Chapter 4

LOCALIZING DISASTER RELIEF

This chapter provides a template for organizing and marshaling international military and civil defence assets (MCDA) and capabilities to respond to humanitarian and disaster relief operations (HADRO) from the international to local levels. Successful use of military and civil defence units requires leadership, pre-crisis planning and preparation; and coordinated implementation and control. Unity of effort is key to any operation and where time sensitive actions are the rule, it becomes imperative that unity exists in command, control and coordination. Unity of effort is needed if skills and resources are to be employed internationally to successfully strengthen Member States capacities to mitigate and control the effects of disasters.

This Chapter is divided into three sections:

• Section I - Foundation Principles in Planning and Execution - provides a basic description of governing principles, and a description of deliberate and crisis action planning processes.

• Section II - A Coordinated Response to Disaster Relief - will show how these foundation principles in planning and execution are put into practice using the UN-DHA Emergency Management System.

• Section III - National Service Modules and Multinational Service Packages - introduces pre-crisis measures that speed-up the planning cycle during execution.

Section I - Foundation Principles in Planning and Execution

4.1 MCDA - A Conditional Response

4.1.1 Anytime MCDA is considered to support disaster relief operations it should do so on condition that:

• it is performing a clearly stated mission with an end point to the operation.

• all other options for use of military assets have been weighed against the humanitarian disaster relief requirement.

• it is synchronized with other participating military, civil defense, civil protection and international and non-governmental organizations.

• it is operating in support of the civilian government, and under the auspices, protections, and legal status afforded those serving in disaster relief operations for the UN (e.g. "Expert on Mission Status").

• MCDA provides the Receiving State short-term leverage to overcome the initial problems caused by the disaster.

4.2 MCDA Principles of Operations

The most significant contribution that military and civil defence forces provide to HADRO is organizational structure - to include command and control, and the skills needed to accomplish the mission. Military forces are normally tasked to provide an immediate short-term response. Civilian agencies traditionally focus on supporting long-term disaster mitigation and development efforts. The differences in these perspectives should be balanced when planning and coordinating relief operations.

Military commanders and planners tasked to support HADRO should consider a few broad and long standing principles in order to maximize the effectiveness of organizing a multinational humanitarian relief effort. It is hoped that by considering and implementing such principles the results will be: improved communications, interagency cooperation, and reductions in inadvertent situational reactions or misunderstandings.

4.2.1 Objective.

Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. To achieve the objective, military commanders and planners should:

• Understand the constraints.

• Clearly articulate military roles in HADRO.

• Establish attainable and realistic goals.

• Develop clear HADRO mission-termination standards and ensure that all military and civil relief agencies involved in the operation understand them.

• Limit operations within the boundaries or parameters of the initial HADRO mission statement or terms of reference.

4.2.2 Unity of Effort.

Seek unity of effort toward every objective. To attain unity of effort commanders conducting HADRO should:

• Support, cooperate with, and take direction from civil governmental authorities.

• Ensure clear lines of authority and cooperation are established between deployed international-multinational military and civil defense forces.

• Approach communication difficulties with flexibility. Seek to resolve in advance potential conflicts in task prioritization.

4.2.3 Perseverance.

Prepare for measured, protracted application of military support capabilities. Commanders should balance their desire to attain objectives quickly with sensitivity for long-term objectives. They must be assured that the resources required to preserve and accomplish the HADRO mission and its respective objectives and tasks are available for the duration of the operation. Donor States must be prepared to support HADRO objectives and provide the necessary resources to complete the mission.

4.2.4 Security.

Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage. The purpose of international disaster relief assistance (IDRA) in a non-hostile environment is to assist the Affected State with the necessary resources and skills to get them back on their feet. To safeguard the safety of unarmed military and civil defence force personnel, the Affected/Receiving State must meet the security requirements stated in a previously agreed upon Status of Forces Agreement. When humanitarian and disaster relief operations are threatened due to a Receiving States' inability to meet the necessary security arrangements, then provisions for self defense or withdrawal should be agreed upon before deployment into the disaster area.

4.2.5 Restraint.

Apply appropriate military capabilities prudently.

• Operate within a legal framework (i.e. status of forces agreement)

• Understand that restraint is essential. A single inadvertent act could cause political consequences that jeopardize the mission and the safety of relief workers as well as civilians and material.

4.2.6 Legitimacy.

Sustain the willing acceptance by the people, and the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions. Military and civil defense planners should:

• Ensure that HADRO adheres to internationally sanctioned standards and laws.

• Provide leverage to the Affected State's Local Emergency Management Authority (LEMA) in reestablishing life-saving and life sustaining societal functions.

• Understand that neutrality is critical in maintaining legitimacy. International disaster relief assistance should not be tied to the endorsement or embracing of political agendas or religious creeds by the intended donors or beneficiaries.

• Operate under a status of forces agreement or other legal instrument. Comply with UN conditions qualifying for "Expert on Mission Status" for deployed military personnel. Such compliance provides international legal protection and rights sanctioned by the United Nations and international law.

4.2.7 Readiness.

• Military and civil defense commanders should anticipate requirements for command and control structures. Resources and organization of the command and control structure that directs the overall HADRO must be fully prepared (preferably in advance) to meet its responsibilities.

• Preparation of forces for HADRO should occur in advance. National contributions should not rely on other participating Donor, Transient, or Receiving States to provide the necessary logistics and support services to sustain their operations without prior commitments from the parties concerned.

• Logistics lines of communication (LOC) should be anticipated and coordinated with the lead UN field agency, UN-DHA Relief Coordination Branch at Geneva, Switzerland, and the Affected States.

4.2.8 Product of a Balanced Effort: Synergism.

• Military and civil defense forces deployed in support of HADRO must be organizationally balanced to avoid redundancy and duplication. The overall balanced effort should include compatible, well rounded operational and service support capabilities as they relate to the overall mission. National contributions integrated into a multinational package can create a synergistic response where the output of the overall relief effort is greater than any single national contribution. A synergistic effect is created when the sum of the parts (civil government military international MCDA, IGO, NGO, PVO and population at large) work together to focus on the objectives of the immediate disaster relief phase.

• The balanced effort should include proper use of military and civil defense resources. Military capabilities should not replace activities which could be done by civil governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, or private volunteers or companies under comparable conditions with basically the same results. Helping the Receiving State to rebound from a catastrophic and sudden onset disaster should be the number one priority.

• The development of multinational service packages for MCDA should take into account the total disaster or humanitarian relief requirements, and contributors beginning with the Receiving State to include all other potential donors, private or public. Military contributions represent one of many contributors that can respond to the immediate needs of the disaster. The balanced effort accounts for all participants measured against the tasks at hand. No single UN agency or military/civil defense unit is capable of overcoming the multifaceted challenges created by sudden onset disasters alone. It must be centrally planned, coordinated at all levels and decentrally executed.

4.3 Pre-Crisis Planning

4.3.1 Deliberate Planning Process.

4.3.1.1 Create a planning environment. Deliberate planning creates an environment where actions are formulated to mitigate potential disasters in advance. The process projects planners into an imaginary pseudo-crisis, allowing them to plan as if the disaster had already occurred. Time is on the side of deliberate planners as crucial details are discovered and illuminated thereby acquainting civil, military, and relief agencies with what they may face during the crisis.

