Journal of Humanitarian Assistance
General outline: main actors/main factors
On 1 October 1990, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), or more specifically its military wing, RPA (Rwandese Patriotic Army), began to invade the north of Rwanda from Uganda. Eventually some 7,000 (Tutsi) troops crossed the border. Almost four years later, on 6 July 1994, a RPF-dominated government took over in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda.
The RPF invasion started a continuous crisis that would escalate dramatically after the shooting down in April 1994 of the plane that took President Habyarimana (and his counterpart from Burundi) back from a peace meeting in Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania). Before dealing in more detail with the period after the RPF invasion and the Arusha process, the main actors and factors in the Rwanda crisis of the 90s will be described. The main actors are the challenged Habyarimana regime, the RPF, the internal political opposition and the international community. The main factors are the refugees and the economic and the political crises. The regional dimension of the whole crisis will be described in a separate chapter.
The RPF; the refugee crisis
The creation of the RPF in the beginning of 1988 in Kampala, the capital of Uganda (following discussions in late 1987), is related to the large involvement of Tutsi men in the Uganda army (NRA) of President Yoweri Museveni. Major-General Fred Rwigyema, who led the RPF into Rwanda on 1 October 1990, was Vice-Minister of Defence under Museveni. Major Paul Kagame, at present Vice-President of Rwanda, was deputy director of military intelligence in Uganda (Prunier, 1995).
Rwandese refugees and citizens in Uganda contributed, in large measure, to Museveni's victory in 1986. Ethnically, they were the third largest group in the NRA (Prunier, 1992). There is recorded evidence that Museveni gave support to the RPF (Prunier, 1992 and 1995; Human Rights Watch /Arms Project, 1994). The RPF constituted a highly-motivated and well-trained force. About 2,500 RPF soldiers had belonged to the Ugandan army (Prunier, 1995). On 3 October, 1990, the RPF offensive was temporarily stopped by the Rwandese Armed Forces (Forces Armées Rwandaises, FAR) (Reyntjens, 1994; Prunier, 1995).
RPF is a creation of the Tutsi refugees who fled Rwanda, mainly between 1959 and 1966. Over the years, the desire of the 600,000 refugees in Uganda, Burundi, Zaire and Tanzania (including their descendants) to return to their country of origin remained strong (Guichaoua, 1992; Watson, 1991). The political change in Uganda after 1986 and the involvement of Tutsi in the consolidation process provided a good framework for the planning of a military invasion. Another contributing factor was the support that RPF got for their cause at the refugee congress in Washington, DC in August 1988.
Although the immediate motive for the RPF was settlement of the refugee crisis, the Front also worked out an eight-point political programme with the aim to structurally modify Rwandese political culture. The programme accused the Rwanda government of undemocratic and corrupt practices and of ethnic discrimination. The RPF explicitly projected itself as multi-ethnic. Nevertheless, the vast majority of its leaders and members were Tutsi.
Some observers question the wisdom of the RPF in taking military action at that particular time (Prunier, 1993). The invasion occurred only two months after the 30-month talks supervised by UNHCR and OAU on the refugee problem had led to a (third) ministerial agreement between Rwanda and Uganda that might have led to concrete results, and during a gradually developing political liberalization process within Rwanda. Although it seems as if the negotiations might have led to a breakthrough, the RPF, however, was not prepared to wait any more; it was apparently tired of the continued stalling by the Rwandese government. It is, however, argued that RPF attacked at that time because a possible breakthrough in the areas of democratization, human rights and refugee repatriation would have diminished the legitimacy of an attack (Reyntjens, 1994).
The challenged regime
The Habyarimana regime, with the MRND party and the army as its main pillars, had never really been challenged during its 17 years of existence, until the RPF invasion. This did not mean that the regime was not exposed to criticism. Some men who were or had become hostile to the Habyari- mana regime during the 70s and 80s - among them radical Hutu such as Alexis Kanyarengwe and Jean Barahinyura - appeared in the early 90s as prominent RPF members (Reyntjens, 1994). Others would join the domestic opposition, out of which political parties would emerge in 1990.
In general, though, Habyarimana enjoyed considerable popularity, in the Hutu as well as in the Tutsi community. From 1985 onwards, that popularity would begin to erode as a result of a general political and economic crisis. As the conflict evolved, the President was increasingly criticized, even within his own party. He was caught between demands for political liberalization from the opposition and the international community, on the one hand, and refusal of his own supporters to give up political-economic positions, on the other. The build-up of party militias (Interahamwe) and of an extremist pro-Hutu party (Coalition pour la Défence de la République, CDR), in particular, and expressions of ethnicity in general, are indicators of this opposition to the reform process.
"Extremists within the MRND set up the CDR" officially in March 1992 "with an explicit agenda of Hutu extremism" (African Rights, 1994). Although the CDR probably never enjoyed a big support in numbers, it did exert an important influence on the ethnic and political attitude of the MRND (Reyntjens, 1994). Its ideas were spread via media (the newspaper Kangura since 1989, and the radio station RTLMC since July 1993). "Kangura used its close links with the highest circles of the military security services and CDR to leak important information to the public, with the explicit aim of generating fear and expectation". "Closer to the most extreme ideologues of CDR than it was even to Habyarimana, it did not hesitate to criticize the President over the concessions he was forced to make in the course of the Arusha process." (African Rights, 1994).
Most observers agree with the notion and possibility that Habyarimana had to pay with his life on 6 April 1994 for not giving in to a total boycott of the political liberalization process resulting from the peace negotiations with the RPF and the domestic opposition in Arusha between July 1992 and August 1993 (Reyntjens, 1994; Prunier, 1995; Lemarchand, 1995).
