

## FAST Update

### Angola

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**Semi-Annual Risk Assessment**  
June to November 2004

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
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Contact FAST:  
 Phone: +41 31 330 12 07  
 Fax: +41 31 330 12 13  
<mailto:FAST@swisspeace.ch>  
[www.swisspeace.org/fast](http://www.swisspeace.org/fast)

Country Expert:  
 Lisa Rimli  
 swisspeace


## Country Stability and Relative Government Direct Actions



## Risk Assessment:

- Since July, the Country Stability curve appears to re-approach the high level constantly featured throughout 2003, following slight fluctuations since February. Relative Government Direct Actions remain on a low level, mirroring Country Stability fluctuations.
- As referred to in previous FAST Updates, the joint military and police operation “Operação Brilhante” launched in December 2003 and aimed at expelling an estimated 300'000 to half a million illegal foreign diamond diggers marks one of the most large-scale moves of the Angolan security forces in the post-war period. The Government of Angola (GoA) declared a 45-day moratorium for forced repatriations in May, reacting to harsh criticism from international humanitarian organizations, Congolese NGOs, and objection from the authorities of the DRC, the home country of the majority of illegal diamond miners in Angola. The second phase of the operation, resuming at the end of July, appears to proceed at a slower, more orderly pace under the command of the National Police.
- Yet, according to unconfirmed reports, police operating against illegal foreign diamond miners have also been targeting Angolan citizens in some provinces, looting their belongings and extorting bribes for release. The victims appear to be mainly ethnic Bakongos from Uíge and Zaire provinces, so-called “regressados”, referring to their origin in Congolese exile.
- The situation in Cabinda province can be characterized as deadlocked between no war and no peace. Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) operations in the Cabinda enclave have been scaled down significantly. Yet, unconfirmed reports of a continued high presence of FAA troops within the enclave, of sporadic FLEC military activities and human rights abuses continue to emerge. No peace accord has been signed, according to the GoA allegedly for lack of a “valid interlocutor” on the side of the separatist guerilla. Continued factionalism within the guerilla, fuelled by the GoA, has undermined efforts of the civic association Mpalabanda and catholic church representatives to facilitate peace talks with the GoA by helping the two main guerilla groups, FLEC-FAC and FLEC Renovada to merge.
- On a positive note, 15'000 Cabindans followed an appeal of Mpalabanda to march for peace in early July. Unlike on earlier occasions, the march was authorized by provincial authorities and local police collaborated positively. In August, the GoA allowed a high-profile visit of the UN Special Representative for Human Rights Defenders Hina Jilani to Cabinda. In another noteworthy development, in late September ChevronTexaco announced that construction of an office building in Cabinda city has started, thus initiating a move out of the closed Malongo oil compound as has long been demanded by Cabindans.