4.3.1.2 Plans are Benchmarks. Plans prepared under this process are benchmarks for exercises and fiscal planning. These plans identify the types of resources, agreements, or understandings that may be required to support relief operations nationally or internationally.

4.3.1.3 Plans provide framework for crisis response. Plans prepared in this way provide a framework for action for actual crisis. Time constraints in crisis planning are leveraged through the use of deliberate plans created when time was not the enemy. They become the template - and through modification or tailoring can be rapidly tailored to the crisis.

4.3.1.4 Deliberate planning phases. The following phases should be considered by disaster relief planners in preparing a successful disaster relief plan:

• Phase I: Plan Initiation. This phase lays the ground work for development of the plan. Phase I provides coordinating instructions, milestones and scheduled planning conferences data published in advance in a letter of instructions or planning directive. This would include identification of the government organizations, agencies, international and non-governmental organizations who would be involved in providing or receiving resources or services during a disaster. For planning purposes scarce resources or services may be apportioned between organizations or agencies that have or may have documented requirements. Publication and distribution of the planning directive signals completion of this phase.

• Phase II: Concept Development. The purpose of this phase is to develop a concept of operations. This would include:

- Preparing a mission statement (what it is that the plan should do).

- Determining the tasks to be performed - both specific and implied.

- Developing alternative courses of action (COA's) or options.

- Testing alternative COA's and selecting the one best suited for the

operation.

The concept of operations or CONOPS is developed from a selected COA. The CONOPS takes the COA and organizes it into operational phases. Typically, deployments are organized using the following phases: Pre-deployment, deployment, employment, transition, redeployment. Checklists are provided in Annex D referring to each of the phases. The CONOPS provides the basis for organizing the relief operation. The CONOPS is the single most important element in a plan contributing to unity of effort in HADRO. (See Figure 4-1, Concept of Operational Phases)

Figure 4-1, Concept of Operational Phases

• Phase III: Plan Development. The Plan Development Phase allows planners to develop the plan to the level of detail consistent with the planning directive published at the end of Phase I. During plan development, forces and services are linked to the concept of operations. The tasks (both specified and implied) which drove the initial mission statement should clearly define responsibilities and projected outcomes. Plans should include time phasing of resources to a disaster site; prioritizing resource expenditures, and identify sustainment requirements for deployed forces. Services provided to civilian agencies should be clearly articulated and included in the plan. This phase is completed when a fully documented plan has been completed. Typically, the completed plan is called an Operations Plan (OPlan) or Plan of Action. Concept Plans (ConPlans) may also be prepared but without the detail found in OPlans. Plan formats differ but should be consistent in structure in order to provide common reference points in developing supporting plans. (See Figure 4-4, Plan Format)

Figure 4-2, Plan Format

• Phase IV: Review and Approval. The plan should be fully reviewed and coordinated by those who agree to carry-out the actions of the plan. Approval comes from the appropriate authorities at the level at which the plan was initiated. An approved plan is published and distributed to all tasked organizations or agencies and provides the basis for continued support planning. The publication and distribution of the plan marks the end of this phase.

• Phase V: Supporting Plans. Often plans developed at higher levels do not get translated to action at the field level. Plans developed at the national level should have supporting plans developed at the lower implementing levels. The same concept of operations from the originating plan allows subordinate levels to tailor their actions in supporting plans to their level of execution. Supporting plans should be reviewed against the originating plans' CONOPS. Plans that maintain consistency against the CONOPS ensures unity of effort in pre-crisis planning is occurring, and if executed, continues throughout the disaster relief operation (See Figure 4-3: Planning Hierarchy)

Figure 4-3, Planning Hierarchy

4.4 Crisis Action Planning.

4.4.1 Crisis action planning expectations. Crisis action planning streamlines the deliberate planning process to the time constraints of the disaster or crisis. Where deliberate planning focuses on the centralized planning process to include development of supporting plans, crisis planning focuses on the decentralized execution elements that implements a centralized planning concept. Whether in deliberate or crisis planning, centralized planning is critical if unity of effort is to be achieved during execution of the plan. Crisis action planning procedures should:

• Follow a logical process beginning with recognizing the problem, developing the solution and preparing and executing an operations order or plan of action.

• Provide an environment where rapid and effective exchanges of information occur about the situation, its analysis and alternative responses.

• Provide timely preparation of courses of action for consideration and approval by civil authorities.

• Include timely relay of decisions to all concerned to permit execution of the operations order or plan of action.

• Successful crisis action planning supports the concept of centralized planning and decentralized execution.

4.4.2 Crisis Planning and Execution Phases. Crisis action planning and execution may be accomplished using the following phases:

• Phase I: Situation monitoring and problem recognition. A tentative assessment that the problem or disaster may be significant is all that is required at this phase.

• Phase II: Crisis Assessment. This phase requires increased awareness, information gathering, reporting, and evaluation. Decisions are made to move to the next phase and begin development of options or Courses of Action (COAs).

• Phase III: Course of Action Development. Crisis action planners develop courses of action following a similar process stated in Phase II of Deliberate Planning. Tentative COA's are developed, refined and forwarded for continued planning and possible selection.

• Phase IV: Course of Action Selection. During this phase a COA or option is approved and a CONOPS is developed becoming the basis for an OpOrd or Plan of Action. The COA selection and developed CONOPS is a prerequisite to execution planning.

• Phase V: Execution Planning. As mentioned, translating plans to action begins here. An OpOrd or Plan of Action is prepared using the five (5) paragraph format. Execution related details are identified. For example: if the plan requires transportation arrangements, these movement requirements are coordinated for scheduling with the provider. Units are tasked as they begin converting the OpOrd into supporting OpOrds. Reports up-and-down the chain identify potential logistics shortfalls that may impact accomplishment of the mission.

• Phase VI: Execution. The decision to implement the OpOrd is made by DHA with approval from the Member States and organizations/agencies providing services/resources. Each level executes actions accordingly and ensures orders or instructions are widely communicated. The implementation of the Plan of Action is monitored closely and modified or adjusted as required.

4.4.3 Procedures orientation. Whether the phases mentioned above or some other system is used during crisis planning, the procedures must be in-place and understood well before the crisis occurs. Deliberate plans may provide this baseline and could significantly shorten the crisis planning period. Figure 4-4, Common Methods in Problem Solving, for a comparison between common elements in problem solving and their relationship to deliberate and crisis action planning.

Figure 4-4, Common Methods in Problem Solving

4.4.4 Standard Operating Procedures. Standardization is key to communication during crisis. The applicability of standard operating procedures (SOP's) to the deployment of international disaster relief assistance (IDRA) in crises enhances unity and reduces the opportunity for error. Some general principles that should be applied in SOP development include:

• Incorporation of the legal basis for action into procedures. (e.g. SOFA considerations, peculiar transportation requirements, security or self-defense rules of engagement, etc.).

• Procedures used in day-to-day operations should mirror or approximate those during crisis.

• SOP procedures reflect the way an MCDA unit operates.

• SOP's provide a basis for training and should be an integral part of an MCDA unit's training plan.

• SOP's should not be changed without instructions and training.

• SOP's are referred to in deliberate plans, OpOrds or Plans of Action.

Plans take advantage of organizational SOP's in carrying out responsibilities and tasks (i.e. mobility plans). A key point to remember is that SOP's should not impede the flow of disaster/humanitarian relief to the disaster site. This is why they should be continually reviewed, to ensure that they are not competing against planned concepts of operations. SOP's do not supersede a planned CONOPs or mission, they support it!

