Journal of Humanitarian Assistance
The genocide
At 8:30 p.m. on April 6 1994, the control tower at Kigali airport cleared for landing the President's Mystère Falcon aircraft returning from Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. Aboard were the President of Rwanda, Juvénal Habyarimana, as well as the President of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira. They were travelling from a meeting in Dar-es-Salaam, where implementation of the power-sharing agreement of August 1993 had been discussed and the implementation agreement finally signed. When the plane was approaching the airport, it was hit by a rocket and exploded. All passengers and crew were killed.
So far, the truth about the shooting down of the aircraft has not been established. Many have been blamed: the RPF, the Belgian government, the Presidential Guard and senior officials from the regular Rwandese Army (African Rights, 1994). The immediate major suspect, however, was the Presidential Guard, who feared the prospect of being dissolved.
Commentators on the event are divided. Some believe that the plane crash unleashed the wave of massacres. Others point to the fact that the killings were planned well ahead, with the aim of physically eliminating the Hutu opposition and Tutsi in general and, thus, argue that the plane crash was an excuse and formed an integral part of a plan to instigate the violence. In the words of Lemarchand:
Who actually fired the missile that brought down Habyarimana's plane may never be known, any more than who ordered the missile to be fired. But if the circumstantial evidence is any index, there is every reason to view the shooting of the plane as an eminently rational act from the standpoint of the immediate goals of Hutu extremists (Lemarchand, 1995).
The violence that followed is one of the worst in the history of humankind. Within a period of less than three months, at least 500,000 people were killed*; thousands and thousands were maimed, raped and both physically and psychologically afflicted for life; two million fled to neighbouring countries; and one million became internally displaced.
There is no question that these massacres took place. Eye-witnesses in Rwanda and all over the world, with their own eyes or on TV, could see how floating bodies filled the rivers and lakes along the borders of Rwanda. Journalists flocked into the area and reported extensively: some 50 publications have already been published on the massacres (Guichaoa, 1995; Braeckman, 1995:1; Prunier, 1995; Verschave, 1994; Brauman, 1994). The most thorough account so far is the report by African Rights of September 1994. The authors of that report have done their utmost to verify what happened during the months of the massacres by interviewing hundreds of people who were victims of or witnesses to the killings. There may well be reason to question some of the conclusions, but no researcher we have confronted questions the account of the killings made in that report; in fact, most others support it (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994:3).
The massacres were implemented in such a meticulous way that it is difficult to conclude that they were not organized in advance. Most Rwanda-watchers agree that the massacres were carried out according to a plan well-prepared by higher officials in the local and national government, the army, the Presidential Guard and the MRND party. The African Rights report is based on that conviction and points to several bits of evidence proving that this was the case. The establishment of military and para-military forces and the Hutu extremism during the early 1990s are discussed above. As for the main killers, African Rights states:
The men (and a few women) who brought down the apocalypse on Rwanda are known. And, while some deny that any killing occurred, others are often shamelessly frank about their role and eager to justify genocide.
The killers include the professional interahamwe, soldiers, gendarmes, Presidential Guardsmen and local government officials who actually supervised and carried out the killings. Some of these people have been witnessed, with their clothes literally drenched in blood, at the scene of massacres or at roadblocks. And, above them, there are the architects of genocide - the men who held the highest offices in the land, who controlled the government , army and radio stations, and who planned and implemented the killings from on high. Few of these people actually wielded machetes or even guns, but it was their policies and words that put guns and machetes in the hands of so many people in Rwanda. Some travelled the country inciting hatred, or spoke on the radio, others were active behind the scenes encouraging the extremists and lending them logistical, financial, political and diplomatic support (African Rights, 1994).
Likewise, Lemarchand identifies the actors and the structures behind the genocide as follows:
By 1992, the institutional apparatus of genocide was already in place. It involved four distinctive levels of activity, or sets of actors: a) the akazu ("little house"), that is the core group, consisting of Habyarimana's immediate entourage, i.e. his wife (Agathe), his three brothers-in-law (Protée Zigiranyirazo, Seraphin Rwabukumba and Elie Sagatwa) and a sprinkling of trusted advisers (most notably Joseph Nzirorera, Laurent Serubuga and Ildephonse Gashumba); b) the rural organizers, numbering anywhere from two to three hundred, drawn from the communal and prefectural cadres (préfets, sous-préfets, conseillers communaux, etc.); c) the militias (interahamwe), estimated at 30,000, forming the ground-level operatives in charge of doing the actual killing; and d) the Presidential Guard, recruited almost exclusively among northerners and trained with a view to providing auxiliary slaughterhouse support to civilian death squads (Lemarchand, 1995) (Cf. also Prunier, 1995).