## Country Stability and Relative Conflictual Actions



## Risk Assessment:

- Since June, Relative Conflictual Actions have been decreasing. This decrease during the monitoring period follows a narrowing gap between the Country Stability and Relative Conflictual Actions curves between February and May.
- Land issues have been on the fore since the Council of Ministers approved a controversial Land Bill in November 2003. On August 10 the Land Bill was finally passed in Parliament against the opposition's minority vote. Some senior MPLA members had tacitly agreed to further review the Bill, but tight party discipline was imposed. Thus MPLA leader president José Eduardo dos Santos avoided that NGO and oppositional pressure for further revision of the Bill might have gained momentum in the emerging election campaign.
- Angolan and international NGOs represented in the Land Network (Rede Terra) waged an intense lobbying campaign in 2004, advocating that the Land Bill should not be passed before the new Constitution, and calling for broader civil society consultations. Churches and NGOs warn that the Land Bill, apparently benefiting a small political elite at the expense of the poor majority, might endanger food security recovery in rural areas and turn land tenure illegal to most urban poor. This could result in social unrest with unpredictable consequences, especially in peri-urban areas. Yet, NGOs managed to influence the drafting process in some minor, but nevertheless important points, and currently a small window of opportunity remains for NGOs to influence the drafting of the law regulations.
- Rural land conflicts are widely believed to increase in the post-war period, following the mass return movement of IDPs, refugees and demobilized UNITA soldiers to their home areas. However, according to recent case study research, conflicts over land between returnees and local populations have remained limited in scope and are being resolved by local mediation. Furthermore, it appears that NGO campaigning over land issues has resulted in increased rights awareness, which to a certain extent has imposed limits to land-grabbing ventures of the political and military elites, such as in Huíla province. However, the consequences of the law implementation remain uncertain and should be monitored closely.
- Urban land conflicts, especially in Luanda shanty-towns have been on the increase since the end of the war, and are characterized by forced evictions of poor dwellers by security forces, mostly on behalf of particular business interests. However, local advocacy NGOs in recent months have achieved significant delays and some negotiation opportunities over eviction plans. It is likely that during the pre-elections period more caution will be applied in order to avoid social unrest. However, medium-term plans of the Management Commission of Luanda to ban informal trade from the city center, closing informal markets and clamping down on street sellers, constitute another important source of potential social tension.
- The extension of the church radio Rádio Ecléssia into the provinces remains deadlocked. Optimism of church representatives following the presidential statement on the Rádio Ecléssia extension in May has meanwhile turned into fatalism that the government will drag out the process until after the elections. De-monopolizing broadcasting in most provinces would pose an unprecedented challenge to the MPLA during the sensitive pre-election period. Hence, while government officials allege legal reasons for the delay, the decision to block the church radio extension is widely seen as politically motivated. So far, intensive diplomatic pressure to unblock the donor-financed extension project has been unsuccessful. This is likely to remain so. The Bishop Conference of Angola and S. Tomé (CEAST), the owner of Rádio Ecléssia, appears unwilling to confront the GoA on the issue, and sees pressure from opposition parties and donors alike as counter-productive.


## IDEA Average Domestic Conflict and Cooperation



## Risk Assessment:

- The Domestic Conflict curve slightly overrides Domestic Cooperation throughout the monitoring period, peaking in November.
- Domestic Cooperation continues to be partly characterized by increased cooperation within the political opposition and sections of civil society. On May 12 the opposition had walked out of the Constitutional Commission, in a move to force the GoA to set an election date. In June, the President held highly selective consultations with civil society representatives and opposition parties on elections. In July the Council of the Republic recommended elections to be conducted in 2006 at the latest, while most of the opposition maintains 2005. The announcement of President José Eduardo dos Santos on November 11 to consider presidential elections to be held only in 2007, one year after legislative elections, introduced yet another element of uncertainty over the final elections schedule.
- However, the ruling party MPLA continues to dominate the political agenda. It published an electoral calendar at the end of August, one month ahead of the opposition, and MPLA pre-electoral campaigning is already becoming visible on the ground. On November 29 the MPLA decision to unilaterally dissolve the Constitutional Commission took the opposition off the hook, which had played with its leverage power within the commission.
- Two shooting attacks on oppositional MPs occurred: On July 2, Mfulumpinga Landu Vitor, MP and president of PDP-ANA, a small opposition party close to the Bakongo “regressado” milieu, died after being shot by unknown individuals in Luanda. The quick denial of any political background by the Angolan authorities only helped to fuel distrust of opposition parties. In their perception politically motivated violence has systematically increased since 2003. Five months later, police investigations remain inconclusive. On November 11, UNITA MP Vicente Tembo was shot at in Luanda, raising further concerns among opposition parties.
- UNITA delegations on municipal and communal levels continue to be subject to harassment and violent attacks, especially in the most war-affected provinces. In a particularly violent incident in mid-July, during three-day riots 80 houses of alleged UNITA sympathisers were burnt and looted in Cazombo, Moxico province. In another reported incident on June 9, despite being accompanied by police, an UNITA delegation including MP's and UNITA's provincial secretary, was physically attacked in the commune of Galanda in Huambo. A quickly set up joint UNITA-MPLA investigation mission concluded that local popular resentment against the appointed UNITA representative, an alleged war criminal, was at the core of the problem in Cazombo.
- The MPLA tends to apply this kind of explanation to most similar incidents — from which many are not reported in the media — and strictly denies any systematic involvement. However, state and MPLA structures are nearly equated on municipal and especially on communal level, and there have been recurring allegations of MPLA youth and MPLA-close Civil Defense Organization (ODC) involvement in many local violent incidents of this kind.
- Calls from churches, civil society organizations and opposition parties on the GoA to dissolve the Civil Defense Organization (ODC), legalized in March 2002 under the Defense Ministry, have been mounting throughout the monitoring period, but have not met any meaningful response.
- At the end of October UNITA president Isaiás Samakuva reiterated earlier accusations against the GoA of failing to fulfill the peace accords in regards to the reintegration of demobilized soldiers, and warned that UNITA is considering to walk out of the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN). In fact, reports have been mounting that the reinsertion of UNITA health workers and teachers in state structures, and access to food aid for demobilized soldiers are at times being conditioned on joining the MPLA. However, while dissatisfaction within UNITA at the pace of the peace process is growing, financial dependence on the state budget drastically limits the options of the current UNITA leadership.

