.
139. There have been many suggestions in the aftermath questioning the true intentions of the RPA and second guessing the plan that was developed. Alison des Forges, one of the most dedicated, knowledgeable and insightful Rwanda watchers, was in Kibeho and the three other camps from 18 to 21 April, and on 23 April. She writes: "Why did I witness (and hear similar accounts from others) of RPA soldiers driving people into the camps on the morning of 19 April - people who came from hills adjacent to the camp where they were permanent residents? Why did I witness soldiers refusing to let people leave the camps when all they wanted was to be allowed to walk home?" (Communication to the authors, 20 November 1995). Robbery (based on perceived incidents) and selective elimination of the strong, have been suggested as motives. As for the actual plan, it has been suggested that as the 24 camps were closed earlier, Kibeho should have been surrounded to prevent the extremists from consolidating in that camp. But surrounding a camp spread out over six hills would have been extremely difficult if not impossible logistically. It would be akin to setting up a closed military line around a city of 100-120,000 people. Alternatively, consolidating the camp in a closer perimeter would have produced precisely the same conditions as occurred on 18 April 1995. In fact, it is estimated that up to 20,000 extremists were able to escape from the camp before the cordon around it was tightened. Similarly, options suggestingthat the police (Rwanda already had an acute shortage of police) should have been used instead of the RPA, or that UNAMIR II (it already had to cover the whole country and the border areas) should have been the military body to implement the plan fail to recognize the severity of the perceived security threat that Kibeho posed. Arguably, the geographical and human conditions were such that the options developed by the IOC were the only realistic ones. Further, if the motives of the RPA included, in fact, robbery and the murder of the strong, then organizing any co-operative plan with the RPA was a mistake in the first place.
140. "I interrogated the officer who was second in command at Kibeho and he couldn't give me the names or companies of the soldiers who had supposedly been shot." Alison des Forges, communication, 20 November 1995. The ICRC has also raised doubts about this claim.
141. "During the night of April 20, several people attacked the displaced with machetes, killing at least two and wounding another 30." New York: Human Rights Watch, Press Release, 24 April 1995.
142. The International Commission of Inquiry found that there were RPA deficiencies in communications, equipment, training, experience, and an intelligence failure in anticipating the reaction of the hard-core, but they did not add the fact that the RPA unilaterally precipitated the closure without the gradualism provided for in the original plan. There was little evidence that the NGOs overtly tried to subvert the evacuation, as the Inter national Commission indicated. A representative of the government indicated that one person from an NGO purportedly urged the camp population not to comply with the government orders. Alison des Forges of Human Rights has questioned the claim of a lack of communication. While at Kibeho during the operation, she saw many officers chatting away on their hand-held radios.
143. The government was ridden with rivalry among the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration, the Defense Ministry and the Foreign Ministry, as well as between Kigali and Gikongoro.
144. For as long as Kibeho was perceived to be a large security threat, no one else but the RPA could have tackled it. If anyone else had, perhaps the up to 20,000 extremists who managed to escape the camp before the cordon was completed would have stayed, and there would have been a two-sided war.
145. A highly-placed MINIREISO official said that only one NGO purportedly urged the camp population not to comply with government orders. (Interview, Kigali August 1995)