The economic crisis
The conflict described above can be viewed as a struggle between an increasingly worn-out regime and its challengers. The latter could no longer reconcile with a one-party government they viewed as authoritarian, undemocratic and thus not adapted to the new political situation. That opposition was fueled by news in the press about corruption within the regime. The Habyarimana regime was further seen as an obstacle to economic recovery. Indeed, one can see a link between the economic crisis that had hit Rwanda hard since 1985 and the increasing opposition from different parts of Rwandese civil society (Chrétien, 1991). Until the end of the 1980s, Rwanda was described as a small and poor, but economically healthy and self-sufficient country (see under Country Brief above and tables 1-8 in Appendix 1). The average inflation rate during the 1980s was not higher than 4% per annum, compared to sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA) average rate of 20%. From 1965 until 1980, Rwanda's GNP per capita grew at a rate one percentage point higher than that of SSA.
Substantial support from multilateral agencies, bilateral donors (Belgium, France, Germany, United States) and NGOs contributed to its development. In 1991, for instance, bilateral and multilateral donor support represented 21.5% (IBRD, 1993) of Rwanda's GNP and 60% of the government's development expenditures, which is higher than SSA's average but far from the highest in the region. Rwanda drew international attention due to its low rural-to-urban migration rate, its sound monetary policy and the active involvement of government and civil society in anti-erosion and reforestration activities, education and health services. International support to Rwanda grew rapidly, from an annual level of US$35 million in 1971-74 to US$343 million in 1990-93, the latter figure representing almost US$50 per capita (OECD statistics).
Problems did develop, however. One major problem was the scarcity of land. Population increase in the already densely-populated country had led to a situation in which the average peasant family did not possess more than 0.7 hectare of land. Under prevailing crop patterns, families faced increasing difficulties to produce sufficiently for their own needs. Whereas in 1982, 9% of the population consumed less than 1,000 calories a day (extreme poverty level), the proportion had increased to 15% in 1989 (with partial famine in the south) and to 31% in 1993 (Maton, 1994). The country, therefore, had in 1993 become more and more dependent on food aid. This deterioration was of course also a result of the civil war. A major attack by the RPA in the most fertile part of the country in January and February 1993 resulted in a massive displacement of 13% of the country's total population and a drop by 15% of agricultural marketed production in one year (Marysse & de Herdt, 1993). All this created ground for extremism and ethnic conflict.
Apart from the internal economic limitations, some major external economic shocks affected Rwanda from the late 1980s. To start with, Rwanda had to close its last tin mine in 1985 due to increasing costs, collapse in world prices and mismanagement (Reyntjens, 1994). Tin provided 15% of Rwanda's export earnings. More dramatic was the decrease in coffee prices on international markets. Coffee usually accounted for more than two-thirds of Rwanda's foreign revenues. Between 1986 and 1992, coffee prices decreased by 75%, resulting in a four-fold increase of the debt service ratio.
Other factors included a severe drought in 1989-90 (which recurred in 1991 and 1993) and diseases affecting two staple crops, cassava and sweet potatoes, which resulted in half a million people experiencing food shortages and malnutrition; increasingly blatant and widespread government corruption; and a diversion of budgetary resources for military expenditures that escalated sharply after the invation of forces of the RPA from Uganda in October 1990. Over the following three years, several RPA incursions, efforts by government of Rwanda forces to repulse the RPA, reprisals against Tutsi and, most importantly, massive internal population displacements of a million people in the northern half of the country in 1993, all combined to deal a crushing blow to the economy.
The international community responded generously to Rwanda's worsening economic crisis. Net official aid disbursements increased by almost 60% in two years, from US$242 million in 1989 to an all-time high of US$375 million in 1991, and were sustained at roughly that level through 1993. A major milestone in the provision of aid to Rwanda was the agreement in September 1990 of a structural adjustment programme with the World Bank and the IMF, which, along with joint and co-financing from seven bilateral donors plus the African Development Bank and the European Union, amounted to US$216 million. After having resisted structural adjustment for several years, the government of Rwanda decided to initiate discussions after pressures had mounted on both the trade account and the fiscal budget, caused in part by the collapse of coffee prices. The link between coffee prices and the government of Rwanda budget stemmed from a long-standing policy of guaranteeing a fixed price to farmers through a Coffee Equalization Fund, in effect a subsidy when the world coffee price, net of marketing and shipping margins, fell below the guaranteed price. With the continued slide in world prices, the degree of budgetary subvention required to meet the guaranteed price shot up dramatically from 1987 (Marysse 1994; IBRD 1993; World Bank, 1991).
The following list of some of the elements of the programme that was approved in June 1991 suggest the wide range of policy measures incorporated in the structural adjustment package:
(i) labour-intensive programmes of rural road construction and soil erosion protection; (ii) a food security programme for drought-affected areas; (iii) a development programme for small entrepreneurs; (iv) financing the parental share of educational expenditures for the poorest 10% of the population; and (v) a fund for redeploying redundant public sector workers (The first three elements of this plan became part of a 1992 World Bank-funded "Food Security and Social Action Project" that expanded support for several UN-agency-sponsored initiatives).
Implementation of these measures varied. Two key measures that were not implemented were the elimination of subsidies to coffee producers and meeting the budget deficit target. Rather than falling, the deficit increased to 18% of GDP in 1992 and 19% in 1993. Since the conditions were not met, the second tranche of the World Bank structural adjustment credit was not provided (Marysse, 1994; World Bank, 1995).