## IDEA Average International Conflict and Cooperation



## Risk Assessment:

- The Average International Conflict curve has been slightly outstripping the Average International Cooperation curve almost throughout the monitoring period.
- In July the African Union Human Rights Commission in Addis Ababa accused the GoA of xenophobia and human rights abuses during its "Operação Brilhante" against illegal foreign diamond diggers. On several occasions, popular outrage at reported sufferings by forcibly expelled DRC citizens and their families from Angola resulted in violent retaliations against Angolan refugees and citizens in the DRC. Yet, these tensions did not affect bilateral relations with the DRC, since military cooperation remains significant.
- Angola's participation in the Dar-es-Salaam summit of the International Conference on the Great Lakes region in November underlines the recognition of Angola as an important player in the Central African region, in addition to its role in the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
- Human rights issues and the lack of political reform came to the fore in August during the visit of the UN Special Representative for Human Rights Defenders, Hina Jilani. Jilani criticized political restrictions on civil society organizations and private media especially in the provinces.
- The office of UN OCHA closed at the end of June, transferring its function to a Transitional Coordination Unit. This hand-over happens at a critical moment of the post-war and post-emergency transition, while tens of thousands of refugees still remain to be repatriated and resettled in their home areas, and road access and food security remain precarious throughout many parts of the country. Donor funding levels for humanitarian aid have been very low throughout the year and are likely to remain so in the mid-term.
- Government relations with the Bretton Woods institutions have further improved: several high-level visits of IMF and World Bank delegations substantiate hopes of the GoA for a new agreement for an IMF Staff Monitored Programme (SMP) probably in the first half of 2005. Such a step would boost the GoA's credibility among the donor community and help to reduce widespread perceptions of corruption and mismanagement. The GoA's long-time plea for an international donor conference has already found positive responses from the US, Belgium, Portugal and South Africa. Steps gradually undertaken by the GoA to improve transparency over oil revenues and macro-economic stability since the beginning of the year are the basis for such encouraging signals.
- However, lessons from the past show that sustainability of such reform moves remain in doubt. In view of high oil prices and steadily increasing oil production – having reached the historic mark of 1m. barrels per day – possibilities for oil-backed loans on the world market continue to be attractive alternatives to a highly conditional agreement with the IMF. For instance, further substantial cuts in food and fuel subsidies, as requested by the IMF, might well bear the potential of social tension.
- In the context of what has been called an Asian "scramble" for West-African oil, China has provided the GoA with important avenues for alternative financing. Currently, an extension of a US\$2 billion loan from the Chinese Eximbank, linked to Chinese reconstruction business contracts, is in discussion.
- By contrast, Western countries with oil interests in Angola have reduced leverage. For instance, the French government came under pressure from the GoA to drop the court case against Pierre Falcone, a key figure of the so-called Angolagate corruption case with strong links to the Angolan Presidency. As a consequence, the newly appointed French Ambassador to Angola waited during five months for his accreditation, and Total eventually lost its share in oil Block 3.