4.4.5 Tactics. Simply stated, tactics are the skills by which specific actions or a combination thereof are employed to overcome problems encountered at a disaster site. Tactics are incorporated into SOP's. The evolution of new tactics improve HADRO and should be incorporated into SOP's as well as pre-crisis planning and execution. Although tactics are associated with field operations, tactics can be employed at the strategic and operational levels to streamline actions necessary to support tactical operations in the field.

4.5 Pre-Crisis Training and Exercises

Exercises provide excellent ways to test deliberate plans as well as the crisis action process. It is important that implementers exercise their skills in executing disaster relief operations before they are confronted with the disaster. There are a number of ways in which this can be accomplished:

4.5.1 Training. Training comes in infinite form, and may include computer assisted lessons, classroom training, seminars, round tables and informal discussions within units or organizations. On-the-job training is the most effective form and can be obtained through exercises.

4.5.2 Exercises. Common types of exercises within the MCDA environment are command post (CPX's), field training exercises (FTX's), and computer assisted (CAX) exercises or combination thereof. These exercises walk participants though the crisis action planning process to include problem solving, reporting and coordination. CPX's/CAX's can be held in conjunction with FTX's or separately. Nothing can replace the FTX for experience. FTX's expand disaster relief operations from the imaginary to the realistic. The more realistic the FTX scenario the greater the learning value of the exercise. Although expanded CPX/CAX simulations come close - its the hands-on training that can more closely prepare practitioners in employing their skills short of the real event.

Section II - A Coordinated Response to Disaster Relief

4.6 UN-DHA: The United Nations Focal Point for HADRO

4.6.1 Guide to UN response to disaster. Chapter 2, The United Nations Response to Disasters, explains how the UN responds to appeals for assistance within the various mandates of its relief agencies.

4.6.2 Planning exercises and training. DHA currently facilitates the planning of international exercises coupled with a training program that prepares executive to unit level decision makers and practitioners for the disaster crisis.

4.6.3 Planning hierarchy. Figure 4-3 illustrates the planning hierarchy. DHA can play a significant role in facilitating deliberate and crisis action planning with the Member States of an affected region. The use of the core plan developed at the regional level with support planning occurring up and down the international to local (field) levels will enhance potential appeals for emergency assistance.

4.7 UNDHA Relief Coordination Branch

4.7.1 Centralized coordination. General Assembly Resolution 46/182 clearly establishes UNDHA's mandate to provide centralized coordination of HADRO. UN-DHA has created an Emergency Management System to monitor, warn and alert Donor States to sudden onset disastrous events, providing a screening process to assess potential levels of international assistance needed to assist Affected States.

4.7.2 Evolution of the UN Emergency Management System. The Emergency Management System is evolving to include pre-crisis deliberate planning and crisis action procedures. The DHA role is to facilitate interagency coordination, and ensure unity of effort through centralized planning and decentralized execution by relief agencies and Donor States.

4.7.3 The Relief Coordination Branch. An integral part of the Emergency Management System (See Figure 4-5) is the Relief Coordination Branch (RCB). The RCB's 24-hour duty system permits continuous monitoring of potential emergency situations around the globe (See Figure 4-6). Emergency warnings, information and situation reports are disseminated using computerized communications to the emergency relief services of major donor governments, the UN system, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, search and rescue teams and other relevant organizations and individuals. At the request (or on behalf) of a country affected by an emergency, the RCB can issue an Appeal for International Assistance specifying priority needs. The RCB also issues consolidated appeals to Donor States on behalf of the UN system. Figure 4-5 provides a graphic overview based on UN emergency management phases. How appeals are processed through the UN where MCDA may be a potential resource is included in Figure 4-6.

Figure 4-5, UN DHA's Emergency Response System

Figure 4-6, UN Appeals for MCDA

4.7.4 Cash grants from DHA. DHA acts as a channel for donor contributions, relying on quick and simple administrative procedures, and when the situation warrants it, can allocate an emergency cash grant of up to US$ 50,000 to cover the most pressing needs of the affected population.

4.7.5 DHA Control Register of Capabilities. In order to have access to relief capabilities, DHA created a Central Register of Disaster Management Capabilities, which contains a Directory of International Search and Rescue (SAR) teams, a Register of Emergency Stockpiles, a Directory of National Emergency management Offices and Relief Services, a Register of Military and Civil Defense Assets for Disaster Relief available for International Assistance and a Register of Roster of Disaster Management Expertise.

4.7.6 Field delegates. To strengthen the capacity of the UN Disaster Management Team at the national level of a Receiving State, DHA can dispatch a Field Delegate or lead an Inter-Agency Mission.

4.7.7 Emergency relief response. Relief items, such as tents and blankets, can be rapidly airlifted to disaster affected areas from the DHA Warehouse at Pisa, Italy. DHA uses the Pisa depot as an assembly point for combined airlift operations in collaboration with United Nations Agencies and other humanitarian relief organizations.

4.8 The UN Focal Point - or Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU)

The IASC, through its Task Force on the Use of Military/Civil Defense (M/CD) Assets has agreed on the establishment of a focal point within DHA (The Military and Civil Defense Unit (MCDU)) to support collective preparedness measures and to provide a point of access for governments, regional organizations and defense forces interested in planning and providing support to humanitarian agencies. This focal point acts in support of all UN humanitarian agencies. Its services cover the use of M/CD assets required as an exceptional measure for major humanitarian emergencies, including natural and technological disasters.

The MCDU is located in the Geneva Office of DHA. It will be resourced through contributions from interested governments. Its principal task will be to ensure that a system is in place which adds value to the effective use of these assets by the responsible operational agencies. It is accountable to the ERC, Chair of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). An oversight committee comprised of members of the IASC meets on a periodic basis to review progress and provide guidance and support.

The Unit will perform the following functions to UN humanitarian agencies:

• Provide governments and defense establishments with a focal point within the UN humanitarian community.
• Develop and improve preparedness measures, including doctrine, contingency planning, standard operating procedures and strategies related to military/civil defense support to humanitarian operations.
• Liaise with interested governments, regional organizations and defense establishments, concerning the use of M/CD assets.
• If required, serve as a back-up to individual agency efforts during crisis situations. Especially when participating in a crisis support function when M/CD Assets may be required.
• Develop and maintain a database of available M/CD assets, a framework for mobilization procedures and principles for their use.
• Serve as a focal point for information on and support to training and other preparedness measures. This would include efforts to improve inter-operability between humanitarian and M/CD organizations, assistance to countries and organizations conducting humanitarian-military training exercises and participation, if appropriate, in such exercises.

4.9 UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) Team

4.9.1 The UNDAC Team. In cooperation with governments, DHA has created the UNDAC team. The team consists of staff members from DHA plus a core group of stand-by disaster relief experts from eight or more countries, together with suitably qualified and experienced persons made available by their respective governments or organizations. The teams are designed for rapid assessment and on-site coordination missions following a sudden-onset emergency. An UNDAC Standby Team can be dispatched at very short notice to the disaster site. The team is fully self sufficient and can remain active during the immediate phase of a disaster (which is normally less than two weeks).