Of possible relevance to the issue of influence on proximate causes of the genocide are the following questions:
With respect to the first question, one issue concerns the impact of the devaluation and the changes in the guaranteed price to coffee farmers. The government of Rwanda reduced the guaranteed price from RWF 125 per kilo to RWF 100 in 1990, but rather than reduce the price further, in line with the SA programme, the government unilaterally raised it to RWF 115 in 1991, out of concern for the im- pact that a lower price would have on export earnings, as well as on the purchasing power and political support of the rural population. In any event, the "benefits" of the devaluation were not passed on to coffee farmers, so their real incomes undoubtedly fell, owing to the relatively modest decline in the farmgate price of coffee, but probably more importantly, to increased inflation associated with devaluation and deficit financing in the early 1990s (Marysse, 1994; World Bank, 1992; World Bank, 1995).
However, the major cause of worsening conditions for the rural population during this period was the reduction in food production caused by prolonged drought, crop disease and massive population displacement (Maton, 1994).
Relevant to the welfare of both rural and urban populations is what the government of Rwanda did with the "windfall" resulting from the devaluation, which was not passed on to farmers. One of the basic rationales for the devaluation was to enable the government of Rwanda to reduce the budgetary deficit and at the same time maintain essential expenditures in the social sectors, health and education. While the structural adjustment programme called for increased fees and "user charges" in health and education, there were also provisions to maintain public sector social expenditures and initiate programmes intended to protect the poor. But this outcome was also based on an assumption that military expenditures would be brought under control. In fact, military spending quadrupled from 1989 to 1992, from 1.9% to 7.8% of GDP, and subsidies to the coffee sector amounted to 46% of export receipts in 1992. Among the consequences of these pressures was severe damage to the "social safety net"; for example, spending for essential drugs targeted to the poorest was only 25% of the budgeted allocation (Marysse, 1994; World Bank, 1992; World Bank, 1995).
While the structural adjustment programme did not require a retrenchment in civil service employment levels, a freeze on public wage scales was implemented. Some employees were able to compensate by participating in the increased private sector activity associated with liberalization and the expansion of external aid. For others, the freeze compounded their fears about the future, kindled by the marked deterioration in their purchasing power after the two devaluations, the generally deteriorating economic situation and the escalating civil war and violence.
Donors had significant potential leverage on Rwanda in view of the very substantial and increasing levels of economic assistance being provided. As is further developed in Study II, while most of the major donors made economic aid conditional on the human rights situation in principle, and several donors and diplomatic representatives made representation to the government of Rwanda, no donor reduced aid with specific and exclusive reference to the increasingly severe human rights violations taking place in the early 1990s.
Instead, the donor response to the escalating civil violence was to employ "positive conditionality" to promote democratization through support to the justice system, the free press and local human rights organizations. Only when the economic and internal security situation deteriorated even further, in later 1993 and early 1994, did several donors sharply reduce or suspend development aid. But the rationale for this stemmed less from concern over civil violence and human rights violations than it did from (1) the need to increase humanitarian aid, some of which came from restructured project aid, in order to meet the needs of the swelling numbers of internally displaced; and (2) the erosion of project accountability and implementation efficiency as the situation in the country rapidly deteriorated.
The domestic opposition; the political crisis
The one-party state was seen more and more as the obstacle rather than the road to further development. This view was mainly propagated by urban politicians from the opposition and by the RPF. From 1985 rumours about corruption within the regime were on the increase (the formal but declining economy could not offer the same amount of advantages as before). Political opposition against Habyarimana was equally on the rise. Although officially Habyarima was re-elected President for seven years with 99.98% of the votes on 19 December 1988, domestic opposition started to sound louder and louder.
As in other parts of Africa in the early 1990s, several protest demonstrations were held in Rwanda in 1990. A strike was suppressed by the police on 4 July, 1990, and a letter denouncing the one-party system was published and circulated on 1 September. Important also was the resignation from the Central Committee of MRND (on the insistance of the Pope) of the Catholic archbishop, Vincent Nsengiyumva. Up to that date, the Catholic church, and the archbishop, had been traditional allies of the MRND. In April 1990 and in September the same year, on the occasion of a visit by the Pope, the church expressed its dissatisfaction with the political and economic situation in the country. The discontent, however, mainly stemmed from the lower echelons of the church. The leadership both of the Catholic and the Anglican churches continued to liaise closely with the President and his government throughout the whole period (Reyntjens, 1994; African Rights, 1994).
Whereas in January 1989 President Habyarimana considered any political change feasible only within the one-party system, one and a half years later, on 5 July 1990, he agreed to the necessity of a separation between party and state. On 24 September, 1990 (i.e. before the armed conflict with the RPF), a national expert commission was set up with the task of working out a national charter that would allow the establishment of different political parties (Reyntjens, 1994). It is difficult to ascertain the President's sincerity with respect to the reforms. However, the subsequent RPF invasion did speed up the formal democratization process.
Initially, the expert commission's mandate ran over two years. The new political-military situation following the invasion of 1 October led to the acceptance of the multi-party system by Habyarimana in a speech on 13 November, which led to the creation of new political parties. In March 1991, the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR) was publicly launched, explicitly stating that it was the successor of MDR-Parmehutu of the first President, Grégoire Kayibanda. About half of the launchers of the "new" party originated from Gitarama-Ruhengeri, Grégoire Kayibanda's traditional stronghold (Reyntjens, 1994). Other, smaller parties that came into existence, and that would play a role in the immediate future, were the so-called intellectuals' Parti Social Démocrate (PSD), with some popularity in the south, and the Parti Libéral (PL), which enjoyed some support from business people and, consequently, from the Tutsi group and the Parti Démocrate Chrétien (PDC).
Except for the desire to oppose the Habyarimana regime, there were few ideological differences in the programmes of the different parties (Reyntjens, 1994).