## Appendix : Description of indicators used | Page 7

Variable Name	Description / Definition
<b>Government Sector</b>	
Relative Government Direct Actions	<b>Proportion</b> of Government Direct Actions compared to All Government Actions. Government Direct Actions are <b>conflictive events</b> that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. These categories encompass direct action limited to the political sector, or government actors.
Conflict Carrying Capacity	The Conflict Carrying Capacity (or CCC) is a composed index that depicts the overall stability of the country or region of interest. The CCC is operationalized in terms of the multiplicative interaction among three Proportional measures: (1) civil contentiousness or the Proportion of civil actions that are reported as contentious or "direct" and thus challenge (at least implicitly) the state's monopoly on conflict regulation; (2) state repression or the Proportion of state actions that are reported as extra-institutional or "direct" both in response to direct challenges from the civil sector and those initiated by the state to repress and control opposition; and (3) violent contention or the Proportion of actions entailing physical damage to persons or property. the index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability.
Country Stability	The country stability index is another version of the CCC measure with minor changes in order to improve the responsiveness of the index to events that influence the stability of a country.
Relative Conflictual Actions	Proportion of all actions belonging to all conflictive categories reject, accuse, protest, deny, demand, warn, threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize, and force to all actions (all Events belonging to the 22 WEIS cue categories).
<b>IDEA Scale</b>	
IDEA	IDEA indicators are used to display <b>Proportions</b> of conflict and cooperation events in time. Each event category is assigned a IDEA rating (value), ranging from -7 (extreme conflict) to 13 (extreme cooperation). Zero value events are excluded from these calculations.
Average	The Average indicator is a cumulative average of all events that are classified with a positive or <b>negative</b> value by IDEA's conflict/cooperation scale. The indicator displays the mean of the conflict/cooperation event values, excluding all zero value events.
Average Domestic Conflict	The Average Domestic Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (IDEA) values of all conflictive intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the <b>negative</b> IDEA values divided by the total number of conflictive domestic events). For interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values).
Average Domestic Cooperation	The Average Domestic Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (IDEA) values of all cooperative intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive IDEA values divided by the total number of cooperative domestic events).
Average International Conflict	The Average International Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (IDEA) values of all conflictive interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the <b>negative</b> IDEA values divided by the total number of conflictive international events). For interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values).
Average International Cooperation	The Average International Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (IDEA) values of all cooperative interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive IDEA values divided by the total number of cooperative international events).

#### Who are we?

FAST (German acronym for “Early Analysis of Tensions and Fact-finding”) is the early warning project of swisspeace, based in Berne, Switzerland. In 1998 the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) assigned swisspeace to set up a political early warning system for early identification of impending armed conflict and political crisis situations.

#### What do we want?

FAST aims to enhance political decision makers’ ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent political strategies can be formulated either to prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or to identify opportunities for peacebuilding.

#### How do we work?

FAST uses both quantitative and qualitative methods for its analysis. The centerpiece in the quantitative analysis is based on event data analysis and the respective tools developed in the framework of the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions and Cultural Survival (PONSACS) at Harvard University. The logic of event data analysis is fairly simple: all events considered relevant to conflict escalation and de-escalation are assigned a certain numeric value according to a distinct conflict scale. These values can then be added up for specific time intervals and graphically displayed in a curve over time. The quality and quantity of data input is crucial for the success of such a method. In order to gather the quality and quantity of data required to suit early warning purposes, FAST sets up its own local information networks (LINs) and thus overcomes shortcomings of existing information sources (e.g., international news wires). A unique set of data is collected for each country completely independently from Western news-media coverage. For qualitative data analysis, FAST contracts internationally renowned country experts.

#### What are our products?

FAST products are risk assessments tailored to individual customers’ needs. The standard product (“FAST Update”) consists of three to five charts depicting the latest conflict related trends and a concise expert interpretation. As the time-series of collected data grow, FAST analysts will apply statistical methods to go beyond retrospective description and forecast future developments. FAST Updates are available in either hard copy or electronic form, covering time intervals as chosen by the customer.

#### Which countries do we monitor?

Africa: Angola, Burundi, DRC/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia

Asia: Afghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Caucasus region, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro

Middle East: Palestine