4.9.2 UNDAC assessment. The UNDAC team provides an initial or rapid assessment. The initial assessment comprises both, situational and needs assessments during the early, critical stage of a disaster to determine the type of relief needed during the immediate response phase. The aim of the initial assessment is to :

• Identify the disaster's impact on the affected society.

• Identify the most vulnerable populations within the affected society and target groups with special needs.

• Identify the level of response by the Affected State; its internal; and coping capabilities.

• Identify the most urgent relief needs and potential methods of providing them most effectively.

• Make recommendations which define and prioritize the actions and resource needs for immediate response (see paragraph 4.19).

• Highlight special concerns for future development of the situation.

• Draw attention to geographical areas/substantive sectors needing in-depth assessment.

4.9.3 UNDAC in crisis planning. The UNDAC team is an on-site crisis support team. Where military or civil defense assets may be required, it may be augmented with MC/D experts. The UNDAC team provides the initial information needed in developing a plan of action. Their recommendation could come in the form of a Hasty Estimate (an abbreviated Estimate of the Situation) with recommended tentative options or COA's or a detailed report on the situation. The tentative COA's reflect the preliminary thinking on how to support the humanitarian disaster relief mission. Tentative COA's are not fully analyzed for feasibility but provide a basis for a more fully defined COA that could be sent to the Donor States for approval. (See Annex D for the format of the Hasty Estimate)..

Figure 4-7, Crisis Planning Community

4.10 The UNDHA Relief Coordination Branch - Crisis Planning

4.10.1 Formation of the Crisis Planning Support Team. A dedicated Crisis Planning Support Team (CST) can also be formed to support the RCB Desk to provide a more detailed plan of action. Ideally, the CST would be expanded to include UN field representatives, planners from Member States (Donor, Transient, and Receiving States), IGO's, and Major NGO's (See Figure 4-7). This expansion could be facilitated through the use teleconferencing or electronic forums similar to those provided by CompuServe or other similar commercial on-line services. The MCDU would be an integral part of the CST when MCDA is required.

UN Planning Directive

Situation

IASC Mission Statement for the crisis.

Anticipated Tasks as seen by UN Agencies for specific crisis - possibly derived from initial assessments by UN Agencies, resident coordinator, Affected State.

Coordinating instructions for planning and execution - to include milestones and COA approval.

Planning directives can be prepared in advance and tailored prior to the disaster.

4.10.2 The UN Planning Directive. DHA, in concert with the IASC would establish a planning directive with a specific time-line for the CST to complete a refined COA for submission to the IASC and the Member States. Particular to this process is DHA's leadership in reviewing the progress of COA development, ensuring UN agencies are involved in the planning and internal coordination process; and that the completed COA has the backing of the UN as an aggregate before sending their recommendation to the nations for approval and execution. DHA would be the UN agency in obtaining necessary interagency and Member States approvals. As has been mentioned, the CST would develop a Plan of Action using an abbreviated Estimate of the Situation (the Hasty Estimate) and upon assignment of MCDA operational units - more detailed estimates would be completed by the Member States involved. Situation reports and tentative COA recommendations would be incorporated into the planning effort by the CST under the supervision of the assigned RCB Desk Officer.

4.10.3 Approval of the COA. Course of Action approval would signal the CST development of the Plan of Action (comparable to the OpOrd mentioned earlier). Donor support or lack thereof would require continued review of the approved COA to determine validity. Nations would be kept in the loop throughout the planning process.

4.10.4 RCB milestones. The UN planning directive (Figure 4-8) would equate to Phase I of the Deliberate Planning Cycle and Crisis Planning and Execution Phase II. Planning directive templates may be prepared in advance by the RCB reflecting a UN approach to a specific type of disaster and tailored as required.

4.11 Developing a Plan of Action

4.11.1 The Estimate of the Situation. The UN Planning Directive would provide the CST with the situation, an initial mission statement, and tasks expected to be performed. Addressed in the planning directive are instructions regarding logistics, and command and control. Milestones for completion would be included in the planning directive to the assigned desk officer and the CST.

Figure 4-9, The Estimate

Assessing the situation and developing a Plan of Action the CST may first make an Estimate of the Situation using the Hasty Estimate format. A more formal estimate would include staff estimates and then a commanders estimate with a recommended COA provided by the commander of a combined joint task force for major humanitarian and disaster relief operations. This scaled down estimate uses the expertise of the CST, and the extended crisis planning community to determine possible courses of action and concepts of operations/logistics support. Such information would dovetail into preparation of a more detailed plan following a standard format, but is tailorable to the information at hand and the expertise of the personnel completing it. This estimate is completed in the following steps:

1. Mission Analysis.
2. Considerations affecting Courses of Action (COA's).
3. Development of Own COA's or options.
4. Other COA's underway or in planning from the Affected States, and relief organizations.
5. Comparison of Own COA's.
6. The Decision on which COA(s) to select.

4.11.1.1 Mission Analysis. Mission analysis is a problem solving technique used to study the mission and ensure awareness of all its inclusive parts. Understanding the process is crucial because it provides proper direction to a commander and his staff enabling them to effectively focus on the problem at hand. The mission is the primary factor in the estimate. It leads those performing it (especially a commander) toward sound decisions, deciding on the best COA, directions to subordinates to accomplish certain tasks, that when accomplished in the aggregate, will achieve the overall mission. The end result of a mission analysis is a restated mission. A mission analysis is an eleven step process. Although these steps are tailored for the CST, they should be used by MCDA commanders in analyzing their missions and preparing supporting plans.

• Step 1: The Source(s) of the Mission. Here the reference should start with the UN Planning Directive.

• Step 2: Who is in charge of organizing and executing the mission? Who is supporting the leader?

• Step 3: State the Superior's Mission. The UN Planning Directive is studied in the context of the general situation, logically deduced conclusions on forthcoming actions and, if the UN mission statement is unclear - the Desk Officer/CST should seek clarification.

• Step 4: State the Superior's Intent. One of the main concerns in the mission analysis is to study the superior's mission and especially his intent. The latter is a concise expression of the purpose of MCDA activities, the desired results, and how action will progress toward that end point. The intent clarifies the why element of the mission statement for those assigned the mission. This should help assigned MCDA commanders to pursue the mission (or desired end state in the case of HADRO) without further orders, even when actions do not unfold as planned.

• Step 5: Derive the Mission. Any mission consists of two parts: task and purpose to be performed by one's own forces and assets. The identification of the tasks and their purposes establishes the criteria by which the suitability of a COA is to be evaluated. If a mission has multiple tasks, then the priority for each task should be clearly expressed. If there are intermediate tasks (assigned or deduced) necessary to the accomplishment of the mission, such tasks should also be listed.

• Step 6: State the Tasks. The task is job or function assigned to a subordinate unit or command by higher authority. A mission may contain a single task, but more often it includes two or more tasks to be performed. Depending on the objective to be attained, tactical, operational, and strategic tasks are differentiated. Tasks that are spelled out in the planning directive received from superiors (initial UN Planning Directive or superior commander's planning directives) provide specified or stated tasks. Implied tasks are those tasks which must be accomplished to achieve a specified task. Implied tasks should be included in the restated mission statement and should be limited to those considered essential to the accomplishment of the mission. Tasks which involve the support of others should be included as implied tasks.

• Steps 7 and 8: State the Purpose and Formulate the Mission Statement. Spell out the tasks and purposes of the operation. The purpose is stated precisely and remains unchanged - even though the tasks may change or become irrelevant due to unforeseen circumstances. The purpose may be put forth: "in order to assist the successful execution of...", or "this force will ....".