Formally, the one-party system was abrogated with the adoption of a new constitution on 10 June 1991 and the law on political parties, one week later. The position of Prime Minister was institutionalized and parliamentary elections were scheduled for the immediate future by the President. Only six weeks later, on 31 July 1991, the most significant "new" parties (MDR, PDC, PL and PSD) denounced in a common declaration the plans to hold elections so soon. Immediate elections could benefit only the MRND, which had held power for two decades. Instead, they demanded a national convention to discuss in detail reform of the institutions and the call for democratic elections.
Habyarimana rejected the idea of a national convention. Only the small PDC was ready to join a transition government. Also, no elections were held. The other opposition parties showed their political dissatisfaction in demonstrations on 17 November 1991 and 8 January 1992 (Chrétien, 1992). This was a major setback for the Presidential hope to build a unified front of Hutu parties against the RPF. It also meant the introduction of an increasingly violent policy on the part of the Habyarimana regime against any Hutu and Tutsi opposition.
On 6 April 1992, after heavy national and international pressure, a new transitional government was established. It included all the major opposition parties and was led by President Habyarimana and a Prime Minister from the opposition (Dismas Nsengiyaremye, MDR). However, relations between Habyarimana and the MRND on the one hand and the opposition parties on the other remained tense throughout the conflict with the RPF. The domestic opposition was vehemently accused of collaborating with the RPF and the Tutsi, who were more and more being incited as ethnic enemies.
The international community
The international community, and in particular the two major bilateral donors, Belgium and France, played a predominant role throughout the conflict. Belgium abstained from getting involved militarily. Its government withdrew its troops one month after the beginning of the conflict. The Belgian government wanted to give democratization a chance and was in favour of, and fought hard for, a negotiated peace. The Belgian Ambassador played an important role during the talks leading to establishment of a transition government led by Dismas Nsengiyaremye.
The French sent 370 men to Rwanda in October 1990 and, after a scaling down in March 1991, increased this number to about 670 in February 1993, i.e. after a relatively large-scale attack by the RPF. Some sources claim that France gave active support both in 1990 and in 1993 (African Rights, 1994; Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, 1994; Prunier, 1995). During the latter clashes, the French were observed "assisting the Rwandese army mortaring RPF-positions" (African Rights, 1994). "French soldiers were deployed at least 40 kilometers north of the capital on the road to Byumba, just south of the RPF's recognized zone of control. No French citizens or other Western expatriates are known to be living there." (Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, 1994). It is thus maintained that the French played an important supporting role: by manning checkpoints and advising FAR officers; by providing military training after the start of the conflict; by sending at least $6 million worth of war material in 1991-92; and by financially guaranteeing material for the same amount shipped via third parties (Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, 1994). Not surprisingly, from the start of the conflict the RPF would require the departure of the French. The French government, however, has officially denied that it actively participated in the conflict.
As far as African countries are concerned, the role of Uganda has been discussed above. The Tanzanian President played an important role bringing the fighting parties to the negotiation table in Arusha and during the whole negotiation process. President Sese Seko Mobutu of Zaire was also involved in the cease-fire negotiations immediately after the start of the conflict. Later, Zaire would play only a secondary role in the conflict. When the conflict had started in October 1990, 500 Zairean troops were sent to Rwanda to help the FAR repel the RPF invasion. Several weeks after their arrival, they were withdrawn amid charges that they had lacked discipline and had abused Rwandese civilians (Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, 1994).
A major international involvement in the conflict came through the the United Nations as a direct result of the Arusha agreements of 4 August 1993. As well as governments and international institutions, human rights groups that regularly issued reports criticizing and exposing human rights abuses during the Habyarimana regime played an important role between 1990 and 1994.
The real influence of the international community is difficult to measure. However, the threat to cut aid in March 1993, following publication of a human rights report blaming Habyarimana for the death of at least 2,000 citizens, for example, is widely believed to have incited the Rwandese President to resume peace talks with the RPF (Reyntjens, 1994).
Evolution of the conflict
As has been shown above, since the beginning of the 1990s the Habyarimana regime had been facing strong internal and external political and military pressure for liberalization (e.g. for a multi-party system, more respect for human rights, good governance and fair settlement of the refugees). Such reforms could lead only to a reduction of the power and privileges enjoyed by the supporters of the one-party system in MRND, the army, local and national administrations, public enterprises etc. One could therefore expect a strong opposition from those groups to the restructuring process.
Below, we will deal first with the positive developments during the conflict period, i.e. the delicate peace-making process between the regime and the opposition. We will describe the different stages of the process and the content of the agreements reached on 4 August 1993. This will be discussed at some length, as it might constitute an important basis for future conflict resolution. Second, we will show why the outcome of the Arusha negotiations never deserved to be called a peace agreement, but were rather a political agreement. In the light of knowledge about the tragedy that hit Rwanda after 6 April 1994, we will deal with the systematic obstruction, mainly by regime supporters, to most reforms. Human rights groups' reports illustrate the systematic use of terror against assumed ethnic and political opponents of the regime. Ethnicity finally poisoned not only the different political parties, but also major segments of Rwandese society.
The Arusha process
After November 1990 there was a stalemate in the military conflict between the RPF and the Rwandese army. A military solution was thus not in sight. The conflict between the political parties and the difficulties in establishing the first real transition government (without RPF) in April 1992, or 18 months after the RPF invasion, also indicated the difficulties in reaching a negotiated solution. Indeed, the Nsengiyaremye-led government that started negotiations with the RPF on a peace treaty in Arusha on 10 August, 1992 was regularly obstructed by the President and the MRND. Systematically, Habyarimana would veto any breakthrough in negotiations that could lead to a substantial decline of MRND power. It took a lot of international pressure to make the President agree each time. Also important underlying factors were RPF military advances, deterioration of the economy and the increased number of internally displaced persons (from 80,000 in late 1990 to 350,000 in May 1992 after the Byumba offensive and to 950,000 in February 1993).