It thus seems that the killings were no spontaneous outbursts, but followed instructions from the highest level. This is also the only conclusion that can be drawn after having studied the sequence of the massacres. Almost immediately (i.e. the same evening) after the crash of the aircraft, a selective assassination of opposition politicians, of which most were Hutu from parties opposing the party in power, began. The most apparent act was the killing of the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, along with 10 Belgian UN soldiers who were assigned to protect her. The President of the Constitutional Court and the Minister of Information were other prominent immediate targets. The leadership of every opposition party was hit in a similar way (African Rights, 1994).
The second target group for assassination, once the leading politicians had been killed, were dissenting civilians, Hutu as well as Tutsi. These included journalists, human rights activists, representatives of non-governmental groups and civil servants. African Rights lists as an example, by name and occupation, 27 journalists who were reported killed immediately after April 6.
Following the killing of the opposition, the generalized massacre of Tutsi starts. This is documented by African Rights, 1994, préfecture by préfecture; with special accounts dealing with attacks on women and children, on churches and hospitals etc, etc. There is no end to the realism and horror of the accounts by the witnesses interviewed. Although there are accounts of people who tried to help victims of the massacres, most people willingly, by force or by coercion, seem to have participated in the killings.
The first targets were Tutsi men and boys. Even the smallest boys were not spared. Educated Tutsi men and women were particularly at risk and the university was "cleansed" (African Rights, 1994). Rape was used extensively. There are many reports of women who were both tortured and raped while others who had been wounded were also raped. Children were not spared and many Tutsi children were killed, others maimed and left with physical and psychological scars for the rest of their lives.
The killings were carried out with extraordinary cruelty. People were burnt alive, thrown dead or alive into pit latrines and often forced to kill their friends or relatives. The survivors were hunted all over the country, even into hospitals and church compounds. Some of the worst massacres were directed against people seeking refuge in churches.
Another factor seen by many observers as evidence that the massacres were pre-planned and controlled from above is the very successful strategy in sowing confusion during the period immediately following the plane crash, so that neither Rwandese nor foreigners knew what was happening. The objective was to create fear and ignorance. The strategy included establishment of roadblocks, a nation-wide curfew and the disruption of telephone links, and was implemented almost immediately. In addition, a very efficient and effective campaign of disinformation was being waged by the most active media at that time, RTLMC and Radio Rwanda. For consumption of the foreign community, the Rwanda crisis was blamed on the RPF and its alleged breaking of the cease-fire agreements.
It took the international press almost three weeks to really grasp the magnitude of the killings taking place in Rwanda, in particular in the rural areas. During the first days, international attention largely focused on the plight of foreigners. The next focus was on the battle for Kigali and the role of the UN. Very few reported on the massacres taking place in rural areas. Only when refugees started to arrive in Burundi in the last week of April did the journalists comprehend what really went on.
It has been stated that the objective of the most extreme of the leaders of the massacres went beyond the physical extermination of every Tutsi - the idea was also to transform the collective identity of the Hutu. Those who hold that view point to the systematic killing of moderate Hutu leaders and Hutu who protected their Tutsi friends or relatives, and deliberate efforts to get as many as possible of the ordinary Hutu people to participate in the killings and lootings, voluntarily or by force. Even if this theory is not fully substantiated, the results of the massacres and the political/ psychological effects are the same.
An interim government was proclaimed on 9 April, based on the MRND and the factions of the other parties that supported it. Théodore Sindikubwabo, the former Speaker of the parliament, was appointed President and Jean Kambanda Prime Minister. On 13 April, the interim government moved from Kigali to Gitarama on the grounds that order had collapsed in the capital. The interim government did very little to stop, or even oppose, the massacres going on in the country. On the contrary, from the documentation available in the form of interviews and statements over the radio, government representatives rather denied or played down the evidence of killings, and sometimes even encouraged them (cf Théodore Sindikubwabo's speech in Butare on 19 May, 1994) (African Rights, 1994; Prunier, 1995).