• Step 9: Identify Constraints. The planning directive should identify circumstances and limitations under which MCDA would be used. The UN or participating nations may impose constraints or limitations on how MCDA is to be used. It may address a specific time period required for specific national service modules to reach a certain level of readiness before deployment. Likewise, constraints on when the Receiving State would allow IDRA to arrive incountry. Assumptions address constraints and limitations. An assumption is an supposition on the current or future situation, which is assumed true in the absence of positive proof. Assumptions fill in the void in the absence of fact. Assumptions facilitate planning despite the absence of concrete information. They should be logical and reasonable. Faulty assumptions could invalidate all or a portion of the overall plan.

• Step 10: Identify Objectives: A good estimate has stated objectives which are specific, realistic and clearly defined. Objectives may be stated as abstract or concrete (or physical) statements. The abstract objective is expressed in terms of the aim of action taken. Examples of abstract objectives are: "to assist," "to strengthen," "to support." These abstract terms would be used to quantify the amount of support or services rendered in HADRO. The concrete objective focuses on action taken to meet specific physical objectives. This may include "X" number of liters or tons of water or food distributed. During planning, major tasks are translated into specific objectives (whether abstract or concrete). Objectives can be good measures of effectiveness in determining whether the mission is being accomplished during execution.

• Step 11: Restated Mission. The end result of mission analysis is the restated mission. The restated mission must be a clear, concise statement of the specified and implied tasks to be accomplished by participants and the purposes to be attained. Multiple tasks are normally listed in the sequence to be accomplished. Although several tasks may have been identified during the mission analysis, the restated mission includes only those that are essential to the overall success of the mission. The tasks that are routine or inherent responsibilities of a unit or commander are not included in the restated mission. The constraints and objectives identified in this step are used later during the formulation of COA's. The restated mission statement is included in COA's as well as the plan of action or OpOrd. "Mission creep" occurs when commanders deviate from the mission statement after execution without undergoing another mission analysis.

4.11.1.2 Considerations affecting COA's. The next step in completing an estimate is to identify those factors influencing the selection of a course of action and to draw conclusions on how these factors might either favor or hinder the selection. Considerations are usually divided into two broad areas: characteristics of the area of operations, and identification of pertinent resources.

• Characteristics of the Area of Operations: These are only those characteristics which should be considered that affect the preparation, planning, and employment of MCDA. Factors at each operational level may consider the following:
  • Military Geography - the physical environment includes sea, land, and air parameters that affect the deployment, and employment of MCDA within that given environment.

  • Topography - the topographical area to include water drainage, vegetation, surface materials, and similar characteristics.

  • Hydrography/Oceanography - includes descriptions of offshore sea/ocean areas, approaches to beaches, currents, tides, ports, docks, and similar maritime structures.

  • Climate/Weather - includes a description of the main features of the seasons, prevalent cloud cover, winds, temperatures, visibility, precipitation, sunrise, sunset, and twilight data, and other factors that can affect the mission.

  • Transportation - characteristics of roads, railways, inland waterways, airfields, including such factors as size, capacity, conditions, etc. of the affected states.

  • Telecommunications - satellite, radio, cable, landlines and other communication facilities in the area of operations that might aid in the exercise of command of MCDA and coordination of other non-military but related humanitarian and disaster relief operations.

  • Politics - considerations in regards to the law, alliances, law and order, etc., as they effect humanitarian and disaster relief operations.

  • Economics - the state of the economy and its ability to cope with the disaster.

  • Sociology - social conditions with possible discussion of the populations capability to cope, health and sanitation conditions, language, social institutions and attitudes, culture.

  • Science and Technology - technical skill level of the population and scientific and technical resources in manpower and facilities should be considered where it affects the choice of a course of action.

  • Identification of pertinent resources. Lists of available military and non-military assets should be available, identifying MCDA which could be used in HADRO. These lists should show what is available now in the Receiving State. In addition, assets which are located outside the borders of the Affected State should be clearly identified. These lists assist in identifying movement requirements which may impact the suitability of a particular course of action under consideration. Logistics should also be considered here - to include supply, maintenance, hospitalization, evacuation, labor, construction, and other elements of logistical support and sustainment. Other factors include:
    • Time and Space Factors - estimate where and when initial MCDA forces and follow-on sustainment could be deployed and employed. Time and space considerations should address distances and transit times by transportation modes from major bases or staging areas to the area of operations. This will assist in determining when MCDA forces will arrive at the disaster site and begin performing their mission.

    • Readiness. Readiness of MCDA forces under consideration. What is their training, physical conditioning, morale, leadership, motivation, tactical doctrine, discipline, cultural compatibility, strengths and weaknesses.

4.11.1.3 Development of own COA's. A course of action, if adopted, would result in the accomplishment of the mission. A COA in general consists of two parts: (1) the objective, and (2) how to accomplish it. Several COA's should be developed taking into account the constraints and considerations already mentioned. Each COA is developed based on the restated mission statement previously discussed describing: Who? (who is in charge); What? (the type of operations); When? (the time the action will begin); Where? (the location of action); How? (the method or scheme of employment of forces and assets); Why? (the purpose of disaster and humanitarian operations). The COA should emphasize the following:

• Direction of the main effort
• Scheme of maneuver
• Task organization
• Method of forces' employment
• Phasing - to include termination point
• Anticipated use of follow-on MCDA, unit rotations, etc.
• Logistics during deployment, employment, redeployment, transition, and sustainment, etc.

Use the following checklist to complete each tentative COA:

• Review the restated mission statement. Develop the tentative COA.
• List the major problems that need to be addressed.
• List physical objectives - specified and implied.
• List potential COA's.
• Are the tentative COA's mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive?
• Develop a concept of operations (CONOPS) for each tentative COA. The CONOPS for each COA should include:
  • General information (level of support, duration, general tasks)
  • Assumptions
  • Employment - how/where MCDA will be employed
  • Deployment - when will MCDA need to be phased into the theater or area of operations; summarize requirements

• Test each of the above COA's using paragraph 4.11.5.

4.11.1.4 Other COA's underway or in planning. List other COA's currently in parallel planning through bilateral initiatives, or by IO/NGO/PVO's or the Receiving State. Compare them against the restated mission statement and determine compatibility. Are they compatible, and can MCDA resources be tailored to account for those identified in the other COA's? Will the tailoring of our own COA's significantly affect the effectiveness of the MCDA operation in planning?

4.11.1.5 Comparison of own COA's. The process of comparing our own COA's, is one of determining the advantages and disadvantages of each. Governing factors assist in determining acceptability of the COA is discussed in paragraph 4.11.5. Figure 4-10 lists some governing factors that may be considered in weighing each COA. The list of governing factors should reflect the criteria determined decisive in the analysis.

4.11.1.6 COA selection. Selection of a COA becomes apparent as the tests are performed for each developed. At the end of this process the selected COA should be clearly justified or explained to Member States participating in the disaster relief operation.

4.11.2 Using the COA for resource approval. Once the estimate of the situation has been completed by the RCB Desk Officer/CST, with a selected COA, DHA contacts all participating states; submits the proposed COA to the Member States with an explanation of the factors and reasons for COA selection. DHA would request approval in their proposal to the nations, to use the resources identified in the COA. Member States electing to participate will most likely validate the planning done by DHA-RCB. Early involvement by participating states will reduce the validation period.