The preliminaries (October 1990-April 1992)
Seventeen days after the RPF invasion, under mediation by Belgian and Tanzanian officials, President Habyarimana and President Museveni of Uganda agreed in Mwanza (Tanzania) on an OAU- and UNHCR-supervized regional conference on the refugee problem and to continue the talks their governments had had since 1988.
In Mwanza, Habyarimana and Museveni also agreed on direct negotiations with the RPF. Consequently, the RPF was recognized by Habyarimana as a discussion partner. Also important was the continuing dialogue between Habyarimana and Museveni, despite the former's accusation of the latter's active pro-RPF involvement in the conflict in Rwanda.
Until the involvement of the major domestic opposition parties in the Rwandese government (5 April,1992), little progress, however, was achieved in the mostly-mediated talks between the government and the RPF. No fundamental agreements that would lead to a sustainable peace were signed, but only those, such as cease-fires, that would solve immediate problems.
Chronologically, cease-fires were signed and renewed after consecutive violations: on 26 October 1990 (Gbadolite, Zaire) after active Belgian diplomacy; on 20 November 1990 (Goma, Zaire), confirming and extending the Gbadolite agreement; mid-February 1991 (Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania); and on 29 March 1991 (Nsele, Zaire). The last-mentioned cease-fire was amended twice: on 16 Septem- ber 1991 in Gbadolite at an OAU summit and on 12 July 1992 in Arusha. The latter amendment led to the creation of a so-called security zone between RPF-held territory and the rest of Rwanda.
Notwithstanding the agreement at the Goma talks to send a 55-man OAU observer force (GOMN, Groupement des Observateurs Militaires Neutres) to oversee implementation of the cease-fire, by September 1991 only 15 officers had arrived.
The fundamentals (May 1992-August 1993)
About one month after the inauguration of the new government, preliminary talks took place in Brussels and Paris (May and June 1992) between the MDR, PSD and the PL on the one hand and the RPF on the other. Agreement was reached to start peace negotiations (in Arusha), not only to restore the Nsele cease-fire, but also to discuss further democratization, integration of the RPF in government, and military reforms.
Peace negotiations between the Rwandese government and the RPF started on 10 August 1992, and were greatly facilitated by Tanzania and President Ali Hassan Mwinyi and his Ambassador, Ami Mpungwe. Observers from the neighbouring countries of Burundi and Zaire and from Belgium, France, Germany, the United States, Senegal and the OAU would be present at the consecutive Arusha negotiations. The negotiations continued for one year before final agreement was reached on a total package of protocols on:
Rule of law
According to the protocol of 18 August 1992, Rwanda should honour the principles of national unity, democracy, pluralism and human rights. All citizens should enjoy the same rights and possibilities irrespective of their ethnic, regional, religious or sexual identity. An implicit consequence was the lifting of the quota system, which attributed power and positions according to a person's ethnic identity. All refugees should have the right to return. The multi-party system should be one of the cornerstones of democracy. All former agreements (Nsele, confirmed in Gbadolite and Arusha) on creation of an enlarged transitional government should be honoured. The protection of human rights should be guaranteed and supervized by a national commission.
The first protocol was concluded in a short period of time. It can be characterized either as a summary of results from earlier negotiations or as a list of more general principles. The situation was different for the negotiations on the ensuing protocols. Real power distribution was then at stake.
Power-sharing and transitional institutions
The texts include stipulations on the transitional institutions (Presidency, government, parliament, courts) and on the power distribution between and within the last three (Communiqué 18/9/92; Protocol 30/10/92; Protocol 9/1/93).
The government should be extended to include the RPF and be composed of 21 ministers: 5 MRND (including Minister of Defence), 5 RPF (including the Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior), 4 MDR (including Prime Minister and Minister of Finance), 3 PSD, 3 PL and 1 PDC. CDR was thus excluded. The new government should in principle decide by consensus.
The transitional parliament would be composed of 11 members each from MRND, MDR, PSD, PL and RPF, 4 members from PDC and 1 member each from the other recognized parties. President Habyarimana would remain head of state. However, he would have to cede certain powers to the Prime Minister and the government. Presidential and parliamentary elections would be organized at the end of the period of transition. A commission would be given the task to draft a new constitution, which would be the object of a referendum.
Three key ingredients to the agreement need to be stressed:
1) the exclusion of CDR;
2) the switch from a primarily Presidential system to a primarily parliamentary system in the distribution of power; and
3) the requirement that the concurrence of at least four parties would be required to reach a majority vote even though the rhetoric suggested the cabinet would try to work by consensus.
Refugees and internally displaced persons
On 9 June 1993, the government of Rwanda and the RPF reached agreement on a solution for the refugees and the internally dislocated persons who had fled the area north of Byumba and Ruhengeri and who numbered about 1,000,000 in February 1993 (Protocol 9/6/93).
Six months after inauguration of the enlarged transitional government, a number of repatriation areas should be identified and equipped. Three months later, a first group of refugees would be allowed to settle in Rwanda. As far as land rights are concerned, it was advised that land that had not been claimed during the previous 10 years should not be considered as property by the returnees. UNHCR and OAU should be asked to convene a donors, conference to discuss the financial implications of the refugee programme.
Military reforms
On 24 June 1993, negotiators from the government and RPF agreed on a definite cease-fire, the inclusion of the RPF in a merged national army (Armée Nationale), including the gendarmerie. The RPF would obtain a ratio of 40% of all troops and 50% of all commanding posts. It was also specified that the enlarged transitional government would rule the country for at least one year (later specified as a maximum of 22 months). Parliamentary elections would be organized at the end of the transition period (Protocol 24/6/93).