Churches
Above it was explained that the leading church representatives were close to the Habyarimana regime. During the massacres, these leaders did nothing to discourage the killing. At a press conference in Nairobi as late as early June 1994, the Anglican archbishop refused unequivocally to denounce the Rwandese interim government (Linden, 1995). The Catholic archbishop even moved with the interim government from Kigali to Gitarama. Furthermore, significant numbers of prominent Christians were involved in the killings, sometimes slaughtering their own church leaders. At the same time, there is also evidence of incidents of martyrdom, heroic self-sacrifice and courage shown by Rwandese Christians (including some foreign missionaries).
The question of complicity of the church must be set in the context of a divided church, split by ethnicity and regionalism. The church (Catholic as well as Anglican) was far from neutral in its sympathies. At another level, "complicity" was about the failure of many church leaders to disassociate themselves enough from and work against the hold that ethnicity had gained over the church in time to speak out strongly against the regime's human rights violations (Linden, 1995).
The civil war
The civil war resumed after the killings began. The 600-strong RPF battalion in Kigali left its headquarters on 7 April and the forces in the north of the country launched an offensive on 8 April. The RPF had kept its forces alert to be able to act swiftly if the peace agreement were to derail. From the slight delay, however, it seems that they were taken by surprise by the shooting down of the plane.
Once the RPF had launched its offensive, it progressed rapidly. After only a short time, the major military base at Byumba was taken, allowing for the re-supply of arms and ammunition. RPF advanced all through April and May, but not fast enough to halt the massacres. An important advance was made when the international airport at Kigali and the nearby Kanombe base were occupied on 22 May. Kigali was taken on 6 July and on 18 July, 1994, RPF declared the war to be over. It announced a cease-fire and formed a new government headed by Pasteur Bizimungu, as President and Faustin Twagiramungu as Prime Minister, both Hutu. Real power, however, rested in the hands of the Tutsi commander of RPF, General Paul Kagame, who became Vice-President and Minister of Defence.
The war was won through a combination of superior fighting skills, higher morale (in part from the need to halt the massacres), discipline and ammunition (African Rights, 1994). The experience from participating in the war in Uganda was important, particularly as regards the tight discipline required of the RPF soldiers. However, human rights groups have reported abuses and excessive violence towards civilians by RPF soldiers during the offensive. Accounts are given, for example, of civilians killed in a mosque in the Bugesera region, of a large number of civilians killed in Kayove (NW Rwanda), of some killings of refugees on May 18 (Rwanda-Tanzania border) and of church groups (Rwantanga near Uganda; Byumba prefecture) (Guichaoua, 1995; African Rights, 1994; Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994:2 and 1994:3).
The role of the international community
During the 1990s, the international community (OAU, UN, Belgium, France, Germany, USA and Rwanda's neighbouring countries, notably Tanzania) had taken upon itself an important and active role in implementing peace and democracy in Rwanda (see above). There were numerous prior warnings of the violence that erupted on 6 April (African Rights, 1994). Some observers point to detailed written plans that UNAMIR and some of the foreign embassies had seen before the massacres took place (Reyntjens, 1995). Despite all warnings, it appears, however, that the international community was caught unprepared when the massacres broke out. The inactivity, or rather inadequate or misdirected kind of activity, continued for several weeks after the massacres started. (This is discussed in detail in Study II.)
This was partly due to the successful disinformation campaign by the leaders of the massacres, partly to the fatigue after the Somalia debacle (Guichaoua, 1995), but also to the fact that most foreign observers did not want to accept the killings for what they were. This was particularly true for the French, who had given their support to the Rwandese government and army all through the early 1990s. However, public opinion in France also cried out heavily against the massacre. Zaire also maintained good relations with the Rwandese interim government throughout the crisis and allowed it and its supporters after the RPF victory to settle in Zaire, keep their weapons and even to operate their radio from Zairian territory. In addition, Zaire, and particularly President Mobutu himself, reaped both diplomatic and economic benefits from the French - as well as the UN - interventions.
The Belgians, who had played an important role during the Arusha process, contributed by sending the largest group of soldiers to UNAMIR. The murder of 10 Belgian soldiers on 7 April led, however, to a popular outcry in Belgium and to the almost immediate withdrawal of its soldiers from Rwanda and the UN task force.