4.11.3 Resourcing and assessing shortfalls. Confirmation of MCDA services and resources from Donor States and the identification of potential shortfalls are again provided to the Desk Officer/CST, who adjusts the selected COA in preparation for execution planning.

4.11.4 Points of contact provided by Member States. The Member States also provide working level points of contact to facilitate plan development coordination, approval and execution.

4.11.5 Criteria for COA selection. The following criteria have been used to determine the best course of action during deliberate and crisis action planning. The criteria is applicable at all levels and should be considered when seeking approval from Donor States for resources and services. The testing criteria should take into account the governing factors in Figure 4-10, as well as other COA's under parallel development.

4.11.5.1 Suitability. Will the course of action actually accomplish the mission when carried out successfully? In other words, is it aimed at the correct objectives?

4.11.5.2 Feasibility. Do we have the required resources, i.e., personnel, transportation, resupply, facilities, etc.? Can the resources be made available in the time contemplated? Are they sustainable? Will the short-term nature of MC/D capability be effectively transferred to civil and non-military organizations and agencies?

4.11.5.3 Acceptability. Even though the action will accomplish the mission and we have the necessary resources, is it worth the cost in terms of possible losses? Losses in time, material, and position are weighed in addition to military and political supportability.

4.11.5.4 Variety. Could there have been non-military resources applied that would have accomplished the same mission?

4.11.5.5 Completeness. When the COA's have been reduced to a manageable number, a final check is given to confirm that they are technically complete. Does each retained course of action adequately answer:

1. Who (what forces) will execute it?
2. What type of action is contemplated?
3. When is it to begin?
4. Where will it take place?
5. How will it be accomplished? There should be no inhibition to clearly explaining how the COA will be executed. Although a plan of action is developed at the international level, it is disseminated down through the nations to units who provide the decentralized execution that describes the "how." The "how" however, must be in harmony with the initial concept of operations if the principle of centralized planning is followed and unity of effort is maintained.

DECISION MATRIX
Governing Factors	Points	COA1	COA2	COA3	COA4
Mission Clarity
Termination Point
Objective
Decisiveness
Mass
Speed
Flexibility
Simplicity
Synchronization
Communications
Economy of Force
Unity of Effort
Security
Maneuver
Unity of Command
Command and Control
Reconnaissance/Intelligence
Dependence on Terrain
Dependence on Climate/Weather
Use of Transportation Links
Logistics Support
Logistics Sustainment
Facilitation of long term objectives
Ease of Transition to civil authorities

Figure 4-10, Decision Matrix - Governing Factors

4.12 The Five Paragraph Plan of Action

The five paragraph plan provides an organized method of including relevant information needed to execute the plan from a well thoughtout/refined course of action (COA)

Figure 4-11, Building a Plan

4.12.1 COA refinement. Development of a refined COA lays the groundwork for an effective plan. The refined COA has the elements listed below. Each of these elements can be transferred quickly to a plan format - again expanding the planning baseline to address more detailed information/arrangements, if required. (See Figure 4-11)

• Assessment of the Situation.
• The COA mission statement.
• Established objectives and tasks to include termination points for MCDA.
• Phases in conducting relief operations.
• Tasks under each phase.
• Timing.
• An approved forces, assets, or services list.
• Responsibilities of participating forces.
• Tasks assigned to participating forces.
• An established command and coordination structure.

4.12.2 Five paragraph format. These elements are organized into a coherent plan using a five paragraph format. Additional details can be included in the plan either by expanding on the paragraph or organizing it into annexes and appendices. Much of the information in the initial estimate can be exported to the plan of action as is shown in Figure 4-11. These five paragraphs are:

• Situation.
• Mission.
• Execution.
• Administration and Logistics.
• Command and Control.

In addition, the plan usually has:

• An executive summary.
• Acknowledgment instructions.
• Approvals and authentications.
• Annexes and appendices.

4.12.3 Clarity essential. The concept of operations, phasing of the operation, and support arrangements must be clearly described and consistent throughout the plan.

4.12.4 Supporting plans. Once the plan has been approved and distributed, supporting organizations develop support plans or OpOrds using the concept of operations provided in the original plan. Supporting plans close the loop in the centralized planning process and allow for decentralized execution through supporting agencies within an approved concept. This is unity of effort.

4.13 Deploying MCDA to a Disaster Site

4.13.1 Deployment of military survey teams. When the Donor State executes their supporting Plan of Action and deploys MC/D forces to a disaster site, they may wish to deploy a Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST). Its primary task is to prepare their forces for HADRO in the disaster area. Results of the UNDAC assessment would be made available to the HAST. Normally, the HAST is deployed by the Donor State to:

• Conduct reconnaissance to determine the nature and extent of the food and water supply, loss of life, injury and illness, numbers of displaced persons, disruption to the receiving government, and destruction of property and infrastructure.
• Estimate situational requirements to formulate recommendations or validate current planning for Donor State provisioning of funds, manpower, equipment and follow-on sustainment.

• Establish liaison and coordinate assessment with the Affected State, other multinational MCDA, national diplomatic personnel, and other UN and IGO/NGO/PVO relief agencies.
• Arrange for reception of national MCDA assets.

4.13.2 Validation. The efforts of the UNDAC during the initial assessment, and the ongoing planning of the RCB should be to expedite national efforts to validate deployment and reception of MCDA requirements. When an On-Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC) has been organized, it becomes an immediate resource to the HAST in providing the necessary cooperation with the Local Emergency Management Authority (LEMA), UN Disaster Management Team (DMT) and non-governmental agencies. The OSOCC provides an immediate resource for coordination at the disaster site and in providing ongoing assessment of the emergency situation.

4.13.3 Liaisons essential. Military experts that deployed with the UNDAC provide liaison with the HAST and become a vital link between the OSOCC and the deployed MCDA task force.

4.13.4 The advance party or ADVON. Military deployments are usually well organized. In addition to the HAST, the commander deploys an advance party or ADVON team. The ADVON links with the HAST, and begins to form a headquarters capable of finalizing preparations for deployment of the main body. Communications with relief agencies and coordination networks with the local government are established. The ADVON prepares the groundwork for the initial support element in identifying possible locations for lodgement and contacts for support.

4.13.5 The initial support element. Following the ADVON is an initial support element which begins preparations for lodgement. They are followed by the main body, and any follow-on support. Sustainment begins shortly after the arrival of the ADVON - with units bringing a basic load of rations, and water enough to sustain operations until resupply begins.

4.13.6 The lead nation. During crisis action planning, a lead nation should be identified to establish a combined joint task force (CJTF). This is usually the military force with the predominance of forces. The CJTF Commander integrates into his headquarters staff, officers from the participating nations sending MCDA organized as National Service Modules.

4.13.7 Logistics is a national responsibility. Each Donor State would also establish national support groups (NSG's) (See Figure 5-2) to maintain logistics lines of communication and sustainment operations for their deployed forces. Logistics is a national responsibility and should not fall on the lead nation.

4.13.8 Military command relationships. Each Donor State would identify to the CTF Commander, their senior officer or commander, possibly from their NSG, in order to complete the formation of command relationships.