Agreement was further reached at Kinihira on an army of 13,000 troops and a gendarmerie of 6,000 men (Articles 25/7/93). As regards the army, this would imply a considerable reduction compared to the number of troops at that moment: about 28,000 in the FAR and 20,000 in the RPA - in both cases a considerable increase since 1990 (UN Reconnaissance mission to Rwanda, August 1993). The Armée Nationale would be headed by a FAR commander, the gendarmerie by a RPA commander.
It was also agreed that 600 RPA men (an armoured battalion) would be allowed to see to the protection of the RPF people in Kigali who would participate in the transition government and administration, and to safety in the capital in general. A neutral international force (UN blue helmets) or an enlarged GOMN under UN supervision, would be in charge of the overall security in all Rwanda and, more specifically, operate along the border with Uganda, in the demilitarized zone and in Kigali. That international force would further be in charge of supervision of the inauguration of the enlarged transition government, the transitional parliament, military reforms, demobilization and the preparation of elections. The installation of this force was a precondition for implementation of the Arusha agreements.
Designation of the post-Arusha Prime Minister
At Kinihira in June 1993, agreement was reached to nominate Faustin Twagiramungu (MDR) as Prime Minister of the enlarged transitional government. However, at the moment of his designation, he was excluded from his party. The immediate reason was that he, as MDR chairman, had consented to President Habyarimana's decision to have Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye replaced by Agathe Uwilingiyimana as of 17 July 1993.
Legally, Dismas Nsengiyaremye's mandate as Prime Minister expired on 16 July. Politically, the President saw in the nomination of Agathe Uwilingiyimana a means to exploit frictions within the MDR and to divide the main opposition party. One MDR faction was centred around Dismas Nsengiyaremye and opposed to fundamental reforms (the so-called PowerGroup, said to follow the former Parmehutu ideology). The second faction supported MDR chairman Faustin Twagiramungu.
On 23 July 1993, a majority of members at an extraordinary congress of the MDR decided to exclude its chairman and Agathe Uwilingiyimana, the new Prime Minister (Reyntjens, 1994). This would not prevent the Prime Minister, and the political parties present in Kinihira, from deciding on Faustin Twagiramungu as prospective Prime Minister two days later. For the newly-formed "PowerGroup" within the MDR, led by Jean Kambanda, an agreement had been signed without the consent of the MDR, which argued that the Prime Minister did not belong to their party, whereas the Arusha negotiators had always agreed on a MDR politician as Prime Minister.
In the following period, the split within the MDR would remain, probably not to the dissatisfaction of the President, who could refer to the absence of consent within political parties in order to fail to inaugurate an enlarged transition government in accordance with the Arusha agreements. Whereas the rivalry within the MDR was at the start basically a struggle between several persons, the dispute became more and more dominated by ethnicism. The "PowerGroup" used more and more an anti-Tutsi language, whereas politicians such as Faustin Twagiramungu were open to compromise with other political and ethnic groups.
Non-implementation (August 1993-April 1994)
The actual Arusha agreements signed on 4 August 1993 by President Habyarimana and RPF Chairman Alexis Kanyarengwe comprise the above protocols plus a series of intermediary and ad hoc agreements, such as the different cease-fire texts and the stipulations.
Already during the negotiations, substantial delays were encountered before the more fundamental questions were agreed upon. The President showed great unwillingness to go along with many conclusions. Habyarimana would veto, or postpone his consent to, agreements between the government and the RPF on several occasions: in mid-November 1992, and in January, June and July 1993.
After signing of the agreements, a number of interlinked factors would contribute to non-implementation of the Arusha accords by 6 April, 1994: the delayed arrival of UN troops, internal disputes with- in different parties and basic unwillingness by the President and his regime to go along with the major changes. The final Arusha texts provided for the operation of the (Faustin Twagiramungu) government at most 37 days after the signing (i.e. by 10 September) pending the arrival of UN blue helmets. As the UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda) mandate was not yet approved by the UN Security Council, the caretaker government led by Agathe Uwilingiyimana had to remain in place.
The general political climate was far from peaceful, in particular after the murder on the night of 20-21 October 1993 of the first democratically-elected Hutu President of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, by Tutsi soldiers of the Burundian army. Most observers point to this event as a decisive factor for the ensuing tragedy in Rwanda. This is expressed by Linden as follows:
Perhaps the single most important trigger enabling those who were determined to abort the process to win the day was ironically an assassination in Burundi on 21 October 1993, that of the new "Hutu" president, Melchior Ndadaye, one of the first fruits of a process of democratiation of its "Tutsi" regime. Tens of thousands died in the wake of the coup and some 70,000 Burundian "Hutu" fled into southern Rwanda. The message of these events to many around Habyarimana was doubtless that the Tutsi would never genuinely accept (Hutu) majority rule within the context of a government of national unity. In other words, the extremists were right: Arusha was too much, too far, too fast (Linden, 1995).
And by Lemarchand:
(Ndadaye's) death at the hands of an all-Tutsi army carried an immediate and powerful demonstration effect to the Hutu of Rwanda (...) The message came through clear and loud: 'Never trust the Tutsi!' (Thus), with Ndadaye's death vanished what few glimmers of hope remained that Arusha might provide a viable forum for a political compromise with the RPF (Lemarchand, 1995).
If one adds to the above the absence of real reconciliation between conservative and reform-oriented persons and groups, the massive spread of weapons in the country and the harsh economic situation, one will better understand the difficulties in implementing the Arusha accords.