Most tragic of all, however, was the inactivity of the UN and its failure to meet expectations, including those of the citizens of Rwanda. After the arrival of UNAMIR, many Rwandese had high hopes. Those hopes were badly shattered, a fact widely repeated in many of the interviews made by African Rights and personal interviews in Rwanda. Discussions in the Security Council after Belgium announced the withdrawal of its troops continued throughout the period of the massacres, without any real conclusions. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Rwanda, Jacques Booh-Booh, his successor, Shaharyar Khan, and other representatives of the UN did not criticize the interim government over the whole period. Instead, they concentrated all their efforts on obtaining a cease-fire between the RPF and the Rwandese army. As the RPF had announced that it would not even discuss a cease-fire unless the killings came to an end, the persistence of the UN to attain a cease-fire without mentioning the massacres was futile.
Thus, while the UN could not respond with any action on the ground, the OAU at least attempted to act more decisively. It was a step ahead of the UN in its analysis, and its public statements. However, divisions among the African countries did not allow for any real intervention.
Although there were UN and OAU soldiers in Rwanda (albeit very few), they did not get an appropriate mandate and sufficient equipment and transport, which might have saved lives. A condem-nation of the massacres might have given moral support to the few who tried to stop the killings and a moral leadership role to the UN, but it never came. In the words of Ian Linden:
The withdrawal of the bulk of the UN forces and the failure of the Security Council to re-inforce them and acknowledge that genocide was taking place cost thousands of lives and will be recorded as one of the most culpable and tragic of the UN's many mistakes on intervention (Linden, 1995).
Although a decision to enlarge and strengthen UNAMIR to 5,500 men was taken by the Security Council on 17 May 1994, decisions on the financing of the force and on operational matters took until the end of July. By then, the French, pressed by public opinion in their country and francophone leaders of Africa, had decided to dispatch 2,200 soldiers to Goma and Bukavu in Zaire, from where they entered western Rwanda. Opération Turquoise started on 23 June. Much has been written about this intervention (See Study II). Suffice it here to say that the Security Council gave this unilateral military force UN status and a Chapter VII mandate (allowing it to use force) for two months until the enlarged UNAMIR force would take over.
The French intervention was welcomed by the interim government, but strongly opposed by the RPF. However, the French came too late to have any sustainable effect either on the war or the massacres (Prunier, 1995). It is estimated, however, that the French, within the so-called Safe Zone they declared in the south-west of Rwanda, saved some 12-15,000 Tutsi. They also helped to provide relief to Hutu internally displaced persons in south-west Rwanda, some of whom stayed in the country after the French left, thereby saving Burundi from an additional refugee crisis (African Rights, 1994; Guichaoua, 1995). The French left Rwanda in August 1994, handing over their Safe Zone to Ethiopian UN troops. The UNAMIR mandate has since been extended a number of times - the latest to 8 March, 1996 - and the UN troops are still present in Rwanda, although their presence is increasingly opposed by the government.
The refugees
The massacres and the war during April-July 1994 provoked massive population movements, internally in Rwanda and from Rwanda to neighbouring countries. In total, about two million people fled Rwanda and the number of internally displaced persons, many in camps, were estimated at about one million* . The first refugees started to flow into Burundi in the end of April; some 270,000 entered the country. The major influx, however, was into Tanzania (580,000) in April-May and into Zaire (1,200,000) in July. The refugee problem is discussed in detail in Study III. Here it suffices to say that the problems and the sacrifices resulting from the inflow of such a large number of refugees in such a short time have been enormous. The international community (multilaterals, bilaterals, neighbouring countries and NGOs), however, responded very rapidly. Though at first acting as the major obstacle to a firm UN intervention in Rwanda, the US government also reacted swiftly to the human crisis in Goma, when hundreds of thousands fled to that small town. Almost immediately, the US Air Force was mobilized to deliver supplies to Goma to save the lives of refugees (African Rights, 1994). Some were Tutsi fleeing from the massacres, but the majority were Hutu, scared of revenge by the RPF. Most of these Tutsi have since returned to Rwanda, while only a smaller part of the Hutu refugees have done so.
Table 2. Rwanda and Burundi refugee figures as of March 1995
Country of Asylum Country of Origin Total
Burundi Rwanda
Burundi - 243,000 243,000
Rwanda 6,000 - 6,000
Tanzania 78,000 589,000 667,000
Uganda - 4,000 4,000
Zaire Bukavu - 347,000 347,000
Uvira 132,000 59,000 191,000
Goma - 743,000 347,000
Total 216.000 1,985,000 2,201,000
Source: UNHCR, Special Unit for Rwanda and Burundi, March 1995.