4.13.9 Facilitating communication. Clearly defined command relationships facilitate communications between deployed forces and the LEMA. It also provides communication pathways for task organizing operations based on priority and need. MCDA operating in this fast moving crisis environment must be flexible enough to accommodate the unexpected. Such an arrangement will provide that flexibility.

4.14 On-Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC)

4.14.1 Authority of OSOCC. DHA has developed the OSOCC to close the coordination loop with UN and national emergency management agencies of the affected country. If necessary, the OSOCC provides a system for coordinating operational activities for international search and rescue teams and relief agencies by providing a framework for cooperation and coordination. The authority of the OSOCC is derived from the UN and the Affected State.

4.14.2 Initial OSOCC formation. During the initial stages, the OSOCC is formed by the UNDAC team, although a lead UN Agency may also stand-up the center. Augmentation from the LEMA, international relief teams, and UN Disaster Management Team (UN-DMT) personnel, round-out personnel manning. Liaison with the LEMA is established with the necessary communication network to coordinate the international disaster relief operation effectively.

4.14.3 Military interface with OSOCC. Military units deployed to the disaster site can interface with OSOCC directly - where SAR operations are concerned or through a Civil-Military Operations Coordination Center (CMOCC) or office which is part of a CJTF Headquarters. Liaison should be established between the OSOCC and CMOCC as soon as possible to coordinate relief operations.

4.14.4 The OSOCC and CMOCC. The OSOCC will focus its efforts on coordinating reception of international relief teams, assisting them in finding lodgement, and critical logistical support. The CMOCC will focus on coordinating the needs of deployed military forces. Both will operate in accordance with the Plan of Action mentioned in previous paragraphs. The OSOCC coordinates with the LEMA to prioritize SAR operations and other IGO/NGO international disaster relief operations. They will also monitor the progress of the Plan of Action during the crisis period.

4.15 Local Emergency Management Authority (LEMA)

4.15.1 The LEMA. The local civil government of the Affected State and their designated emergency operations center is the LEMA. The LEMA varies considerability between Member States. Deployed international disaster relief assistance (IDRA) - particularly MCDA, takes a subordinate role to the LEMA. Military units are guests in the Affected Country and should be fully briefed on and subordinate to the laws and customs of the nation and people they are trying to assist.

4.15.2 Complex emergency implications. In some cases, such as Somalia, the government may be too weak or non-existent to support international relief efforts without the deployment of self-sustaining command and control capabilities. This situation advances a pure humanitarian and disaster relief mission to one with complex emergency implications. Although the principles described in this Reference Manual are applicable to that of complex emergencies, the focus of the manual is to support non-complex emergencies where a breakdown of law and order has not occurred and the local government can guarantee the safety of military personnel.

4.15.3 International (IO), Non-governmental Organizations (NGO) and Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO). The Red Cross (See Annex C, Appendix 1) and over 350 NGO's, many of which are capable of responding in HADRO, may be present at the disaster site. Although the CMOCC can coordinate with NGO/PVO's, the OSOCC has a UN mandate through DHA to coordinate with these organizations. Commanders on the scene should consider ensuring that a focal point is identified to coordinate the activities of these organizations as they impact on the MCDA mission through the OSOCC. See Annex M for a listing of the prominent NGO's.

Section III - National Service Modules and Multinational Service Packages

4.16 Multinational Service Packaging Methodology

4.16.1 National MCDA capabilities. Member States come to the humanitarian and disaster relief roundtable with MCDA capabilities developed for war but applicable in peacetime HADRO. Chapter 5 goes into more detail on describing types of applicable MCDA capabilities, but the intent of this section is to describe a methodology that can be used as a tool in both deliberate and crisis action planning, making it easier to respond to international appeals within the framework described in the previous sections of this chapter.

4.16.2 The Central Register of Disaster Management Capabilities. The Central Register is a collection of database registries developed to support disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations. Sub-registries include: Search and rescue (SAR) teams, emergency stockpiles, technical expertise rosters, and MCDA.

Figure 4-12, MCDA Register

The MCDA Register has two basic components used for both deliberate and crisis planning. It contains a list of UN agency templates or standards, detailing possible requirements, to include performance standards needed for MCDA in HADRO. Questionnaires are sent to Member States requesting MCDA support of UN standards. The Member States in response to the questionnaire, provide to UN DHA a list of national capabilities that could support the standard or elements thereof. The capabilities, and constraints or limitations are entered into the MCDA register as National Service Modules (NSM's). Information provided by Member States does not equate to a commitment to provide such. Commitments come after the Member States validation the Plan of Action and confirm availability of the NSM requested.

4.16.3 National Service Modules. The database description for each NSM provides the following information:

• A statement of capabilities.
• A list of manpower and skills.
• A list of equipment with weights and dimensions needed for air, land, and sea movements.
• Constraints and conditions for deployment, and employment.

4.16.4 Advantages of a standard database. Using a standardized MCDA Register assists in identifying the movement, support, and sustainment requirements of a plan during deliberate as well as crisis planning. It allows for tailoring within a prescribed format facilitating rapid assessment as to the feasibility of logistics and transportation support.

4.16.5 National Service Modules and planning. National Service Modules provide the framework for disaster relief campaign planning. As the Plan of Action is developed, and where the use of MCDA is justified, NSM's are put together forming an MCDA Multinational Service Package. The package represents the shortfall of services or capabilities needed to assist the Affected State after they have done everything possible within their own means to control the disaster.

4.16.6 Non-MCDA capabilities. Other factors include the use of international, non-governmental and private organizations and volunteers in matching needs with resources. The Multinational Service Package Concept with its NSM's, should not replicate but rather facilitate and compliment non-MCDA capabilities throughout the operation. Non-MCDA capabilities are identified during COA development.

4.16.7 Framework for rapid deployment of MCDA in disaster relief. The NSM building block approach speeds-up the COA development process during crisis planning. National Service Modules can be developed during deliberate planning to react to anticipated problems which could be encountered in a disaster or crisis.

4.16.8 Maintaining National Service Modules. National modules would be maintained by the originating country and kept on file in the UN MCDA Register. In response to disasters, nations would be contacted to provide these modules as part of a multinational service package provided they are available and justification is given for their use.

4.17 Building the MCDA Disaster Relief Force List

4.17.1 Requirements identification. Often, what is needed by way of resources, is skewed by what planners "think" is available. This raises the age old argument of requirements versus capability planning. Obviously, we cannot execute a plan without the resources - but knowing, without prejudice, what is required is an essential part of the planning/problem solving process. Nations with specific capabilities or services can pre-identify them as National Service Modules (NSM's) to the UN MCDA Register of Capabilities. Nations are not expected to identify specific MC/D units but rather the capability or service description, numbers of personnel, and equipment with associated movement characteristics. This information allows for estimating transportation requirements and closure to the disaster site early in the planning process. Many nations already have these capabilities preidentified although the knowledge of their existence has not been made available to the UN. Identifying potential requirements and building NSM's to meet those requirements expedite the humanitarian and disaster relief force build process. Identifying requirements is one of the initial steps after determining the mission, concept of operations, tasks, and objectives. Figure 4-13 provides a good overview linking the mission planning process to resources.

4.17.2 Requirements sourcing. Sourcing occurs after a requirement has been established. During the planning process, the UN crisis support team would ask Donor States to identify specific NSM's (units or teams) to support a proposed course of action. The notional or unsourced requirements become more specific. Sourcing occurs when nations match assets against the disaster relief requirements. These requirements were determined by the RCB Desk Officer and Crisis Support Team during mission analysis and COA selection.