Still, most observers thought in November 1993 that the Arusha agreements would slowly but certainly lead to a more stable situation. Donors tried hard to give their support to a peaceful development. UNDP's preparation (September 1993-April 1994) of a "Round-Table Conference for the rehabilitation of the areas affected by the war and the social reintegration of the demobilized soldiers" is a case in point. After the formal approval on 5 October 1993 by the UN Security Council (Resolution 872) to station 2,500 blue helmets in Rwanda by the end of March 1994, the first troops arrived at the end of October 1993. The final formal obstacle of the 22-months period of the transition government had thus been overcome.
One of the first tasks for the blue helmets was to escort the 600 RPA soldiers and the designated RPF ministers and staff members to Kigali (on 28 December 1993; Operation Clean Corridor). Other tasks were to guarantee the safety of the capital, the border area with Uganda and the demilitarized zone in the north. In 1994, the UN troops would be in charge of the supervision of military reforms, demobilization and demilitarization. In 1995, their attention was to be focused on the process that would lead to municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections during the last six months of the transition.
However, the enlarged transitional government, the cornerstone of the agreement on which most other activities depended, never came into existence. Rwanda's Prime Minister was still Agathe Uwilingiyimana on the fatal date of 6 April, 1994. After the arrival of the blue helmets, the reasons for delay were internal, accentuated by the violent aftermath of the murder of Melchior Ndadaye in Burundi on 20 October 1993.
The inauguration of a new government and parliament was planned first for 5 January, 1994, later for 23 February and then for 24 March, but did not take place. In the eyes of the President, the different parties were too internally divided to provide for a stable government that he could support. As long as no government was acknowledged, part of the opposition boycotted the installation of a new parliament.
Faustin Twagiramungu, who was proposed as Prime Minister, lacked the support of the majority of his party, which was strongly divided. In the aftermath of the murder of Ndadaye, accusations of corruption and of ethnicism increased. The MDR, the PL and the PSD split politically, between those ready for power-sharing (the moderates) and those who were ready to go to the utmost extremities to retain power (the so-called "Power" fractions). Each side accused the other of complicity with either the MRND or the RPF. For instance, Faustin Twagiramungu (a pro-reform Hutu) was accused of siding with the RPF and of having been corrupted. That accusation allowed the "PowerGroup" within the MDR to adopt a harsher pro-Hutu stance. Within the PL, its chairman, Justin Mugenzi, was accused of anti-RPF positions, whereas the Minister of Social Affairs, Ndasingwa, was accused of siding with the RPF.
In the meantime, in mid-February, Jacques Booh-Booh, the representative of the UN Secretary-General in Rwanda, had seriously warned of the massive spread of weapons among citizens and supporters of the militias.
Manipulation of ethnicity
As noted above, in the early 1990s the Habyarimana regime had attempted to establish a broad Hutu-dominated front. The strategy adopted by at least part of the regime's supporters was to create a political climate that would result in a political and military marginalization of the RPF and, broadly speaking, of the whole Tutsi population. Political and ethnic polarization was clearly a strategy from the start of the conflict (Reyntjens, 1994). This has been confirmed in a number of reports by different international human rights organizations (Africa Watch, 1992; Amnesty International, 1992; Fédération Internationale des droits de l'homme, 1993; Africa Watch, 1993; Human Rights Watch/Arms Project 1994; African Rights, 1994).
One of these reports, from March 1993, written by a group of international human rights committees, gives a detailed description of offences against human rights. The report gives an idea of the increasing extremism within and around the Presidency and the MRND (Fédération Internationale des droits de l'homme, 1993).
Some examples are: In mid-October 1990, a group of Hutu, agitated by local authorities, take revenge on a group of Tutsi in the region of Kibilira (Gisenyi), killing 300 people and causing a massive flight of refugees (Africa Watch, 1992). Citizens, mainly Tutsi, accused of sympathizing with the RPF, are sentenced to death. More than 8,000 citizens are arrested without clear motives. International diplomatic and NGO pressure results in lifting of the death penalty and the release of the prisoners. After a temporary territorial success for the RPF in the Ruhengeri area, military and civilian authorities take revenge on the Bagogwe, a Tutsi sub-group, causing at least 500 deaths. The Bagogwe were to become further victims of terror during the conflict (December 1991 and November/December 1992).
From the end of 1991, the south of the country became involved in the conflict for the first time (Fédération Internationale des droits de l'homme, 1993). The violence that occurred in Bugesera is indicated by several sources as the dark turning-point in the anti-reform strategy of Habyarimana's supporters. "The 1992 Bugesera massacre marked an important turning point in the development of the methods of killings, because of the central role played by extremist propaganda. For four months before the killing started, extremist politicians and ideologues had been active in the area, inciting the Hutu populace" (African Rights, 1994). Rwambuka, the mayor of Kanzenze who belonged to the central committee of the MRND, was the driving force behind the terror. Five hundred persons were arrested after the events, but in most cases released without charges (Fédération Internationale des droits de l'homme, 1993).
Similtaneous and similar patterns of violent conflicts against Tutsi and reform-minded Hutu at different places (e.g. Kibilira in March 1992; Kibilira, Kayoya, Mutura in November/December 1992) reveal a particular strategy and plan adopted by local authorities, with strong support from the highest levels. Increasing involvement of party militias, multiplication of the number of FAR soldiers by five over a 16-months period, escalating hostile ethnic-political propaganda by highly-placed officials against presumed opponents of the regime (Hutu and Tutsi in opposition parties and RPF), and a deliberately-created climate of insecurity and unsafety, are different indications of an organized agressive attitude against any opponents of the MRND regime (Fédération Internationale des droits de l'homme, 1993).