The former leadership of Rwanda, including that of the army, de facto if not de jure, has taken over control of the external refugee camps and refuses to let the refugees return home, knowing that keeping them in the camps gives leverage over the international community and, thus, over the Rwandese government. They use propaganda and spread stories of revenge by the RPF, as well as threats and violence against anyone who shows interest in returning home (Human Rights Watch/ Africa, 1994:3). Within the camps, they have re-established the political structures that existed in Rwanda before the massacres: i.e. cells, sectors, communes and préfectures. They have even reportedly established a system of taxing refugees who work outside the camps. Representatives of international organizations, including NGOs, have been challenging the system, but with little success.
Further, reports and observations have it that the camps are used to build up a new force to strike against the government in Rwanda. Troops of the former Rwandese army have been seen exercising at a number of points close to the camps in Zaire. These troops seem to be well armed. Incursions into Rwanda have already been reported and verified (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994:3; Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, 1995).
At the end of December 1994, the former President, Théodore Sindikubwabo, and Prime Minister Jean Kambanda proclaimed a new government in exile in Zaire. At the same time they called for renewed war and preparedness for attack. However, some recent reports point to a loss of power of the self-proclaimed leaders and a deterioration of the morale of the soldiers and the militia. Other reports tell of new training camps for soldiers being established in countries other than Zaire (Amnesty International, 1995).
According to Human Rights Watch Arms Project's report of May 1995, the situation, however, still seems to be very serious:
Ensconced in refugee camps, primarily in eastern Zaire, the perpetrators of the Rwandese genocide have regrouped, rebuilt their military infrastructure, and succeeded in asserting their control over the civilian population in most of the camps during the last year. Acting with impunity, these forces rule over the refugee population through intimidation and terror, effectively preventing the return of refugees to their homes in Rwanda, while inducting fresh recruits into the former Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and militias. Emboldened by military assistance, including arms, from France* and Zaire, among other countries, they have openly declared their intent to return to Rwanda and, in the words of one ex-FAR commander, Col. Musonera, "kill all Tutsi who prevent us from returning." Currently, the ex-FAR has an estimated troop strength of 50,000 men in over a dozen camps, and has brought the militias more tightly under its control. These forces have launched cross-border raids to destabilize the already precarious situation in Rwanda and to obtain information and experience for a future offensive against the current government in Kigali. In addition, the ex-FAR and Rwandan Hutu militias have aligned themselves with Hutu militias from neighbouring Burundi, inflaming an already tense situation inside Burundi and threatening to regionalize the conflict (Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, 1995).
The situation has also created problems in Zaire. Conflicts between the refugees and the local community have become more and more common and violent. In the second half of 1995, Zaire increased its pressure on the international community to assist in solving the refugee problem. In August 1995 there were mass deportations of refugees and threats to expel all refugees. However, towards the end of the year it seemed that an agreement was close between Rwanda, Zaire and UNHCR on preparing for an orderly return of refugees from Zaire.
Rwanda after the war
As of 18 July 1994, the new government of the RPF had taken over the leadership of Rwanda. As described above, the country they took over was a country in shock and complete economic and social disruption. The economy had collapsed, almost all institutions of local and central government had been destroyed and the social fabric was torn apart. Among the casualties of the conflict were thousands of educated and skilled people. Hence, the country lacked most of the expertise needed for the running of an administration and a government. Taxes could not be collected and the government lacked funds for the most basic services.
The situation was aggravated by the large number of persons who had fled the country as refugees (some two million) or were internally displaced (one million, of which 500,000 in camps) and by the return of the former (Tutsi) refugees (some 500,000) to Rwanda after tens of years outside the country (Prunier, 1995).
The internal situation has improved, particularly with regard to the private sector. However, calls for revenge and the unresolved question of property rights are factors that from time to time cause setbacks to the slow progress achieved.
In order to avoid militia activity in the displaced persons' camps inside Rwanda, the government decided at an early stage to close these, by force if necessary (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994:3). Efforts to persuade the displaced to return home voluntarily met with some success in September and October 1994 and even more so in January and February 1995, but came to a complete halt thereafter. In total, some 250,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) had returned home by the end of March 1995, leaving around 250,000 still in the camps. Reports of arrests and in some cases even of torture of homecoming IDPs caused the government, after pressure from the international community, led by the UN coordinating body UNREO, to postpone further actions in the camps. While the government's intention was to repatriate the IDPs by force, the international community prepared new plans for a gradual and safe settlement. The situation, however, exploded in mid-April 1995, when government troops finally closed down the remaining camps, leading to a massacre in Kibeho camp.