4.17.3 Resolving shortfalls. Shortfalls occur when a delta exists between requirements and sourcing. Resolving a shortfall may require returning to the MCDA Register to identify similar capabilities that could be used in lieu of those originally proposed. If shortfalls cannot be sourced, the COA must be adjusted accordingly. If shortfalls do not pose a significant risk to the operation, then the decision can be made to accept them and press ahead with the operation. Determining requirements, sourcing and resolving shortfalls requires close coordination between the RCB Desk Officer/Crisis Support Team, the Donor and Receiving States and participating UN Agencies, IGO's and NGO's.

Figure 4-13, Force Planning Overview

4.18 Transportation Planning

4.18.1 Identifying transportation requirements. Planning the use of transportation resources requires that:

• Force requirements be clearly stated in transportation terms. The MCDA Register could provide the initial movement data for feasibility estimates.

• Force routing describing the origin, intermediate stops, and destination along with the timing required for the unit or material to arrive.

• Unit identification of the unit or capability provides points of contact and the responsible party for coordinating and overseeing transportation arrangements with the provider.

• Sustainment earmarks supplies and manpower needed to support the operation throughout the duration of the mission. Many nations use planning factors to estimate consumption to determine sustainment requirements. Transportation requirements for sustainment are determined by identifying what must be delivered, the time constraint in which the unit require the sustainment - as is articulated in the Plan of Action under phasing. (See Figure 4-13)

4.18.2 Sourcing transportation requirements. Sourcing transportation requires linking transport carriers with the stated and sourced movement requirement.

4.18.3 Intransit visibility. Intransit visibility requires accurate accountability of departures from origins to arrivals at final destinations. Visibility is maintained through the Donor State and the carrier providing the service. Common administrative tools include passenger manifests and for cargo, packing lists and cargo manifests. Access to this information during transport provides an accurate picture of where the force is in regards to the overall time phasing of the disaster relief operation.

4.18.4 Transportation shortfalls. Shortfalls in transportation occur when sufficient transportation resources (i.e., aircraft, ships, railcars, trucks, etc.) are not available to close a force within the timeframe specified in the plan. Closing the force refers to the arrival of the last unit at the destination. Transportation shortfalls are resolved by using other modes of transportation or by reducing the movement requirement. Time phasing may also be lengthened providing more time to close the arrival of MCDA to destination. The impact of these actions in relationship to the concept of operations determine transportation feasibility.

• Transportation shortfalls can occur when air/sea port or rail terminals are unable to receive or support the movement MCDA/Relief supplies between various transportation modes. For example, the length of a runway, refueling capability, availability of material handling equipment or access to a railhead - all directly affect access to transportation facilities and are critical in assessing transportation feasibility and identifying transportation shortfalls. National Service Modules can be added to a Multinational Service Package to increase the throughput capability of air, sea or land terminals. This could include increasing the capability of a port to receive and sustain HADRO near or enroute to the disaster site.

• Transportation shortfalls impact the concept of operations. When testing the suitability of a particular course of action it is important to account for port facilities, and line haul (road, rail or inland waterways) in order to determine types of MCDA needed to facilitate a humanitarian and disaster relief operation. The concept of operations should have transportation enhancing capabilities identified in the force list otherwise the supportability of the overall operation maybe unsustainable.

Figure 4-14, Movement Control

4.18.5 Command and control. Usually the ports of debarkation in support of HADRO are limited and require control of airspace, aerial port operations, sea port operations and intermodal linkages. Time phasing of port throughput priorities must be identified in the plan during crisis action planning. Coordinating the arrival and departures must be accomplished by the LEMA or by a task force headquarters to maintain order in mobility operations and to ensure conformity to pre-identified priorities. This could occur through the use of a Movements Control Center (MCC) and subordinate air, land and sea control centers.

4.19 Standby National Service Modules (SNSMís)

4.19.1 The Golden Day. What has been commonly called "The Golden Dayî within the search and rescue community illustrates the need for a response within the first 24 hours. Studies have shown that within the first 24 hours the survival rate among disaster victims is highest. After the ìGolden Dayî the mortality rate increases significantly.

4.19.2 Standby National Service Modules. Smaller SNSM's could be preidentified as available on short notice. These would provide the advance elements or be sufficient in the case of smaller emergencies to meet the needs of mitigating sudden onset disasters. They may take the form of NSM's and be provided by a single nation.

4.19.3 MSP compatibility. These SNSM's could be integrated easily into a standby MSP's for minor disaster relief operations requiring integration of more than one Member State. Follow-on use of SNSM or standby MSP's should follow the planning methodology for expanded humanitarian and disaster relief operations.

4.20 Integrating Essential Functions and Capabilities Into MSP/SSP's

4.20.1 In-kind contributions. In the past, nations have responded to UN appeals for assistance in behalf of disaster struck Member States generating assorted contributions - from financial support to in-kind contributions. Unfortunately the in-kind contributions donated may not meet the needs of the victims at the disaster site. Diplomacy makes it difficult to turn down such contributions, however the logistics support to handle in-kind contributions may interfere with field operations. This situation may prove detrimental and circumvent the overall relief effort. Working through the crisis planning process and identifying and disseminating requirements to the world community should assist to mitigate this situation. The deployment of Standby Service Packages early will assist in channeling the good will of nations to reach out to the victims of the Affected State.

4.20.2 Military expert participation. Early participation by military experts in disaster assessment can identify particular military capabilities and functions quickly. Such integration occurs when developing a commanders estimate. This estimate develops the mission of MCDA in HADRO, its objectives, and specific tasks that need to be accomplished. Armed with this information, MSP's can be constructed to include essential military functions that will focus on accomplishment of the mission.

4.20.3 Interoperability. Interoperability plays a major role in building the MSP. MCDA exercises provide excellent opportunities to identify obstacles in interoperability between multinational forces. For example: problems in connecting gauged firehoses from different nations may mean the difference between life or death for victims in a burning building. Others include differences in electrical compatibility, stretchers fitting into ambulances, etc., are examples where exercises could facilitate resolution before the crisis. The areas listed below should be considered when building a multinational service package.

* Aircraft ground support equipment	* Fire fighting equipment
* Billeting requirements	* Language
* Communications	* Medical Care
* Electrical power	* Medical Equipment
* Engineering	* Messing
* Fuel nozzles	* Metric versus Imperial tooling
* Fire fighting equipment	* Transport Services
* Sanitation	* Vehicle Line Haul
* Shipping	* Spare Part
* Decontamination	* Operational Support procedures
* NBC Equipment/Productive	* Subsistance Clothing

4.21 Summary

This chapter was designed to provide a resource to planners when MCDA becomes a possible solution to support humanitarian and disaster relief operations. The objective of any disaster relief operation is to provide lifesaving services to its victims. Unfortunately, military assets - may not be the most cost effective. The deliberate and crisis action planning procedures described in this chapter are designed to help planners think through the problems and effectively determine whether MCDA should be used and to what extent.

The key to any humanitarian and disaster relief operation is tailoring the resources available to the crisis at hand. A multinational response provides an effectual burden-sharing opportunity and lays the foundations for international cooperation in times when disaster response comes suddenly and advance preparation yields a successful humanitarian and disaster relief mission.