To give an example from the build-up of the party militias (interahamwe = "those who work together"): They were first seen in action during a massacre carried out at Bugesera in March 1992. "Specific details of the establishment of these militias are found in a Ministry of Defence memorandum dated September 1991. This envisaged at least one armed man for every 10 households and one policeman per sector". While at that date "the mobilization was to be restricted to the northern areas close to the front line", "the 'home guard' project was overtaken by the mass mobilization of party militia throughout the country under the control of very senior politicians and military officers. It is likely that one motivation for this was that, as opposition political parties mobilized, lines of authority from the Presidency to every rural commune began to dissolve. This made it more essential to mobilize a militia whose sole loyalty was to the hard-liners". "Interahamwe were recruited widely across Rwanda. Many were unemployed young men". "The arming of the interahamwe intensified after the February 1993 offensive by the RPF", notwithstanding several prior demands from the Prime Minister (Dismas Nsengiyaremye) "to the MRND and the CDR to adhere to the law on political parties, and disband the militias" (African Rights, 1994).
The gradual political, military and ethnic escalation benefitted from at least the tacit support of the President. Habyarimana is held personally liable for the death of at least 2,000 people in the period October 1990-January 1993. He never objected, e.g. in speeches, either to the increasingly ethnic-extremist attitude of local authorities or to the increasing involvement of party militias in the gradually-widening conflict since November 1991. One of the main conclusions is that there is a similarity between the different acts of violence committed by regime supporters between October 1990 and February 1993 (Fédération Internationale des droits de l'homme, 1993).
Already in 1993, some members of human rights groups concluded in the report that, since the conflict with the RPF began, the Tutsi population had been exposed to a massacre: "Tutsi have been killed, mutilated, harassed, made to disappear, frightened, only because of their ethnic identity." Bearing the dramatic events of April/May 1994 in mind, little doubt can exist that political manipulation of ethnicity had been on the rise in Rwanda for quite some time (Fédération Internationale des droits de l'homme, 1993).
In November 1992, when an agreement was reached in Arusha, political violence by Habyarimana supporters escalated. In February 1993, the RPF attacked and occupied part of the area of Ruhengeri-Gisenyi, as a direct response to stalling by the President of the negotiations in Arusha, but also as a response to the ethnic harassement of Tutsi by Hutu militias in north-western Rwanda, in which more than 300 people died (Africa Watch, 1993).
The RPF attack caused an internal flow of displaced persons of one out of seven Rwandese, who felt forced to leave areas containing the most fertile soils in the country. The number of internally displaced persons thus increased to about 950,000 in 1993, compared to an estimated 350,000 in mid-1992. After 8 February 1993, the RPF had doubled the size of its occupied territory in Rwanda, thereby infringing one of the basic elements of the cease-fire agreement with the Rwandese government, i.e. the "neutrality" of the buffer zone between "RPF territory" and the rest of Rwanda.
The RPF attacks brought massive protest in and outside the country. In Rwanda, the President and the Prime Minister denounced the latest acts of violence in a joint communique. The European Union, in particular Belgium, France and Germany, expressed its discontent in a similar way. France decided to increase the number of its troops by 300, to discourage the RPF march towards Kigali. Reyntjens (1994) strongly doubts whether the RPF, after its only half-successful invasion of October 1990, really planned to attempt a take-over of Kigali. The February 1993 offensive should rather be seen in the same light as the one in May 1992, when the RPF launched an attack on Byumba to express its discontent with lack of progress at the negotiations with the government. The strategy would be to demonstrate its military strength and superiority to convince the other parties of the necessity of a political agreement with the Front.
New talks were held between the RPF and all the parties of the government save MRND in Bujumbura from 25 February to 2 March 1993, leading to the Dar-es-Salaam cease-fire agreement of 9 March (after promises on the withdrawal of the French troops). This cease-fire agreement was important since it included stipulations on an international force (OAU or UN) to replace the French troops, a demilitarized zone and a resumption of the Arusha talks.
After the agreements of 4 August 1993 were signed, hostility did not diminish. On the contrary, Rwandese society tended to polarize more and more in anti- and pro-RPF (and Tutsi) parties and groups. As described above, the unity of the MDR, the PSD and the PL was put under enormous pressure from Habyarimana's supporters, who tended to equate opponents of the MRND regime with enemies of the Hutu people. Parallel events in neighbouring Burundi added to the polarization.
The political violence that plagued Rwanda throughout 1993 and the first months of 1994 was increasingly fueled by influential media, which agitated the Hutu population against their presumed enemies. On 8 July, 1993, Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLMC) started to broadcast, officially to counterbalance Radio Muhabura (RPF) and the official Radio Rwanda (Reyntjens, 1994). According to African Rights (1994), "RTLMC played a key role in inciting violence against Tutsi and moderate Hutu… (It) fervently opposed the Arusha Accords". Among the RTLMC promotors one found influential people belonging to the right wing of the MRND (e.g. Kabuga) and the CDR: Hassan Ngeze, director of the very pro-CDR newspaper Kangura (established already in 1989) and Ferdinand Nahimana, Director of the National Information Services. The latter was even dismissed for his ethnic and regional excesses.
This illustrates the attitude of groups of major regime supporters throughout the conflict. First, creation of a poisoned political climate and of ethnicism had been planned since the beginning of the conflict. Second, direct means (use of militias; spreading of weapons; creation of extremist movements; political assassinations and planned massacres) as well as indirect means (permanent climate of terror and fear; propaganda via the media) were strategically used, certainly from 1992 on. Third, the planning emanated from the highest-ranking persons in the army, the Presidential guard, the administration etc. who had benefitted from the one-party regime (Lemarchand, 1995; African Rights, 1994).