The new government quickly recognized the primacy of the rights of current property owners. But the return of some 500,000 refugees, most of them having lived outside Rwanda since the Tutsi outflows of the 1960s, has made government policy virtually impractical. The new arrivals have occupied land and houses all over the country. Hutu are the major victims of this development. A commission has been created to resolve property disputes. However, this problem is, and will remain, a major problem and obstacle to a peaceful reintegration of Tutsi and Hutu in the future (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994:3).
The situation within the government sector is still difficult. Government institutions lack most things required to run a government and a country. Available funds are used to pay salaries, but are far from sufficient. This leads to new problems, which can be summarized as follows:
Because the RPA soldiers receive no government salary, they are susceptible to (bribes) [...] and increasingly participate as well in small-scale extortion and banditry to fill their pockets (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994:3).
As the system of tax-collection is only partly repaired, government relies heavily on foreign funding. The international community, however, so far has not, with some exceptions, delivered any substantial aid to fund the new Rwandese government. At the same time, donor organizations in Kigali have all the equipment necessary for implementing their programmes, while the government has very little. This contrast has further exacerbated relations between the government and the donors. Lacking the means to establish a functioning civilian administration and a judicial system, the government cannot respond to the wishes and requirements of either the international community or its own population.
Lack of resources, and, some would argue, lack of political will (Reyntjens, 1995, Human Rights Watch, April 1995), has also had the consequence that the government has not been able to begin prosecuting persons accused of participation in the massacres. The original intention was an orderly prosecution of all accused of killing. With no resources available, and most legal personnel either killed, in exile or themselves implicated, implementation has been stalled. In the meantime, thousands have been arrested and are awaiting trial, lodged in inhuman conditions in prisons and other sites (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994:3). Amnesty International emphasizes the large number of "secret detentions", with risks of torture, execution and "disappearance". These are not included in the estimated figure of 58,000 detainees as of October 1995 (Amnesty International, 1995).
With the judicial system in disarray, reprisal killings and disappearances continued. Reports on new abuses of human rights, such as arbitrary arrests, torture and acts of revenge, are made every day. The situation in the overcrowded prisons is appalling. The government has therefore appealed for assistance in the form of judges and prosecutors from other countries to begin the work of investigating and prosecuting the persons charged. The government has been cooperating with the UN human rights operation, but progress has been very slow. With donor funding, new prisons have been built, slightly improving the plight of the detainees. In October 1995 a Supreme Court was also established by an act of parliament.
To catch the leaders who are abroad, either in camps in neighbouring countries or in Europe, an international war-crimes tribunal on Rwanda was created in November 1994. It will be convened in Arusha under the leadership of the well-known South African judge, Richard Goldstone. The tribunal, which has the same prosecutor (Goldstone) and the same appeal judges as the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, is not expected to try more than 20 suspects per year. The vast majority of cases will have to be investigated and prosecuted by the Rwandese judiciary (Amnesty International, 1995). Its first indictment, was signed only on 23 November 1995.
The internal political situation
As stated above, the RPF took over the command of Rwanda in July 1994. To show its preparedness for compromise, the RPF included in the new government Hutu moderates who had survived the massacres. Thus, Faustin Twagiramungu became, as had been agreed in the Arusha negotiations, Prime Minister. Other prominent Hutu politicians in the government were the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Justice.
However, the difficulties encountered in finding funds for running the government and the administration, increasing incursions directed from refugee camps outside the country, the problems of finding proper settlements for returning refugees, particularly the increasing discontent of surviving Tutsi, especially those emigrating from Burundi, is straining the government's ability to hold together and to implement the professed reconciliatory policies of the RPF. It appears that the Tutsi community is increasing its pressure on the government for a more Tutsi-"friendly" policy. On 28 August, Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu resigned from office. A new Prime Minister, Pierre-Céléstin Rwigyema and a new government were appointed on 30 August.
The current political situation gives little hope for a peaceful long-term development of Rwanda. In a seminar held in Uppsala in early April 1995, Catherine Newbury summarized the preconditions for reconciliation, and thereby peace, under the following headings:
1. End the legacy of violence and culture of impunity;
2. Material reconstruction;
3. Broad political solutions, including orderly repatriation of refugees; and
4. Reconstitution of the social fabric.
These are daunting challenges, but necessary to address.